Journey of the phoenix : Overseas study and women's changing position in China by Kajanus, Anni
JOURNEY OF THE PHOENIX
Overseas study and women’s changing position in China
Anni Kajanus
Research Series in Anthropology
University of Helsinki
Academic dissertation
Research Series in Anthropology
University of Helsinki, Finland
Distributed by 
Unigrafia
P.O. Box 4 (Vuorikatu 3 A)
00014 University of Helsinki
ISSN 1458-3186
ISBN 978-952-10-9703-4 (paperback)
ISBN 978-952-10-9704-1 (PDF)
Unigrafia 2014
CONTENTS
List of Tables
Acknowledgements
INTRODUCTION! 1
Migration and the patrilineal family! 2
Gendering student migration! 4
Migrant subjectivities! 5
Five discourses! 9
Cosmopolitanism! 11
Geography of power! 15
In the field! 16
1. AFFECTED MOBILITY! 25
The self, the family and the state! 26
The caring subject! 33
The enterprising subject! 42
The desiring subject! 45
Conclusion! 50
2. COSMOPOLITICAL EDUCATION! 51
International education market! 53
Destination country policies! 56
Chinese student migration! 59
Chinese education system as a push factor! 65
Graduate job market! 74
Conclusion! 75
3. JOURNEYS ON THE FIRST MOUNTAIN! 77
The benefits of studying abroad! 78
Personal characteristics! 82
Family background and power geometry! 85
Shifting social location! 90
Cosmopolitan affect! 91
Gendered geographical scales! 94
Conclusion! 103
4. LEFTOVER WOMEN! 105
Béarn bachelors and Chinese leftover women! 105
Good wives, good husbands! 108
Love! 112
Sex! 116
Compromises! 119
Non-compliance! 122
Dating and marrying foreigners! 124
Conclusion! 128
5. COSMOPOLITAN LIVES! 131
Lulu – Cosmopolitan mastery! 132
Jonatan – Reluctant returnee! 140
Nicole – Family ties across distance! 145
Conclusion! 150
6. BEING THE FIRST TO GET RICH! 153
Crossing the fuzzy borders ! 155
New life, new reference group! 162
In the web of care! 165
In the web of affect! 171
Conclusion! 173
CONCLUSIONS! 175
References! 181
Glossary ! 194
Appendix 1! 197
Appendix 2! 199
List of tables
Table 1. Planned care for parents by gender, Aspiring student 
migrants! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 36
Table 2. Planned care for parents by gender, Current student 
migrants! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 37
Table 3. Chinese undergraduate and postgraduate students in 
the UK by gender! ! ! ! ! ! ! 60
Table 4. Students going abroad and returning to China by year! 61
Table 5. Current education system in China!! ! ! 69
Table 6. The rating of the benefits of overseas study by gender, 
Aspiring student migrants ! ! ! ! ! ! 79
Table 7. Never married urban population (>15 years) by gender 
and education level! ! ! ! ! ! ! 101
Acknowledgements
! Before all else I would like to thank all the people in China, UK, 
Finland and Holland who took part in this study, became my teachers and 
friends, shared their lives and experiences, and gave unaccountable forms 
of help and support. Special thanks to Yvette, Vanessa, Fan, John, Liu 
Meiqin and their families. I will always try to learn from your generosity 
and patience.
! My supervisor Karen Armstrong at the Helsinki University had a 
great influence on the initial direction this research took. She has always 
had the right questions to ask to help me work through ideas, find new 
directions and to move forward. Charles Stafford at the LSE has been an 
invaluable guide with his expertise on China, and a great support in his 
kindness and enthusiasm. As scholars and teachers, they continue to be a 
source of inspiration.
! Several teachers, colleagues, fellow students and conference 
participants have also offered their insights and comments of chapter 
drafts. The writing-up seminars at the anthropology departments of the 
Helsinki University and the LSE have both been places of reflection and 
inspiration. At the different stages of this project I have benefited greatly 
from discussions with other China specialists including Stephan 
Feuchtwang, Zai Liang, Huang Jianbo, Li Jin, Wang Jiewen, Fang I-Chieh 
and Elisabeth Engebretsen. I would also like to thank my two pre-
examiners, Susanne Brandstädter and Ellen Oxfeld, for their insightful 
comments and suggestions. Any failures to incorporate their ideas in the 
final work remain mine. 
! I thank my parents, sisters and the rest of my extended family and 
friends, who have spurred me on and given much practical support after 
the little ones came along. Finally I thank Pete, my intrepid companion, 
for sticking by through thick and thin and for wanting me to succeed.
! The fieldwork and writing have been made possible by grants 
from the Finnish Cultural Foundation and Sasakawa Young Leaders 
Fellowship Fund. Hanban scholarship enabled my stay at the Renmin 
University of China, and Joel Toivola Foundation funded my stay at the 
Anthropology Department of the London School of Economics. My most 
sincere thanks for all this support.
INTRODUCTION
! ‘Everyone wants their son to become a dragon and their daughter 
to become a phoenix’ (Wang zi cheng long, wang nü cheng feng) was a 
phrase I often heard from the urban Chinese parents and their student 
children in response to my questions about the parental investment on the 
education of sons and daughters. The mythical creatures, phoenix and 
dragon, connote power and distinction, the implication being that 
regardless of the sex of the child, every parent wants their only child to 
succeed. The beautiful and graceful phoenix is associated with femininity 
and the dragon, being the symbol of heavenly and worldly power, with 
masculinity. Here in short is my argument. The educational achievement 
of the daughters and sons of urban single-child Chinese families is equally 
supported by their parents. This is evident when looking at parents who 
are willing to take on the considerable financial burden of sponsoring 
their child’s overseas study. In the past four decades, the proportion of 
women in the student migration flow has increased fivefold, marking a 
clear change to the previous focus on investing in the future of sons. But 
despite the relatively equal access to resources and support, the cultural 
models of gender, that is, what women and men are in essence, influence 
the ways success is defined and pursued. This results in the paradox that 
women’s educational and professional success is supported in some 
contexts and not in others, or to put it another way, women as daughters are 
supported to succeed, but women as wives and mothers are not. The gendered 
models for familial roles and obligations, success and security shape the 
experiences and the choices of the young student migrants, but in turn, 
their cosmopolitan engagements become part of the transformation of the 
social and moral landscape of China (Yan 2011). Now let us trace the way 
back to the questions behind this argument, and the reasons for asking 
them in the first place.  
Migration and the patrilineal family
!
! Across the research on historical and contemporary migration 
flows originating from China (for a review of the patterns see Wang 1991), 
a relatively consistent image of the migrant and his culturally defined 
motivations emerge. From the 19th century coolie migrants (Campbell 
1923; Kung 1962; McKenzie 1925; Mei 1979; Shen 1970; Stewart 1951; Zo 
1978), to the traders in Southeast Asia (Fitzgerald 1965; Skeldon 1996; 
Purcell 1965; Skinner 1950; Suryadinata 1985); from the Republican period 
educated sojourners (Harrell 1992; Orleans 1988) to the reform era labour 
migrants to the US and Europe (Benton and Pieke 1998; Chin 1999; Liang 
2001; Pieke and Mallee 1999; Pieke et al. 2004); and to the cosmopolitan 
business men (Ong 1999, 2006), the Chinese migrant is male, and his 
ventures abroad are partly aimed at fulfilling his role as a son, a husband 
and a father in the patrilineal and patriarchal kinship system. By remitting 
money and investing in home-place projects he fulfils his filial duty not 
only to the family, but also to the motherland. Taking up the strategy of 
migration that is high in risk, cost, and hopefully returns, is also in line 
with the gender model that assigns the male gender with existential 
qualities (Kopytoff 1990) of physical and mental strength, autonomy and 
aggression (Evans 1995: 371-2). In line with their existential gender 
qualities: physical and mental weakness, responsiveness and altruism 
(Evans 1995: 371-2), women play the supporting roles in Chinese 
migration. They are the left-behind wives who care for the parents-in-law, 
the children and the households. Some achieve mobility through the 
initiative of others, when they follow their husbands or parents abroad. A 
notable exception is marriage migration, which is initiated by women who 
move abroad to marry foreign nationals (see the edited volume Constable 
2005a). But even though women are the initiators of these flows, their 
migration is still largely in line with the central cultural models of kinship 
and gender in China, patrilineality and patriarchy. They marry ‘out’ of 
their natal families, and they marry ‘up’ according to the logic of global 
hypergamy.
! However, while in Amsterdam conducting research for my 
master’s degree in 2006, I came across a group of Chinese migrants who, 
almost invisible in the scholarly work on Chinese migration, seemed to 
challenge the compliance between mobility and cultural models of kinship 
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and gender. The young mainland Chinese women who had come to the 
Netherlands to study were there not to support a (male) family member, 
or to work for the greater good of the family. They were the daughters of 
urban single-child families, and their parents were spending their life 
savings to support their overseas study. These young women articulated 
their migration in terms of personal goals and interests: career ambitions, 
desire to see the world and to experience different cultures, to be free and 
independent. Many of them had no intention of returning to China. Some 
had Dutch boyfriends and planned to marry, others hoped to remigrate to 
even more desirable destinations such as UK or US, after graduation. 
! There are a few historical reviews of Chinese students in the US 
(Orleans 1988; Ling 1997, 1998) that also deal with women. These accounts 
address time periods before the ‘overseas study fever’, when student 
migration was still mainly a strategy of a few elite families, the number of 
women student migrants was very small, and many of them were spouses 
of male student migrants. After the start of this project, student migration 
has gained more scholarly interest (e.g. Fong 2011; Nyíri 2006; Waters 
2005, 2008; Xiang and Shen 2009). None of these works, however, deals 
with the parental investment in the overseas education of their only child 
in the context of the cultural models of kinship and gender. Sending sons 
abroad to study makes sense in terms of the patrilineal, patrilocal and 
patriarchal principles of Chinese kinship. A son is responsible for caring 
for his parents in old age and parents thus benefit from his success and 
rely on it. Daughters, on the other hand, become part of their husband’s 
family upon marriage and are responsible for performing in practice 
much of the care their husband owes to his own parents. According to this 
logic, parents can expect no direct return for their investment in their 
daughter’s future. But as the family planning policies have made a single 
child the norm in urban areas (Mueggler 2001: 292-98), parental support 
for daughters’s education and future has increased to an extent that there 
appears to be little difference between sons and daughters (Fong 2004; 
Tsui and Rich 2002; Zheng 2000). 
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Gendering student migration
! The findings of my research support this view. Urban parents are 
willing to go into great lengths to ensure their only child, a daughter or a 
son, will get a share of the newly available wealth of the country. This 
development is reflected in the increased investment in daughters’ 
education abroad. By 2000, when the first generation of singletons had 
reached the age of entering higher education, women had come to 
constitute half of the student migrant flow to the UK (Table 3). In my LSE 
survey, 94% of the female students received funding for their studies from 
their parents, for the male students the figure was 88%. The ‘problem’ I set 
out to explore in this project can be articulated as ‘How does the recently 
increased familial support for female student migration interact with the 
cultural models of kinship and gender?’ Interaction here points to the 
mutual impact between culture and migration. First, my aim is to offer an 
insight into the transformation of the social and moral landscape of China, 
and the role migration plays in the changing family and gender dynamics. 
Second is to look at how cultural models shape the migration flow and the 
experiences of migrants. In other words, what makes the student 
migration specifically Chinese?
! To understand these mutually constitutive dynamics, we need to 
look at all three aspects of migration flows: the structural context that 
facilitates migration by enabling and driving people to look for 
opportunities elsewhere; the cultural models that shape the form the 
mobility takes and the way it is viewed and experienced; and the role of 
individual choice and manoeuvring. Chinese student migration is clearly 
embedded in the transformations of the Chinese society and culture in the 
past three decades, which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 1. In 
brief, student migration has responded to the economic needs and desires 
of both, the country and the people. The reform era governments have 
promoted the internationalisation of education as one of the keys to the 
country’s development. For individual families and students, overseas 
education has given opportunities for career development, higher 
earnings and accumulation of capitals (financial, social and cultural) 
outside the national politico-economic borders. The main destination 
countries, as well as the international education industry with its various 
agents, brokers and institutions, have generally been eager to 
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accommodate the needs and  the fees of the student migrants. The policy 
changes in China and the destinations countries, as well as the economic 
trends in both national and global levels, have effected periodic 
fluctuations in the flow. Apart from these structural developments, the 
sociocultural changes of the recent decades have given Chinese student 
migration its character. The increase of youth autonomy, consumerism, the 
rise of individualism and women’s changed position in the society and in 
the family, are all directly linked to student migration (Jankowiak 1995; 
Kleinman et al. 2011; Rofel 2007; Whyte 2003; Yan 2003, 2009, 2011). 
Migrant subjectivities
! To analyse the dynamics of migrant experience, I employ the 
concept of subjectivity, which encompasses structural conditions, cultural 
models and individual reflexivity (some would say agency). I take Sherry 
Ortner’s (2005) view that culture, as a set of models, meanings and 
dispositions shared by a historically situated group of people (i.e. within 
particular structural conditions), is simultaneously collective and 
subjective, constitutive of people’s subjectivity and reflected upon by 
them. Cultural formations are thus powerful constituents of people’s 
subjectivities, but at the same time, they are rarely internalised in full. She 
argues:
I said earlier that I take people to be “conscious” in the sense 
of being at least partially “knowing subjects,” self-aware and 
reflexive. Subjectivities are complex because they are culturally 
and emotionally complex, but also because of the ongoing 
work of reflexivity, monitoring the relationship of the self to 
the world. No doubt there are cultural subjects who fully 
embody, in the mode of power, the dominant culture (“Davos 
Man”), and no doubt there are cultural subjects who have been 
fully subjected, in the mode of powerlessness, by the dominant 
culture. By and large, however, I assume at the most 
fundamental level that for most subjects, most of the time, this 
never fully works, and there are countercurrents of subjectivity 
as well as of culture (2005: 59).
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! Change and transformation are central to Ortner’s notions of 
culture and subjectivity. New modes of power, often originating in 
economic and political transformations, come to be embedded in the 
cultural formations that are central to the subjects’ positioning and self-
positioning in the world. In China, perhaps the most important of these 
cultural formations has been the family, or the kinship system. The 
importance of the particularistic ties of kinship in determining a person’s 
status, identity and role in both public and private domains has continued 
(although not unaffected) across various structural transformations during 
the past century. Each of them has left a mark to the relations of power 
and attachment in the family, from the rise of conjugality during the 
collectivist era to the rise of the desiring individual in the reform era 
(Kleinman et al. 2011; Rofel 2007; Yan 2003, 2009, 2011). I will thus begin 
the study of the student migrants’ subjectivity within the domain of the 
family. As Yanagisako and Collier (1987) and more recently Carsten (2004) 
have argued, kinship and gender are often mutually constituted cultural 
formations, and the study of one should include the other. I treat them not 
as separate domains but as two perspectives on the same set of issues that 
concern human relatedness. The recent transformation of the Chinese 
family system, which has followed from the one child policy and other 
reform era transformations (urbanisation, market capitalism, 
consumerism), has critical implications for the cultural model of gender.
! Cultural formations are models that inform the subject on an 
abstract level, they do not determine actions on a practical level. They 
form an ethical discourse against which moral dilemmas of lived 
experience are reflected; explaining, justifying and motivating actions and 
relating a person to the world. To conceptualise the relationship of an 
acting subject to these abstract models, to see how they are 
intersubjectively produced and enacted, and to bring them to the level of 
lived experience, I turn to the concept of affect. Of its various recent 
theoretical deployments, I find Richard and Rudnyckyj’s (2009) concept 
‘economies of affect’ particularly useful. This Foucauldian ‘economy’ 
refers to a zone where certain types of subjects are produced through 
affective attachments and enactments. Affects are thus not only the 
emotional impacts other people, landscapes, encounters and objects have 
on individuals and groups (Stewart 2007; Navaro-Yashin 2009) but a form 
of subjectification (Richard and Rudnyckyj 2009; see also Muehlebach 
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2011).  Family is a site of strong affective attachments and it is through 
these ties of affect that cultural formations become alive; in other words, 
the models of kinship and gender become part of the student migrant 
experience. It is precisely to emphasise the impact emotions have, and the 
way the emotions are produced in the cycles of care in the family, that I 
have chosen to use affect instead of emotion, feeling, passion or other 
similar concepts. Affect is not an inner state outwardly expressed, but a 
relationship of sentimental nature that has an impact, thus being 
inherently reflexive and intersubjective (Richard and Rudnyckyj 2009). 
! For most modern populations, the economy of affect is a single 
zone where the self, the family and the state form a continuum of 
government. In the case of China, the state tries to forge affective 
attachments with the student migrants by instilling in them a sense of 
filial nationalism (Fong 2011). Even more importantly, it directly 
influences the affective ties within the family through various policies that 
have, sometimes unintentionally, resulted in the recent transformations of 
the intergenerational, conjugal and gender relations. Apart from the 
affective ties with the parents, sexual and romantic affect is central to the 
experiences of the student migrants, who are in the age group that has 
recently started dating or are hoping to marry soon. I consider the sexual 
and romantic ties of affect as part of the domain of ‘family’ in the 
continuum of government. They include not only romantic and sexual 
relationships, but powerful fantasies about an ideal relationship and a 
partner. Finding a compromise between fantasy and reality often involves 
reflexive work on the various models of kinship and gender the student 
migrants are invested in.
! To put it simply, affect refers to relationships practised between 
individuals, not to the experience of the individual per se. Cultural 
models are enacted in these relationships, thus becoming constitutive of 
the subjectivity of the individual, i.e. her of his modes of perception, 
desires and anxieties (Ortner 2005). Two important points follow from this 
conceptualisation. First, particular types of affect enable particular types 
of subjectivities. In order to understand the subjectivities of the Chinese 
student migrants and the global connections that emerge from this flow, 
we must look at the ties of affect they have with the Chinese state and 
with their families, and moreover, how the state influences the affective 
ties within families. Second, locating agency in the reflexive quality of 
Introduction
7
affect, and thus subjectivity, removes its problematic association with 
individual autonomy, freedom and resistance. As Saba Mahmood (2005) 
has argued, having agency does not equal to exercising free will. More 
precisely, freedom is always of a historically specific kind, defining the 
techniques of the self through which agency is exercised (Laidlaw 2002, 
drawing from Foucault). The systems of power are multiple, and we thus 
need to be careful when defining people’s actions as resistance. When a 
Chinese student migrant claims that her filiality towards her parents is 
best performed by pursuing personal success and happiness, should this 
be seen as a manifestation of the waning patriarchy and generational 
hierarchy, or as the result of the rise of the neoliberalist individualism and 
market-driven consumerism? Agency that reflects upon and acts against 
one system of power is often embedded in another power system, not in 
some mythical autonomy of the individual (Mahmood 2005). As a result, 
groups of people have subjectivities that are partly shared but never 
exactly the same. 
! In China, power systems include for example the hierarchies of 
gender and generation, regional and economic stratification and the 
political system. In the case of the student migrants, cosmopolitan 
resources, and cosmopolitanism itself as a resource, can be added to the 
list. Because of their cosmopolitan engagements, i.e. engagements with the 
power systems of other cultures and societies, as well as a ‘cosmopolitan 
competence’ (see Friedman 1994; Hannerz 1990) they develop to varying 
degrees, student migrants are at the forefront of many sociocultural 
transformations in China. Pierre Bourdieu (2007) has called a similar 
process in post-war France a ‘unification of symbolic markets’, when 
women and landless men from rural Béarn started to migrate into cities. 
As a result, the value systems of the rural and urban societies became 
unified in a way that devalued the peasant way of life and shifted the 
rural power hierarchies. Bourdieu’s focus is the changing marriage 
market, and I will take up his work again in my discussion of the student 
migrants and the Chinese marriage market in Chapter 5. Here I want to 
borrow his more general insight that the unification of symbolic markets is 
not a process that encompasses the society as a whole, but takes place 
through countless individual journeys. Each individual must negotiate the 
conflicts of different symbolic systems in her or his personal experience. 
For the student migrants conflicts between different ideas about kinship 
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and gender arise when they try to combine personal interests, hopes and 
ambitions with the gendered models of filiality and success. The conflicts 
can take the form of personal anxiety when individuals are invested in 
more than one symbolic system and must act against one; or become 
conflicts between people, often the student migrant and her or his parents, 
about the terms of familial responsibility (gendered forms of support that 
flow between parents and the child), the parents’ expectations and 
personal aspirations (what subject to study, where to work and live, 
whom to marry, etc.). 
Five discourses
! I have identified five major discourses that the student migrants 
commonly draw from in their negotiations of the conflicts. They are: 
patrilineality, patriarchy, gender equality, filiality of daughters, and 
romantic love. The cultural model of patrilineality still has strength as an 
ethical discourse that can be used, or sometimes very consciously 
manipulated, to evaluate and articulate lived realities. But as its 
institutionalised forms: patrilineal inheritance, ancestor worship and 
patrilocality, are not held up by many urban families, it can be de-
emphasised to the extent that other discourses take precedence. Patriarchy 
is a more general model of male supremacy that includes patrilineage and 
its institutions. It also encompasses the existential, asymmetrical and 
hierarchical gender model. At times it is used as a rationale for a natural 
order of things, as when used as an explanation for gender discrimination 
in the job market. At other times, it is held up as an ideal model that needs 
to be completed through appropriate social action, for example through 
hypergamous marriages. 
! A gender equality discourse was part and parcel of the Maoist 
project of liberation that  aimed, and by and large succeeded, to 
universalise women’s participation in education and non-domestic work 
(Bauer et al. 1992; Lin 2001; Entwistle et al. 1995), and to end the ‘feudalist’ 
practices of arranged marriage, concubinage, etc. (Evans 1995; Jacka 1990). 
In the reform era (post-1978), the state propagated model of gender 
equality has been linked to the larger project for population quality (suzhi) 
that the family planning policies are part of (Greenhalgh and Winckler 
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2005; see also Kipnis 2009; Mueggler 2001). The rationale is that fewer 
children will result in a better nurtured, educated, and healthier 
population. Campaigns that promote the value of daughters through 
ideological teaching and negative and positive incentives have supported 
the project, most recently the ‘Care for Girls’ campaign that combats the 
alarmingly high sex ratio in some regions (Shang, Li and Feldman 2012).
! The discourse about the filial daughters is used to emphasise their 
value to parents through claiming that daughters are in fact more filial 
than sons, because they love their parents more. This discourse draws 
from two sources: the change in intergenerational power dynamics and 
the cultural gender model. Firstly, as Martin King Whyte (2003: 7) has 
pointed out, the notion of filiality includes both the divine obligation and 
the built up emotional attachment. In the recent decades, the emphasis has 
shifted from the former to the latter. Women, through their existential 
gender identities are considered (and thus taught and expected) to be 
more caring and altruistic than men. Men’s relationships with their 
parents, in contrast, have been more mediated by their formal patrilineal 
attachments and obligations. As familial obligations and formal filiality 
have lost weight with the rise of the desiring individual (Rofel 2007; Yan 
2011) and decline of the patrilocality and ancestor worship in urban 
China, the filiality of the child is seen to a growing effect to result from the 
degree of emotional attachment the parents manage to cultivate in the 
child (Kleinman et al. 2011; Yan 2003). The building of such attachment is 
considered easier, or more precisely, more natural, between parents and a 
daughter than a son. The idea of the more filial daughters have thus 
emerged, often used by parents and daughters to articulate their feelings, 
experiences and choices.
! The discourse of romantic love is used to negotiate conflicts that 
evolve around dating, marriage and sexual relations. With the growing 
emphasis on individuality and desire, the idealisation of love and 
romance has become central to the experience of the urban youth. It is 
often set against the more instrumental rationale of a ‘proper match’, 
which conforms to the hierarchies of gender and class and is a powerful 
model in the marriage market.
! These discourses are used in conflicts that evolve around parent-
child relations, cycles of familial support, choices about study, work and 
place of residence, and about dating and marriage partners and sexual 
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relations. They can all be used in ways that contest or conform to systems 
of power. For example, young women often use the patrilineal and 
patriarchal discourses to claim independence from familial control and 
obligations, and the discourses of gender equality and filiality of 
daughters to claim a valuable role in that cycle. Some of these discourses 
are considered more traditional than others, but this does not mean that 
the newer discourses are always associated with progress. For example, 
the parents of the students often criticised the contemporary youth for 
being materialistic and practical in their attitudes towards marriage. They 
contrasted this with their own youth (for most in the late 1970s and 
during the 1980s) when relationships were based on love with little 
concern for other factors. The complexity and creativity in the ways these 
discourses are used will become clear in the following chapters.
! The discourses of patrilineality, patriarchy and filial daughters rest 
mainly on Chinese systems of power, while the discourses of gender 
equality and romantic love combine elements of Chinese and foreign 
systems. The foreign elements become part of the changing Chinese moral 
landscape through cosmopolitan engagements. The student migrants, 
through their personal processes of adaptation and alienation, play a 
central role in the wider process of the partial unification of symbolic 
markets that is going on in China. Their journeys are motivated, shaped 
and restricted by a very particular kind of structural context in which the 
politico-economic trajectories of the Chinese state and the destination 
countries are connected by the international education market. In this 
market the rhetoric of cosmopolitan education covers the interests of 
various states and other agents, including educational institutions, agents, 
brokers, supranational institutions (World Bank, WTO, UNESCO and 
OECD), etc. Let us now turn to the concept of cosmopolitanism and how I 
use it to analyse the trajectories of the student migrants, their parents, the 
different states involved, and the international education industry. 
Cosmopolitanism
! Of the various terms that refer to internationally mobile persons 
and their attachments to different places (transnational, international, 
cross-border, cross-cultural, etc.), I have chosen to use ‘cosmopolitan’, as it 
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encompasses both the fact of mobility (of people, but also of things and 
ideas) and its ideological connotations. For the young Chinese student 
migrants and their families, cosmopolitan subjectivity is something to be 
desired, and achieved through conscious effort. The Chinese state 
promotes the training of ‘talents’ (rencai) through overseas study with its 
policy that is reflected in the slogan ‘Support overseas study, encourage 
people to return, give freedom to come and go’ (Zhichi liuxue, guli hui guo, 
lai qu ziyou). What does being cosmopolitan mean, then, to these different 
agents?  Nothing, in a sense that it was not a term used by my informants 
or the Chinese state in this context. But as an analytical concept, it 
encompasses the various identities, dispositions, desires, skills and 
abilities that stem from the international encounters of student migration. 
! The concept of cosmopolitan brings together the desiring, the 
enterprising and the caring aspects of the Chinese student migrant 
subjectivity, which I will outline in detail in Chapter 1. The association of 
certain places with ideals of modernity, freedom, wealth and adventure, or 
what I call the ‘geography of desire’, following Sarah Mahler and Patricia 
Pessar’s (2001; Pessar and Mahler 2003) concept ‘geography of power’, 
motivates students to pursue an access to these places. An access is gained 
through individual enterprising to acquire the credentials, skills and 
resources that are required for successful manoeuvring in these privileged 
spaces (e.g., Western countries, China-based foreign and multinational 
companies). The cycle of familial care facilitates the pursuit of these 
resources, as the student migrants often rely on their parents’ sponsorship. 
The paradox is that while supporting a child’s cosmopolitan quest can 
give her or him better material means to return the care to the parents in 
old age, the physical mobility that often follows raises barriers to the 
effective return of emotional care, which in fact is considered more 
important by many urban parents. This is one of the many potential 
interruptions in the cycle of familial care that the student migrants and 
their parents must negotiate.
! Of the different conceptualisations of the term listed by Vertovec 
and Cohen (2002), cosmopolitanism as a ‘mode of orientation to the 
world’ (see Hannerz 1990) and as a ‘set of competencies’ (see Friedman 1994) 
best describe the goals of the student migrants and their parents. Some 
students and parents view cosmopolitan competency in utilitarian terms, 
as a cultural capital that can be converted into other forms. For others, 
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cosmopolitan orientation is something more abstract, a widening of 
horizons, a form of self-development and fulfilment that has value in 
addition to its practical benefits. In her study of Chinese student 
migration, Vanessa Fong (2011) similarly found that the motivation of the 
students involves both the concrete benefits and a desire to step into a 
wider field of action and opportunities. She explains this cosmopolitan 
pursuit in terms of trying to acquire a ‘developed world citizenship’ that 
she divides into ‘legal’ (the legal rights of residency, work and 
citizenship), ‘social’ (the status that gives access to a certain level of 
services, prestige and comfort), and ‘cultural’ (the sense of belonging and 
its recognition by others). I want to emphasise that the degree to which 
the students and their parents view the cosmopolitan pursuit in terms of 
skills and competency or a mode of orientation to the world varies, which 
results in conflicts between them. Moreover, their perspectives and 
motivations change throughout the process. Chapters 3, 5 and 6 explore 
the different ideas about the aims, benefits and disadvantages of the 
overseas study and the conflicts that emerge between the student 
migrants and their parents.
! The processes of adaptation and alienation the student migrants 
experience, and their particular way of inhabiting physical and 
sociocultural space, reflect a cosmopolitan ‘socio-cultural condition’ (see 
Appadurai 1996). This cosmopolitan condition is produced by three types 
of travel: physical, imaginative (via media images) and virtual (via 
information technology) (Szerszynski and Urry 2006), thus involving not 
only the people who move, but also many who stay put: family members, 
students who wish to move but are not able to, and students who have the 
means to move but choose not to. The imaginative and virtual modes of 
travel are significant in fuelling the desire for migration and 
cosmopolitanism. They play a key role in constructing the geography of 
desire by linking locations with imageries of backwardness or progress, 
stagnation or opportunity, dependence or independence, and hardship or 
luxury. Physical travel produces the power dynamics of the cosmopolitan 
sociocultural condition. The student migrants partially relate to several 
physical locations and socioeconomic fields, and their positioning vis-à-
vis the various power systems shifts with their mobility. 
! The international education market and China’s engagement in it 
is best understood in terms of cosmopolitanism as a ‘political project to 
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build transnational institutions’ (see Kaldor 1996), although it must be noted 
that this is a project as much driven by economic as political interests.1 
This will be discussed in Chapter 2.
! It should be clear by now that even though I use cosmopolitanism 
as a concept to explore ideals and desires that may connote universalism, 
detachment and freedom, my use is far from the Kantian universalist 
philosophical sense. I take as a starting point that ‘actually 
existing’ (Malcomson 1998) cosmopolitanism is always culturally and 
politically rooted and particular (e.g., Cohen 1992; Cheah 1998; Ong 1999, 
2006; Werbner 2006), a mode of attachment rather than detachment (e.g., 
Ong 1999; 2006; Robbins 1998), can involve the underprivileged as much 
as the privileged (e.g., Abbas 2002; Clifford 1992; Mardsen 2008), and the 
mobiles as much as the immobiles (e.g., Notar 2008). 
! Cosmopolitanism characterises all three aspects of Chinese student 
migration. The individual student migrants hope to gain cosmopolitan 
competency and orientation through migration. For some it means 
becoming a cosmopolitan subject, a person who feels and can act with 
confidence in transnational settings and has the same range of 
opportunities as the citizens of developed countries (fada guojia). For 
others the most important benefit is not the competence in transnational 
settings, but the prestige such competence might bring them in China, and 
the advantage it could give in the extremely competitive domestic labour 
market. The second aspect of the dynamics of the Chinese student 
migration, the structural context, is cosmopolitan in a sense that at its 
centre is the international education market, from which different 
institutions and nation states try to benefit. Finally, the cultural formations 
that forge student migrant subjectivities are not static. Through their 
cosmopolitan encounters the student migrants engage in a wider range of 
power systems, e.g., different discourses of gender. By bringing these 
discourses into the parent-child relations, and the relations of romantic 
and sexual affect, they are participating in the unification of symbolic 
markets between China and their destination countries. Moreover, their 
very mode of existence can be described as cosmopolitan, in the sense that 
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(see Beck 1998); and as a political project to recognise multiple identities (see Held 
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they are able to manipulate social and geographical distance in their 
engagements with different sociocultural fields.
Geography of power
! Finally, I will use Mahler and Pessar’s (2001) concept ‘gendered 
geographies of power’ to highlight the relationship between power 
systems and spatial mobility. Their basic premise is that individuals are 
situated within power hierarchies that are not of their own making and 
limit their actions. Their positioning in the hierarchies of gender, race, 
nationality, ethnicity, generation and sexuality constitute their social 
location at a particular physical location. At times I drop out the 
‘gendered’ prefix, as many aspects of student migration are not influenced 
by gender and other hierarchies can be more relevant. The positioning of 
individuals in the various hierarchies shifts with their physical mobility 
across geographical scales, and the hierarchies intersect in complex ways. 
For example, the student migrants’ positioning in the generational 
hierarchy can change through migration, as they gain a higher degree of 
autonomy from parental control though spatial and sociocultural distance. 
But at the same time, their status in the hierarchies of nationality and race 
may decrease as they become aliens in another country. Moreover, a shift 
in one hierarchy can influence the positioning in another. For example, the 
requirement of the proof of financial resources and the restrictions for 
work that are imposed on non-nationals in the destination countries, can 
increase the dependency of the student migrants on their parents support. 
In this example, the hierarchies of generation and nationality, or in 
Mahmood’s (2005) terms, power systems, intersect in a way that the 
parental power over the student does not necessarily decrease, but 
changes its form. 
! I have outlined the conceptual framework for encompassing the 
three elements: structural conditions, cultural models and individual 
agency, in the analysis of the dynamics of Chinese student migration. In 
the first two chapters I will outline the structural and the cultural contexts 
of this migration flow, and devote the final four chapters to the 
exploration of the strategies and the experiences of migrants and their 
families. 
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In the field
! The main part of the data for this project was collected during 
seventeen months of fieldwork in China from September 2008 to February 
2010. I chose Beijing as my base, as it is a major source of Chinese overseas 
student migration, as well as a major destination of the domestic student 
migration. I enrolled as a part-time language student in a private language 
school, which arranged my visa for the first eleven months. For the last 
seven months I was a language student at the Renmin University of 
China. I had started this research project in Europe, and the Chinese 
students I knew in Amsterdam and in Helsinki provided me with some 
initial contacts in Beijing. For the first 11 months of fieldwork I shared a 
flat with Hannah, a recent graduate with plans to go abroad to study, and 
for the last seven months, I shared a room with a Chinese undergraduate 
student at the Renmin University dormitory. The social networks of the 
informants were not bound to a single locale. I met their classmates, 
friends, colleagues and partners when accompanying them to shopping 
centres, restaurants, bars, KTVs (karaoke), cafes, the gym, the library, the 
cinema, match-making events, concerts and art exhibitions. I met their 
families and relatives when I visited their homes, or if they no longer lived 
with their parents, when accompanying them on a home visit.
! I took as my starting point that migration is a process during 
which aims, interests, and dispositions change. I thus wanted to include 
young people (and their parents) who had a vague dream of going 
abroad, who were actively making plans and arrangements, who were 
currently studying abroad, or who had graduated and were either living 
in China or abroad. For the purposes of clarity, I refer to all these young 
people as ‘student migrants’, sometimes using the specifying prefixes 
‘aspiring’, ‘current’ and ‘returned’. For those who have studied abroad 
and currently live in China, I use the term ‘returnee’, regardless of their 
future plans that range from permanent settlement in China to a 
remigration, or back and forth movement between China and other 
destinations. 
! In China my group of key informants consisted of nine families 
and 25 individual student migrants whose parents I did not meet. Of 
these, 21 were aspiring student migrants, 13 were returnees, 23 were 
women and 11 were men. I also got to know well two sets of parents with 
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a child, who I never met, studying abroad. Some of these key informants I 
became closer to than others, but with all of them I spent time in informal 
settings, as well as sitting down for semi-structured interviews at some 
point of our acquaintance.
! I have used some of the material I gathered in Amsterdam for my 
master’s dissertation on the social, cultural, political and economic 
connections between the different groups of Chinese migrants. This 
included interview data with seven current student migrants, and 
fieldnotes from my participation in formal (recruitment events and 
festivals) and informal social events (meals, house parties) with Chinese 
student migrants. I have supplemented the data on current student 
migrants after my return from China to Europe, by interviewing 13 
student migrants in the UK and eight in Finland and by taking part in 
formal and informal social events. Some of the friendships developed in 
the course of this research have now lasted for several years, and during 
this time students have migrated back and forth between China and other 
locations. I have thus been able to take part in the lives of some of them in 
different countries, as I have myself moved back and forth between 
Holland, Finland, China and UK. I have also kept in contact with 19 of the 
key informants via email, instant messaging, text messaging and social 
networking websites. 
! My account and analysis of the Chinese student migration relies 
most heavily on the data gathered from the interactions with these 86 
people, who include male and female student migrants at all different 
stages of the migration process and their parents. I have met numerous 
other people in the context of this project, many of them also student 
migrants and parents, with whom I have discussed issues relevant to this 
research. These discussions ranged from a few exchanged words to 
semiformal interviews. Many times I was not a participant, but an 
observer in the discussions. I have not recorded the number of these 
people, who are friends, relatives, acquaintances, colleagues and fellow 
students of the key informants, participants in events organised for 
student migrants, or in some other way connected to the social setting in 
question, but they number several hundred.
! For the semi-structured interviews I used a rough list of topics of 
discussion. With most informants, the interview/s (usually more than 
one) took place after some time of knowing each other, but in some cases 
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the interview worked as a way to establish initial contact, which then built 
into a long-term friendship. The duration of the interviews ranged from 
one hour to five hours. Most were either recorded with my mobile phone 
recorder, or I took notes by hand during them. In some cases (e.g. when 
interviewing while taking a long walk with an informant) I did not record 
or take notes during an interview, but wrote notes immediately after the 
meeting. At complicated settings and events such as calendrical festivals, 
family celebrations, weddings, funerals, trips, fairs and exhibitions, I took 
pictures and made short video recordings that have later served as 
memory cues. I have also used photographs and video recordings in 
interviews to get clarifications on some aspects of rituals and events. I 
collected commercial and promotional materials (e.g., from overseas 
studies agencies, education institutions, match-making events). I collected 
news and stories from newspapers and magazines relating to the themes 
of my research, and followed internet discussion forums (Tianya, Mop, 
Sina), video sharing websites (Youku, Tudou, 56.com), social networking 
sites (Weib and Renren), and QQ (instant messenger that also hosts 
profiles, blogs, a discussion forum, etc.) that are popular among the urban 
youth.
! I have also interviewed representatives of the different institutions 
of the international education industry. Many of these interviews I 
conducted at the 14th China International Education Exhibition Tour 
(CIEET) in March 2009 at the Beijing’s Guomao centre. Others were 
individually arranged with overseas study agencies, university professors, 
English teachers and promoters in China. These interviewees include: 
eight representatives of overseas study agencies, five university promoters 
(US, UK, Canada, the Netherlands), two high school promoters (UK, US), 
a promoter of preparatory courses for universities (US), a promoter of 
Erasmus Mundus programme, a representative of the Mayor of London 
Office, three English teachers in China, the President of the Chinese 
Students and Scholars Association (CSSA) in Amsterdam, and three 
Chinese university professors involved in the international education 
exchanges of their institutions.
! Additionally, I carried out two surveys to get quantitative data on 
the themes of my research, one at the Renmin University of China 
(n=427)2, and one among the Chinese students at the London School of 
Introduction
18
2 See Appendix 1 for details.
Economics (n=203)3. My main Chinese sources of statistical data have 
been the National Bureau of Statistics of China and the China Scholarship 
Council (affiliated with the Ministry of Education). However, I was not 
able to find, or to gain access to, Chinese statistics on the key issue of this 
research: the proportion of female and male students in the student 
migration flow. I thus had to resort to using data from one of the main 
destination countries. I used the statistics on the Chinese students in the 
UK, provided by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) and the 
UK Data Archive for Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS). UK has 
been among the top destinations for Chinese student migration 
throughout the reform period. The UK statistics thus provide a reliable 
indication for the trends in the sex ratio. 
LIMITATIONS
! At the centre of this study are the individual student migrants. The 
reason for this is in part methodological and in part the nature of the 
phenomena that is studied. My main informants were women and men 
mostly in their twenties, who had either recently moved away from their 
families (and their home-places), or had lived an independent life for 
several years. Most were yet to marry and none had children. This time of 
their life, when the families no longer lived together and were yet to have 
grandchildren, was a phase of relatively little contact between the student 
migrants and the parents. Moreover, the centrality of individualism, 
success and desire in the experience of contemporary urban youth means 
that student migration is not primarily a family strategy. The students 
define their migration in terms of self-development and self-fulfilment 
rather than some collective interests of the family. The role of the parents 
is to facilitate and to support, not to benefit from the migration. The 
spatial and sociocultural distance that emerges between the students and 
the parents in the course of migration, and importantly, which is often 
purposefully sought by the students, created methodological problems for 
equally including the perspectives of the students and the parents in this 
study.
! Many of the student migrants I got to know were not originally 
from Beijing. Some of those who were, were reluctant to introduce me to 
their parents. This may be partly due to unwillingness to bother their busy 
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parents with questions and interviews. It also seemed that some student 
migrants considered the issues we talked about: their education and 
career plans, their dating, marriage and future aspirations, as their 
personal concerns and did not wish me to discuss them with their parents. 
In these circumstances, my research became focused on the student 
migrants, rather than on entire families. I was urgently aware that the 
perspective of the student migrants would not be enough to address my 
research questions and tried to alleviate the problem by a few things. I 
accompanied four students on their home visits, each extending from 12 
to 18 days. During these trips to their hometowns or villages, staying with 
their families, I had the opportunity to interview the parents, relatives and 
friends, as well as to observe some of the family dynamics. I also 
purposefully sought out some informants who had family in Beijing. This 
gave a chance for regular meetings with the families through participation 
in family meals and special celebrations. Finally, I included four families 
in my research in which the parents, rather than the students, were my 
main informants. Two of them had a young child still in primary school 
whom they planned to send abroad in the future. The other two had a 
child currently studying abroad. These strategies were aimed at gaining 
more data on the parent’s perspective, but they did not completely erase 
the bias. 
! The tension between the pursuit for independence and the 
practical and financial reliance on the parents is central to the experience 
of the Chinese student migrants. I have therefore chosen to present much 
of my data in the form of stories of individuals, to give insight to this 
tension, the complexity of their subjectivities and to the negotiation of the 
different power systems, of which some are of Chinese and others of 
foreign origin, and still others can be described as cosmopolitan in nature. 
CENTRAL CHARACTERS
! I have chosen a few student migrants whose stories I recurrently 
use to illustrate different themes of the chapters. They differ from each 
other in personal characteristics, family’s status and resources, academic 
performance, parental involvement, and the stage of the migration process 
they are in. Although not covering all the various positions, they offer a 
glimpse to the diversity of the student migrant population, as well as 
serving as examples of some of the common positions. By recounting the 
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stories of these individuals in detail throughout this thesis, they become a 
background against which the references to various other individuals 
become more comprehensible. I will here briefly introduce these central 
characters.
! Jonatan is a 24 year old returnee. His parents are originally from 
Beijing, and with the relative success of his father in real estate and pawn 
business, they could easily support Jonatan’s studies of business 
administration in Austria. Jonatan was not a particularly good student in 
school, and to him, or more precisely to his ambitious father, overseas 
study gave an alternative to the unpromising prospects in the extremely 
competitive Chinese education market. Jonatan’s migrant experience has 
been much influenced by the tensions between him and his authoritative 
father, and by the structural restrictions on his mobility. His pursuit for 
autonomy and adventure has continuously been interrupted by visa 
problems and his father’s ambitions that differ from his own. As Jonatan’s 
family lived in Beijing, I was able to get to know them relatively well. 
! Nicole is the only child of an elite family from a county level city of 
a relatively poor southwestern province. We lived on the same street in 
Beijing and I visited Nicole’s family in her hometown. After my fieldwork 
we both moved to London, where Nicole went to study media and 
broadcasting. Nicole’s parents possess various means to ensure she has 
the best opportunities for a successful future, and they strongly guide her 
towards it. Having received all this support and guidance, Nicole is 
immensely loyal and filial to her parents, listens to their advice and tries 
to fulfil their wishes. At the same time, she has been brought up to 
consider a wealth of opportunities within her horizon, and not 
surprisingly, has developed interests and ambitions that are not in line 
with those of her parents. The careful negotiations that should not 
threaten the family unity thus characterise the relationship between 
Nicole and her parents. Nicole went to good primary and secondary 
schools and was a diligent student. In her case, going abroad to study is 
not a strategy to avoid the competitive domestic market, but to take the 
next step from the national to the international field. Through her family 
background, Nicole is already part of the national elite. Through her 
cosmopolitan quest she encounters a whole range of new opportunities 
and challenges. 
Introduction
21
! I first got to know Lulu in Finland where she studied international 
business. I got to know her family during my fieldwork in China and 
accompanied Lulu on her hometown trip. Our friendship continued after 
my return to Europe. After graduation, Lulu married an English man who 
lives in Finland, and the couple now live and work there. Lulu is the only 
child of a middle-income family from Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan 
province. Lulu’s parents are an example of a family who, despite their 
limited financial resources, are able to send their child abroad because all 
resources can be directed to one child. In addition, the family searched for 
low-cost opportunities for overseas study, and a major motivation for 
choosing Finland was the absence of tuition fees. An average student, 
Lulu could have fared well enough in the Chinese education market, in 
fact she gained access to a university and enrolled on a statistics course. 
Her mother, however, continued to encourage her to go abroad. Her long-
term dream of sending Lulu abroad was more motivated by the wish to 
give her daughter a chance to experience something new and exciting and 
a general hope that this would provide her with some good opportunities, 
than the kind of detailed plans Jonatan’s or Nicole’s parents have for 
them. 
! Hannah is a recent graduate originating from rural Fujian. I shared 
an apartment with her for the first 11 months of fieldwork. She has two 
brothers and is the only one in the family who has received higher 
education. Hannah was a particularly high achieving student in school, 
and with the help of her teachers, managed to persuade her parents to 
first send her to a good middle school, and then to a university. The family 
borrowed money to pay for Hannah’s studies in Beijing, where she 
studied international business in one of the country’s top universities. 
Hannah’s goal is to start her own business, and to study for an MBA in the 
UK. However, after graduation her family’s requests for financial support 
have made it difficult for Hannah to save money for her business ventures 
and studies. In Hannah’s case, the overseas study is not a family project, 
but an individual aspiration she tries to pursue in conflict with her 
family’s interests. It may well be that Hannah is the cosmopolitan who 
never manages to move abroad. The only daughter of a multi-child rural 
family, Hannah’s situation differs greatly from that my urban informants’. 
I have chosen to include her story in this thesis, in fact devote one chapter 
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entirely to it, as it illustrates the tensions between new social practices and 
durable cultural models particularly well. 
NOTE ON THE USE OF LANGUAGE AND NAMES 
! In the interactions with the informants, I have used Mandarin 
Chinese, English and Finnish. Language is an important cosmopolitan 
resource, a marketable skill and a tool of inclusion and exclusion. The 
chosen language of communication in different occasions was thus not 
only a practicality of research but a type of data, and I tried to always 
follow the initiative of the informant in this. Many young people wanted 
to practice their English with me, others used it in the presence of their 
parents for the very reason that the parents could then not understand our 
conversation. Others preferred to use Chinese because it was easier for 
them. Almost all the parents used Chinese. When accompanying students 
on home visits, I interacted with people in Mandarin Chinese, and relied 
on others to translate some of the interactions in the local dialect between 
the family, friends and relatives. Many analytical points raised by the use 
of language are brought up in the following chapters.!
! Similarly, the use of Chinese and English names varied among 
informants and was a conscious act of self-positioning and identification 
among the young cosmopolitans. All young Chinese I met had chosen an 
English language name for themselves, often already in school, and many 
preferred to use that in interactions with foreigners, including me. There 
were also individuals who took the use of their Chinese name as a marker 
of either patriotism or a proper kind of cosmopolitanism. In identifying 
individuals in this work, I have followed their own practice of using either 
a Chinese or an English name. To protect their privacy, all names have 
been changed. 
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1. AFFECTED MOBILITY
! To answer the question of what is specific to the subjectivity of the 
Chinese student migrants, this chapter looks into the power continuum of 
the self, the family and the state, where ties and enactments of affect 
produce particular types of subjectivities. With the retreat of the providing 
state, the waning importance of patrilineage in favour of nuclear family, 
and the rise of the desiring individual, a student migrant subjectivity 
emerges that can be explored through a tripartite model: the caring 
subject, the enterprising subject, and the desiring subject. In China, the 
affective attachments in the family are enacted through the exchange of 
emotional, material and practical care. The state policies have direct 
impact on the way families circulate support. In the reform era China new 
opportunities for socioeconomic mobility have emerged, but people have 
highly unequal access to them. Moreover, as in many transitional societies, 
the dismantling of the services of the communist state has rendered 
people more reliant on familial support and informal networks. The state 
also directly cultivates affective ties with the people, for example through 
nationalist education. As Fong (2011) notes, of the discourses of 
nationalism promoted by the Chinese state, the one that models after the 
filial parent-child relationship has been the most successful. Rather than 
drawing on nationalistic pride based on current achievements and past 
glory, the contemporary Chinese youth are prone to feeling strong 
emotional attachment and filial duty to the state, from which, despite all 
its faults, they can not detach themselves any more than from their 
parents (Fong 2011). But unlike the previous generations who had to 
prove their patriotism through anti-internationalism, the contemporary 
student migrants best demonstrate their filial duty to the state, and to an 
extent to their parents, by becoming successful cosmopolitans who use 
their cosmopolitan resources, skills and competency to the benefit of the 
motherland. Finally, the pursuit for success through individual 
enterprising involves a strong emphasis on individual desire. The desire 
to have and to be is a strong motivation behind the cosmopolitan pursuit of 
the student migrants. These three aspects: care, enterprising and desire, 
which characterise the Chinese student migrant subjectivity, are the source 
of many tensions and ethical dilemmas that will be explored in this 
chapter. I will first outline some of the historical and current 
developments that shape the dynamics between the three parts of the 
economy of affect: the self, the family and the state. 
The self, the family and the state
! On most nights Hannah, my flatmate, returned late from the office. 
We cooked some vegetables and rice for dinner and then sat in front of the 
TV to eat. More often than not, the conversation wandered to one of three 
topics: Hannah’s career plans, her hope to study in the UK, or her search 
for a good, preferably foreign, husband. One night, what started as 
Hannah’s halfhearted commentary on the news report of the US 
presidential election, turned into a critique of the overseas Chinese 
migrants’ relationship with the motherland and their parents.  
Hannah: I don’t like it when Chinese people go abroad, to 
America or to Britain, and just stay there because it’s rich. 
They just think about themselves. Maybe stay there when it’s 
good, and when [the countries] have problems, then just 
return to China. I know some people, my previous flatmates 
and some others, who’ve been born in the US and then their 
parents have sent them to China to learn Chinese language 
and culture. They don’t know anything about China! And they 
can’t speak Chinese! So they come here to discover that they 
are Chinese. 
AK: So what about, if you go to the UK and meet a European 
man and get married?
Hannah: I would like to move back to China. If he is willing to 
come with me, then OK. But if not, then it’s just: sorry, not 
going to last. I will not stay there all my life. Because I think, if 
you stay there, you just think about yourself and how to make 
life better for yourself. But if you return, and have a very 
excellent education, you can work for your country. People 
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will respect you and honour you. Because, you know, your 
country has spent so much on you, on your primary and 
secondary education and everything. Then you don’t know 
how to thank your country! No, I don’t like this, I will not stay 
there forever. […] And also, if I have children, I will hire a 
Chinese teacher for them, to teach Chinese culture and 
language. Because in China, in school, children know how to 
take care of themselves! We have this saying in Chinese, it 
means: if you can’t keep your house in order, how can you 
keep the country in order? The Americans [previous flatmates] 
didn’t know how to clean their rooms! So if you can’t do that, 
how can you organise a big company?  You can’t! The parents 
don’t know how to raise their children! If my children were 
like that, I would say: get out! [...] In America everyone is so 
free. The parents can’t say anything to their children. The 
children just close the door and the parents can’t say anything! 
In China it’s different, until you can make your own living, 
you have to listen to your parents. [...] So it’s like that, America 
has so many problems because if they can’t even clean their 
houses, how can they organise a country.
!
! This quote expresses the ideal connection between the self, the 
family and the state, as well as anxiety over the contradictory processes 
that threaten the harmony. The state nationalistic project promoted in 
schools, which aims to encourage the return of the ‘overseas talents’ to the 
motherland in order to catalyst its development4, filters through to 
Hannah’s narrative. Until the early 20th century, imperial feudalism 
operated largely through the patrilineal kinship system. Its ethical 
counterpart was the Confucian notion of filial piety, which not only 
dictated family hierarchy, but was a model for natural hierarchy of the 
social universe. The relationship of the father and the son was an earthly 
mirror image of the relationship between god and humans, and the 
emperor and the subject; a model for the continuum that organised the 
ancestors and the living, the elders and the youth, and men and women in 
Affected mobility
27
4 See for example Wang (2010, 2011) for China’s National Talent Development 
Plan, which was jointly issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese 
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positions of power and subordination. On the basis of these principles, 
family was idealised as a harmonious microcosmos, a parallel model of 
the empire, and a corporate unit working for the benefit of the whole (for 
a classic account of the Chinese patriliny and the state, see Freedman 1958; 
for a critical review of these early anthropological works within the 
lineage paradigm, see Watson 1986). Hannah uses the analogy of the 
family and the state to highlight the degeneration of the Chinese migrants, 
who have suspended the proper ties of affect with the motherland. Their 
unfiliality to the state repeats, and duplicates, itself in the unfiliality of 
their children towards both, the state and the parents. Hannah’s critique 
has a very familiar ring to anyone with knowledge of the current popular 
discourse of morality in China. Anxiety over the declining filiality and the 
rising individualism, corruption, selfishness and hedonism, all ills 
associated with Westernisation (sometimes Americanisation in particular), 
recur in the media and in conversations with people.  
! The transformation of intrafamilial relations of power and 
attachment started well before the reform era marketisation, urbanisation, 
consumerism and family planning policies. It was already under way in 
the republican China, but took a radical leap during the Maoist socialism 
(from 1949 to the late 1970s). The CCP implemented various policies that 
either directly aimed at, or indirectly supported, dissolving the old 
hierarchies and created new ones based on the ideology of class struggle 
and loyalty to the party-state. The power of the family elders and gender 
inequality were on the list of feudalist traditions to be eliminated. 
Universal education and women’s participation in the labour market were 
promoted with impressive results. The percentage of girls who completed 
primary education increased from 30% in 1955 to 70% in 1958, and 
women’s participation in the workforce increased from around 29% before 
1949 to nearly universal in urban areas in the early 80s (Bauer et al. 1992: 
342, 350). Following the patterns of women’s employment and 
educational attainment throughout the Maoist period to the early reform 
era also shows, however, that women tended to concentrate in positions of 
low pay and low status. In all levels of education, women’s move up to 
the next level was less likely than that of their male counterparts. A 
woman’s chances for higher education were significantly increased if she 
had a highly educated father or no brothers (Bauer et al. 1992: 365). 
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Nevertheless women’s lives changed considerably after the Communist 
Revolution (1949). 
! Some direct measures were also taken to change the gender roles 
within the family. The 1950 Marriage Law prohibited arranged marriages, 
bigamy and concubinage, legalised divorce and set the minimum age for 
marriage at 20 for men and at 18 for women. In general, the family and 
sexual policies of the CCP promoted the idea that common good came 
before family interests, and the main function of the family was to support 
a stable society. Rather than focusing on the family or sexual relations, 
people were expected to preoccupy themselves with hard work and 
collective enthusiasm for the new China (Evans 1995: 358). Yet several 
scholars have pointed out that the CCP policies also strengthened family 
ties, especially within the domestic group. Xin Liu (2000) argues that 
during the collectivist period, lineage ties weakened but those within the 
household strengthened. As the ownership of land and the link between 
ownership and labour were eliminated, people’s control over production 
and consumption diminished. Meanwhile the houses remained in the 
family’s possession, thus becoming the centre of familial identity (2000: 
37-8). The restrictions on mobility and access to health care and famine 
relief that decreased child mortality also contributed to the strength of the 
patrilocal families (Davis and Harrell 1993). Finally, a person’s political 
positioning was determined by her or his family background, as class 
labels were assigned on the basis of family history. Despite the efforts to 
replace the feudalist lineage system with socialist hierarchy, it continued 
to be entwined with kinship.
! As the social and political importance of the lineage waned, 
dynamics within the family also changed. The collectivist system removed 
the basis of the corporeal family, thus undermining the power of the 
elders. Especially in urban areas the state provision of childcare, 
education, pensions and healthcare weakened intergenerational 
dependency. Parish and Whyte (1978) and Yan (2003) report another, 
indirect impact collectivism had on family relations. For the young, 
collectivities created a new social space where it was possible to interact 
with the opposite sex outside the reach of parental supervision and 
control. They argue that these informal interactions played a more 
significant role than the new marriage law in increasing youth autonomy 
in spouse selection. The ‘romantic revolution’ that started during the 
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collectivist era and continued in the 1980s and 1990s, has been an 
important part of the shift of the affective weight in the family away from 
the parent-child (or more precisely father-son) unit towards the conjugal 
couple. To summarise, increased youth autonomy, the start of the 
‘romantic revolution’, and women’s changed role in the society and in the 
family were central transformations in the Maoist period, although it must 
be noted that these trends were not straightforward and there were some 
paradoxical policy outcomes, exemplified by the strengthening of the 
nuclear family. 
! Apart from these trends that have continued in the reform years, 
new ones have  recently emerged. Most notably, the rise of the individual 
(Yan 2009). It is somewhat misleading to treat these as linear 
developments from less to more freedom, autonomy, individualism and 
equality. While women have become more involved and vocal in the 
public arenas of work and politics, the removal of positive discrimination 
measures have lead to increased institutional discrimination in the labour 
market since the 1980s (Jacka 1990; Zheng 2000). More women are also 
lead to capitalise on their youth and beauty when competing over jobs 
(Zheng 2000). The trend of increasing youth autonomy and the rise of 
individualism have been countered by the financial reliance of the youth 
on parents, and the parents’ reliance on their only child, resulting from the 
one child policy and the increased need for capitals to arrange education, 
marriage, jobs, housing and healthcare. These countercurrents are part of 
the reformation of power relations in the current Chinese society. The 
relations and hierarchies are not reversed, but they take new forms, and 
groups formerly disadvantaged find new avenues of agency. 
! With the dismantling of much of the patriarchal and patrilineal 
structures as well as the socialist hierarchy, which formerly provided a 
frame for a person’s identity, new space has opened for individual desires 
and development. This is not to say that they did not exist before, but that 
their articulation has changed. Passions formerly positioned in kin 
relations or class struggle are now expressed and understood in terms of 
individual rights and longings. The rising living standards, consumerism, 
and the engagement with foreign popular culture (imported from the US, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Hong Kong) have offered avenues for 
self-identification and expression. This is what Lisa Rofel (2007) has called 
the emergence of the ‘desiring subject’ in the 1990s. At the same time, the 
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return of meritocratic education, the dismantling of job allocation and 
public welfare systems, and the introduction of free market policies has 
enabled, and forced, the emergence of the ‘enterprising self’ (Kleinmann 
et al. 2011; Rofel 2007; Yan 2013). 
! The echo of neoliberalist project inevitably comes through this 
description, but the label can be assigned too quickly. The continuum of 
the self, the family and the state is of a very specific kind in China, and 
recent scholarship has struggled to categorise it in the terms of the current 
discourse on neoliberalism. The past three decades have been a 
combination of privatisation, the retreat of the providing state and the 
partial liberalisation of the markets, while the strong involvement of the 
state in other parts of the market, its unlimited political power and the 
lack of transparency have remained. David Harvey’s (2005) ‘neoliberalism 
with Chinese characteristics’ and Zheng Yongnian’s (2008) ‘mutated form 
of neoliberalism’ seek to emphasise the historical specificity of the system. 
In this line, Xibai Xu (2010) argues that neoliberalism, as an ideology and 
practice, does not best explain the social inequalities created by the current 
Chinese politico-economic system. Rather, it is a dynastic tradition with its 
reversed welfare system (state provision based on privilege, being a gift, 
not a right) and the unlimited political power, that forms its basis. In this 
structural environment, individuals are left to build their own success and 
security, but cannot rely on equal or meritocratic access to opportunities 
and resources. Social trust that is characteristic of highly mobile, 
individualistic societies of strangers is low in China because the 
institutions that protect the individual, such as the freedom of speech, rule 
of law and checks on power and privilege, are absent (Yan 2011). The self-
serving individual on the rise in China is thus vulnerable to other such 
individuals. Meanwhile the circle of personal trust has closed in 
considerably with the erosion of patrilineal and socialist network systems.
! The families in this study viewed the financing and the practical 
arrangements of overseas study as a private matter of the nuclear family. 
Various connections could be mobilised for the purpose, but the wider kin 
group, including lineage elders, was not involved in the decision making. 
Nicole’s family illustrates this particularly well. Her mother is a police 
officer and her father a government official in charge of the department 
that deals with state-owned real estate. Through these positions, the 
parents have gained considerable wealth and influence, which they have 
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used in various ways to ensure Nicole receives the best possible education 
that will eventually lead to a successful career. For example, to increase 
her chances to get access to a key-point high school in the provincial 
capital, Nicole’s mother changed her ethnicity registration into one of the 
official minorities, which gave her extra points in the application process. 
Nicole went on to study media and broadcasting in London, with the 
plans of returning to China to work after finishing a master’s degree. 
Nicole’s parents are beneficiaries of the privatisation reforms and they 
know how to operate the new system for personal gain. This brings a risk 
of public and official critique and corruption accusations, which limits the 
overt flaunting of their wealth. Considering the high cost of overseas 
education, their daughter’s study in the UK might raise some unwelcome 
questions. The family has thus decided to keep it a secret, not only from 
strangers, but also from close kin. Apart from a very small trusted circle, 
relatives, friends and acquaintances have been told that Nicole studies in 
Tianjin. When I accompanied Nicole on a visit to her hometown, the 
family introduced me to others as her English teacher, and asked me not 
to talk about my research or Nicole’s overseas studies in the presence of 
others, including grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins we met daily. 
For Nicole’s family, the opportunities in the reform era China are seized 
through the mobilisation of interpersonal resources, but at the same time, 
keeping one’s strategies and intentions to oneself.
! Adding to the affective contradictions is the relationship between 
the individual and the state. People have embraced the neoliberal 
subjectivities of the self-expressing and self-governing individual. The 
state has actively promoted them by legitimising the pursuit of wealth 
and circulating discourses of quality (suzhi), civilisation (wenming), culture 
(wenhua) and modernity (xiandaihua). These discourses, however, are 
enfolded in a nationalistic project that articulates individual development 
in terms of patriotic duty, and frames it in terms of competition with other 
nation states (US, India and Russia in particular). This is a powerful 
discourse permeated through education and official media, and comes 
through in the stock phrases the student migrants use. ‘Serving the 
motherland’, ‘helping our China to develop’ and ‘loving my country’ are 
an integral part of the self-development trajectory of many of them, 
including Hannah above. In the early reform years, the role of the 
overseas Chinese in spurring on economic growth and linking China with 
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global markets cannot be overestimated (Harvey 2005). The state makes 
continuous efforts not to lose the new ‘overseas talents’ who have 
migrated for higher education since the 1980s. Not relying only on 
patriotic sentiment, the central and local governments have introduced a 
variety of policies that favour returnees in taxation, hukou registration 
(residency registration system that determines access to health care, jobs, 
education, etc. in a particular location), setting up businesses, etc. (Wang 
2010).
!  The subject that emerges from this context is simultaneously a 
highly individualistic in her or his endeavours and desires, and highly 
entwined in ties of affect with family and the state. As Richard and 
Rudnyckyj (2009) argue, affect has not waned, but has been reorganised 
with the effect of the globalised, neoliberal capitalism. The remainder of 
this chapter is devoted to tracking these ways for the student migrants. 
Drawing from Rofel (2007) and Kleinmann et al. (2011; see also Yan 2013) 
and adding the aspect of exchange of care, I explore three parts of 
subjectivity: care, enterprising and desire.
The caring subject
! The subjectivity of the student migrants is partly formed in the 
relations of care, as affective ties within families are largely enacted 
through its circulation. The parents’ acts of support: when they carry the 
child’s backpack and walk her to school, when they prepare nutritious 
foods when he studies for the exams and then stand a silent vigil outside 
the examination halls, or when they spend their savings to send her 
abroad, are filled with familial feelings of attachment and care. These acts 
of practical, emotional and material support affect, i.e. have an impact, on 
the constitution of the self and subjectivity. Charles Stafford (2000b) has 
argued that the cycles of care (yang) are at the centre of Chinese 
relatedness, and work somewhat independently from the lineage system 
in creating and reproducing ties. Lineage ties can be disrupted if 
obligations of care are not fulfilled, and relatedness can be founded 
exclusively on the basis of care. This is an element of Chinese relatedness 
that has remained constant throughout the various transformations of the 
past century (Stafford 2000b). It is this core of exchange that enables 
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continuity in the cultural formation of the family, despite the shifting 
focus from the lineage to the domestic group, from the intergenerational 
unit to the conjugal couple, and the dissolution of the patrilineal systems 
of inheritance, locality and ancestor worship. Family relations and guanxi 
(informal instrumental networks) are mobilised to give security where the 
state fails to provide, and to make the most of the opportunities available. 
Between parents and children the exchange of care is the medium for 
enacting affect. For the parents, it usually takes the form of the practical 
care for young children, facilitating access to education (tutoring with 
homework, paying for extra classes, using various strategies to get the 
child to a good school, paying for higher education) and work (using 
guanxi networks), financing marriage (can include the wedding, an 
apartment, a car, household appliances), and helping adult children with 
childcare and household chores. Children help their ageing parents 
financially, by giving food, clothes and other material goods, by helping 
with chores and by providing physical assistance. As is clear from these 
lists, the times of need for different types of care vary, and the balance of 
exchange changes over time (Fang and Whyte 2003: 47-50). 
! Many urban families have no son who would continue the lineage 
and live with the parents taking care of them with his wife, while the 
daughters of the family ‘marry out’. Do daughters then care for the 
parents? According to recent research, they do, significantly. Reports from 
rural China show that the migrant worker daughters often play a crucial 
role in facilitating their brothers’ education, thus indirectly providing for 
their parents, and also give considerable material support directly 
(Obendiek 2011; Fang 2011). In urban China the daughters’ supporting 
role is even more clear, as they are often the only child of their parents. 
Fong (2004) shows that in Dalian, the previous generation of daughters 
already started to take on more responsibility of providing for the parents. 
Being the mothers of the first single-child generation, their lighter burden 
of domestic duties enabled devotion to paid work, and gave more time 
and material resources to care for their parents. Based on this experience, 
they trust in their own daughter’s ability to care for them in old age, and 
are willing to invest family resources on their child’s education and career 
regardless of the sex of the child. Martin King Whyte and colleagues’ 1994 
survey in Baoding shows that in multi-child families with both daughters 
and sons, married daughters actually gave more support than married 
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sons in the categories of help with daily chores, physical care and 
providing material goods. Sons gave slightly more financial support, but 
when the factor of men’s higher incomes was controlled, the daughters’ 
support was higher in frequency and amount also in this category (Whyte 
and Qin 2003). 
! As the responsibility of caring for the parents is still in the future 
for most of my informants and survey respondents, I have little data 
about the care daughters provide for parents. Being students or recent 
graduates, they are still mostly at the receiving end of the parent-child 
exchanges. But discussions with the students and their parents, as well as 
the surveys I carried out among the aspiring and current student 
migrants, give some insight to how the gendered responsibilities of care 
are viewed. The survey asked students what types of care they plan to 
provide for the parents in the future. The results (Tables 1 and 2) show 
that there is little gender difference in planned care, and for most 
categories the percentage of women who intend to provide that type of 
care is in fact higher than of men.
 ! Some of the forms of care listed in the survey, such as helping with 
chores, visiting and giving gifts and money occasionally, have 
traditionally been forms of care daughters provide after marriage. 
Furthermore, in a patrilocal household, helping with housework is mainly 
the responsibility of the daughter-in-law, not the son. Therefore the 
women’s high rates of planning these forms of care do not contest the 
more traditional gender roles within the family. The higher percentage of 
the women planning to live with their parents and to give money 
regularly, both traditionally male forms of care, however show that the 
women born in the 1980s and early 1990s do not plan to limit their 
support to forms previously preserved for married-out daughters. The 
survey results are in line with my ethnographic material. Commenting the 
general principles of care, most parents and children of single-child 
families agreed with the official discourse that daughters these days are 
equally responsible for caring for their own parents. Female and male 
student migrants displayed equally strong filial attitudes. The men used 
the partilineal discourse to explain their duty to the parents, and women 
used the discourses of gender equality and greater filiality of daughters. 
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Table 1. Planned care for parents by gender, Aspiring student migrants
Female Male Total
Planned care for 
parents in old age Live together
Count 53 24 77
% within 
sex 44 % 32 % 40 %
Give non-
monetary gifts
Count 67 34 101
% within 
sex 56 % 46 % 52 %
Regularly give 
money
Count 64 32 96
% within 
sex 53 % 43 % 49 %
Occasionally give 
money
Count 16 11 27
% within 
sex 13 % 15 % 14 %
Help with 
housework
Count 59 24 83
% within 
sex 49 % 32 % 43 %
Visit
Count 70 39 109
% within 
sex 58 % 53 % 56 %
Hire help for 
parents
Count 27 20 47
% within 
sex 23 % 27 % 24 %
Send parents to an 
old-age home
Count 4 1 5
% within 
sex 3 % 1 % 3 %
Total count 120 74 194
Source: Author’s survey at the Renmin University, Beijing 5
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5 Table 2 has higher percentage in each category of care compared to Table 1. This 
should not lead to a conclusion that filiality increases over the migration process. 
The LSE sample reflects the gender composition of the Chinese student 
population at the LSE, of which 70% are female. The Renmin sample is more 
gender balanced with 54% of the respondents female. As more female than male 
respondents in both samples answered yes to different categories of planned care, 
it is expected that in the LSE sample the total rates are higher than in the Renmin 
sample.
Table 2. Planned care for parents by gender, Current student migrants
Female Male Total
Planned care for 
parents in old age Live together
Count 79 18 97
% within 
sex 50 % 43 % 48 %
Give non-
monetary gifts
Count 98 18 116
% within 
sex 62 % 43 % 58 %
Regularly give 
money
Count 128 31 159
% within 
sex 81 % 74 % 79 %
Occasionally give 
money
Count 31 6 37
% within 
sex 19 % 14 % 18 %
Help with 
housework
Count 96 21 117
% within 
sex 60 % 50 % 58 %
Visit
Count 137 33 170
% within 
sex 86 % 79 % 86 %
Hire help for 
parents
Count 104 29 133
% within 
sex 65 % 69 % 66 %
Send parents to an 
old-age home
Count 23 2 25
% within 
sex 14 % 5 % 12 %
Total count 159 42 201
Source: Author’s survey at the London School of Economics, UK 
!  Some of the forms of care listed in the survey, such as helping with 
chores, visiting and giving gifts and money occasionally, have 
traditionally been forms of care daughters provide after marriage. 
Furthermore, in a patrilocal household, helping with housework is mainly 
the responsibility of the daughter-in-law, not the son. Therefore the 
women’s high rates of planning these forms of care do not contest the 
more traditional gender roles within the family. The higher percentage of 
the women planning to live with their parents and to give money 
regularly, both traditionally male forms of care, however show that the 
women born in the 1980s and early 1990s do not plan to limit their 
support to forms previously preserved for married-out daughters. The 
survey results are in line with my ethnographic material. Commenting the 
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general principles of care, most parents and children of single-child 
families agreed with the official discourse that daughters these days are 
equally responsible for caring for their own parents. Female and male 
student migrants displayed equally strong filial attitudes. The men used 
the partilineal discourse to explain their duty to the parents, and women 
used the discourses of gender equality and the filiality of more loving and 
sensitive daughters. 
! Looking at the response rates to one particular form of care, ‘live 
together’, raises some interesting questions. The number of students who 
plan to live together with their parents in the future is surprising (almost 
half in both samples), considering the trend of neolocality since the late 
1980s. Even more striking is women’s higher percentage. Even if a young 
urban couple would decide to go against the trend of neolocal marriage, 
there is a strong historical preference for patrilocal rather than matrilocal 
residence. It is thus surprising that women not only plan to live with 
parents, but with their own parents. The first point to make here is that the 
survey measures people’s opinions and attitudes, not their actual 
practices. When asking the student migrants how they will care for their 
parents if they end up settling abroad, a common answer was that they 
will bring their parents abroad to live with them. If I asked about 
particular arrangements and the parents’ opinions, it turned out the 
student migrants had not thought the plan through. When discussing the 
same issue with the parents of the same students, they strongly stated that 
they would not be willing to migrate abroad, away from everything and 
everyone they knew. The student migrants thus feel a strong sense of 
filiality, while their actual plans of caring for their parents are marked by 
vagueness. This is not surprising when considering the different ways 
sending a child abroad disrupts the cycle of care. The parental support is 
not only an enactment of familial attachment, but it affects the child by 
cultivating a sense of filiality, both as an obligation and as an emotional 
attachment. The proper avenue for enacting this would be to care for the 
parents when they are old, more specifically here, by living with them. But 
the support the parents provide is aimed at creating a condition where 
this is impossible. Moreover, going back one more step, the intense 
parental support for the child’s education is linked to the fact that they 
only have one child. The flip-side of not having to compete for the 
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parental support with siblings is, of course, not having siblings to share 
the filial obligations.
! The student migrants’ plans to live with their parents that seem 
surprising in light of the trends of youth autonomy and individualism, 
could also relate to the geography of power. Migration has impact on the 
positioning of students and their parents in the generational hierarchy. 
The power dynamics are very different when an elderly parent migrates 
abroad to join her or his already settled adult child, than when a young 
daughter-in-law moves into the family home of her husband. Ellen Oxfeld 
(2005) describes this situation in her account of the intergenerational 
power dynamics of the Chinese families in Calcutta. Many of the adult 
children of Calcuttan Chinese migrate to Toronto, and as the parents 
follow them, they sometimes find themselves in a position resembling that 
of domestic help, isolated and completely dependent on their child and 
her or his spouse in terms of language and cultural knowledge. In these 
circumstances, many of the parents choose to return to Calcutta. Around 
one third of the survey respondents (33% of those in the planning stage 
and 24% of those currently studying abroad) were willing to settle abroad 
permanently. The rest would prefer to return to China immediately upon 
graduation or after some years of working abroad. My ethnographic data 
suggests that many returnees wish to try their chances in Beijing, 
Shanghai or one of the other metropolises rather than return to their 
original home place. If they succeed in finding work and settling down, 
co-residence can only be arranged if the parents relocate, if not abroad, at 
least to another city in China. This puts the child into a position of relative 
power. It thus comes as a little surprise that in the urban families of 
reasonable economic security and living standard, it is primarily the 
parents, not the children, who wish to limit future dependency on the 
children.  
! Is there an explanation for the daughters’ equally, if not more, filial 
attitudes that come across in this survey in general?  Furthermore, why 
daughters plan to live with their own parents? The cultural and the 
structural transformations of the recent decades have resulted in a 
situation where many urban parents cannot, and need not, rely on 
material support from their children. In the process the notion of filiality 
has taken a different emphasis. Filiality is not a mere obligation to return 
the care received as a child to the elderly parents. It is an ethical model for 
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relationships that partly rests on duty and partly on affection (Whyte 2003: 
7). As the children’s practical responsibilities and their patrilineal basis 
have waned, the parent-child ties have become more centred on affection 
than duty, and as a result, on reciprocity rather than moral obligation 
(Kleinman et al. 2011; Yan 2003). As explained by Jonatan: ‘It depends on 
the parents, how they treat their child, how the child treats them back. It’s 
like, how you treat your child, is the way you treat yourself.’ In a 
patrilineal and patrilocal tradition this type of relationship, one defined by 
reciprocity and affection, has been more characteristic of parents and 
‘married out’ daughters, than parents and sons, whose relationship has 
been more mediated through continuing obligations. As the sense of filial 
obligation has decreased in the recent decades and its basis on affective 
relations between parents and children has strengthened, it is not so 
surprising that daughters show a high degree of filiality in attitudes and 
practice, in particular toward their own parents rather than parents-in-
law. This is further supported by the gender model of more sensitive and 
caring women. The discourse of the greater filiality of daughters rests on 
these basis, and many parents and student migrants claimed that 
daughters are emotionally closer to their parents and take better care of 
them because they ‘love their parents more’ than sons. 
! Finally, I cannot discuss family care in China without a mention of 
the ageing of the population. Urbanisation, women’s participation in 
education and paid work and economic development are all factors well 
known to have effected fertility transition in other societies. In China, the 
family planning policies have made the process fast and abrupt. The 
problem this generation of singletons and their parents will face in the 
future, is that in the absence of siblings to share the responsibility, the only 
child will not have enough time and resources to provide the parents with 
sufficient material and emotional care. Both parents and the younger 
generation are well aware of this. When talking about this issue with the 
parents of the students, they invariably stated that they do not need or 
expect material support from their child. Most urban parents now have 
pension plans and savings for retirement. The following quotes are from 
interviews with Mr Zhang, whose son currently studies in the US, and 
Mrs Wu who has a young daughter she plans to send to a high school in 
Canada. They bring up the general change in lifestyles and the problem of 
an ageing population.
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The ageing population is not a big problem, with elderly 
homes. We call them eldergardens (laorenyuan), like 
kindergardens [laughs]. In big cities we have many of them. 
When we get old, we can find a place like that, go there. My 
son and my future daughter-in-law, they are just two with four 
old people to look after. But when his sons marries, they will 
have eight old people. So they must also go to an eldergarden. 
[…] From the perspective of tradition, our son should take 
care of us. In our opinion, ours and his, he should take care of 
us. But in reality, how will he take care of us?  This is the 
problem of every household. Because his work will be busy, he 
won’t have time to take care of us. (Mr Zhang)
I think in the one child families, the child has no way of taking 
care of the parents. [...] I think it’s because of lifestyle as well, 
now we don’t have the idea of taking care of the elderly 
anymore. I have no expectation at all that my daughter would 
take care of us in the future. [...] Our child is the only one. So I 
think it’s best that we take care of ourselves. Because she 
won’t have the ability, practical or economic. So I think it’s 
best that us two take care of each other. (Mrs Wu)
Elderly care homes are mostly talked about in a joking manner. Although 
they might well be in the future for some of these parents, the option is 
still almost too absurd to be seriously discussed. The care facilities are 
being developed, but the general view is that their quality is still very 
poor, and more importantly, there is a cultural sanction against the family 
not taking care of their elderly by themselves. This is also clear from the 
students’ responses. Only 3% of the Renmin sample planned to send their 
parents to a care home in the future. The figure remains low (5%) for the 
male students at the LSE, but is slightly higher for the female students 
(15%). 
! Urban parents are willing to go to great lengths to give the best 
care to their only child. They know that the support they provide can 
make a difference in the competitive Chinese education and job markets. 
Facilitating the child’s overseas study is one form of support. The student 
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migrants are not only aware of the work and sacrifices of their parents, but 
emotionally affected by it, in a way that the sense of filiality significantly 
constitutes the relationship they have to their parents, their sense of self, 
and their self-positioning in the world i.e. their (migrant) subjectivity. Yet 
this part of their subjectivity, which I have termed the ‘caring subject’, is 
very much entangled with the other two: enterprise and desire. It is easy 
to see how the current emphasis on enterprising and desire fit well with 
the practice of parents supporting their child’s success, but create 
problems when the cycle of care should be completed, i.e. the flow of 
support reversed. Migration itself, through creating spatial and 
sociocultural distance between students and the parents, creates its own 
problems. But as the vagueness of their plans shows, the obligations to 
care for parents is not something the student migrants are greatly 
preoccupied by at this point of their lives. Their focus is in projects of self-
development, studies and career plans, adventure and romance. In other 
words, enterprising and desire. 
The enterprising subject
! Enterprising subjects are considered to be ‘rational, calculating 
creatures whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for self-
care’ (Rofel 2007:17). The idealisation of such individual agent is an 
important part of the subjectivity of the student migrants. Determination 
and strong belief in one’s ability to not just live, but to make a successful, 
happy life, is characteristic of many of them. This ability is also necessary, 
because it is clear that in transitional China, such a life is not freely 
awarded to all. The cosmopolitan pursuit is to become an enterprising 
individual who has the confidence and the ability to seize opportunities, 
wealth, prestige and happiness wherever it may arise. Most student 
migrants have to reconcile the ideal of self-reliance and enterprising with 
the  dependency on their parents. To accomplish this, they try to weaken 
the ties of affect. The sense of being more independent can be achieved 
through geographical distance, which limits the parents’ involvement in 
their daily lives; by living the student life in a foreign country with no 
local support network, being forced to learn how to cope with difficulties 
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independently; and by returning the financial support the parents have 
provided.
! The last strategy is particularly interesting, because as common as 
it was for student migrants to talk about returning the money to the 
parents, I never knew or heard of a person (of urban origin) who would 
have done that. All the urban parents I interviewed claimed, often with a 
laugh, that they do not want or need their child’s money. Many students, 
however, insisted that they plan to pay the money back and support their 
parents financially in the future. I asked if they expected their parents to 
accept the offer, and it turned out many students expected a refusal and 
some had plans for alternative uses of the money. Xiao Wei, a second year 
new media student with plans to go to New York to do master’s in 
interactive media design, had clear plans for his life after graduation. He 
is to go to Tokyo to earn money, and after saving five million yuan, to 
return to China. He will have to offer this money to his parents as a 
repayment of their financial support. His parents will not accept it and 
they do not need it, so in reality he will use it to found his own company. 
Xiao Wei’s friend Emma had similar plans of working abroad and offering 
the saved money to her parents, which she expected them to refuse. To 
explain this dynamic, she said: ‘This is Chinese culture, if you treat your 
parents well, they will also treat you well.’ How do you treat your parents 
well, I asked, ‘If I live a good life, they will also be happy’ she responded. 
Nelly, a 26 year old returnee with a master’s degree and a 6000 yuan 
monthly salary, lived with her parents who are retired workers. Her 
parents had spent 150.000 yuan on her studies abroad. Nelly and her 
friend Sarah, also a returnee, explained to me:
Nelly: They didn’t mind spending the money. Because you 
know, Chinese parents are like this, they want to spend all 
their money on you. So they will support you. Even if they 
have nothing, they still want to give you everything. 
Sarah: Yeah, they live for their children.
Nelly: Yeah, some will sell even blood or sell their land to pay 
for their children’s education or something. There are these 
Affected mobility
43
stories. So my parents for example, they don’t care how much 
it costs, as long as I’m happy. They think it’s worth it.
AK: Do the parents get anything in return?
Nelly: No. They don’t ask for anything in return. They just 
want us to be happy and healthy.
Sarah: That’s our parents’ generation, our generation is 
different. I live for myself.
Nelly: Well, after first year of working, I wanted to give my 
parents some money every month, like 500 a month. But even 
that they didn’t accept. They said, don’t give us your money, 
rather buy something nice for yourself. I mean, it wasn’t 
much, but I wanted to give it to them just to show filiality. But 
they didn’t even take that.
Sarah: I bought one thing for my parents when they moved. A 
washing machine! [laughs]
Nelly: And I’ve bought my mother a necklace, gifts like that on 
mother’s day.
For these student migrants a sense of entitlement to their parents’s 
support partly resolves the tension between enterprising and caring. The 
game of offering and refusing the money can batch up the disrupted 
affective cycle of care. But the problem of care is not only that it evokes a 
sense of obligation or duty, but also that it evokes a sense of being cared. 
As Liu Zhu, a second year social work student in Beijing who hopes to 
study for an MBA abroad explained:
I want to study abroad and do everything all by myself. Now I 
think, I’m the only child of my family, I depend on my family 
so much. My parents care about me, they don’t want me to be 
tired or something, they just want to do a lot of things for me. I 
want myself to get excellent, especially my independent 
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ability. […] If I’m strong enough I can control the world, and 
not let the world control me. 
Parents are not against the development of the students’ independence. 
On the contrary, they cite confidence, knowledge about the society and the 
world, a critical and inquiring mind, and learning new ways of thinking 
as the most important benefits of overseas study. But while for the parents 
these are marketable skills and competencies, for many a student migrant 
they are as much about making a break from parental authority and, yes, 
care. 
! From these experiences of the students, we can see the complexity 
of their subjectivities that encompass the sense of entitlement to the 
support and opportunities available, and the idealisation of the 
independent, enterprising subject. The sense of entitlement at times 
resolves the tension between the idealisation of independence and the 
actual reliance. This is still an uneasy union, as shown by the game of 
money return. In any case the tension between the idealised autonomy 
and the parental authority and influence remains, which will become 
apparent in many examples in the following chapters. In the quote in the 
beginning of this chapter Hannah gave her own idealisation of the parent-
child hierarchical relationship, tying parental authority to material 
support. Parental authority would thus end when the child attains 
financial independence. This was certainly not true in her own family 
relationships. Her family’s constant negotiations over exchanges, duty 
and autonomy exemplify the problem of caring and enterprising 
particularly well, and are detailed in Chapter 6. 
! The enterprising subjectivity is framed in filial duty, national 
development and competition for wealth and success. But most of all, it is 
framed in desire, an individualistic pursuit to better one’s life. The third 
part of student migrant subjectivity, the desiring subject, is thus very 
much entangled with the first two.
The desiring subject
! The desire to have, to experience and to be something better is not 
just accepted, but required from a properly modern, cosmopolitan 
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Chinese subject. Consumption, education and career aspirations are routes 
to self-expression and development that distance one from the political 
passions of the previous decades (both Maoist and the 1980s reformist) 
(Rofel 2007). The accompanying transformation in people’s subjectivities 
has been the rise of affects that centre around individualistic emotions, 
ranging from romantic love (Jankowiak 1995; Yan 2003) to depression (Lee 
2011). In the cosmopolitan arena of action, desire is embedded in the 
geography of power. The actions of student migrants are partly motivated 
by the desire for upward mobility in the hierarchies of nationality, race, 
ethnicity, gender, class, etc., which can take the form of higher income, 
better work opportunities, residency rights or citizenship and the 
resulting access to opportunities and services the countries higher up in 
the global hierarchy can offer. For many there is still more to the project 
than these practical benefits. The goal is to become a cosmopolitan subject, 
a person who feels and can act with confidence in transnational settings, 
feels no inferiority and has the same range of opportunities as the citizens 
of developed countries (see Fong 2011). Powerful imageries of what is 
desirable, modern, high quality and progressive are central to becoming a 
properly cosmopolitan Chinese subject. This is what I call a ‘geography of 
desire’.
! When I met Xiao Zhao a month into my field work, she was a 21 
year old returnee and an aspiring overseas student. A student of German 
language and literature, she had spent a year in Germany as an exchange 
student and was planning to return there for a master’s degree. I instantly 
noticed that Xiao Zhao was different from the other aspiring migrant 
students I had got to know so far. Generally I had found it easy to meet 
students, through my room advertisement and further introductions, or 
simply by being approached in public places. When I told students about 
my research, many offered their help, becoming my first informants. There 
were at least two reasons for their willingness to participate. First, my 
research subject was directly relevant to their own experiences, which 
made it interesting for them. Second, these were young people with 
cosmopolitan orientations, I was a young foreign person, and our 
friendship was often clearly part of their cosmopolitan pursuit. Most 
preferred to use their English names and insisted on speaking English 
with me. We often met at foreign chain restaurants, visited night clubs and 
bars frequented by foreigners, drank expensive coffee in chain cafe’s and 
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walked around the upscale shopping centres, rather than going to one of 
the markets that offer Chinese and fake foreign brands, where we could 
actually afford to buy something. I was solicited for opinions about 
fashion, American pop music, TV shows and films, education, family 
relations, sex, dating and marriage. In these conversations, I represented 
the ‘foreigner‘, an identity defined not by my nationality but by being 
Caucasian and Western. At times I also found myself representing this 
identity for the purpose of signifying the cosmopolitan identity of others. 
As the ‘foreign friend’, I accompanied informants to meetings with 
friends, colleagues, relations and relatives, or simply to public places 
where we were seen together by strangers. At the same time, I was often 
treated as a guest, shown the best scenic spots and historical sites, or the 
most fabulous symbols of development and modernity; being treated to 
meals at expensive restaurants, or shown the local secrets unknown to 
tourists; i.e. being explained and shown the best parts of Chinese culture. 
For many informants, our relationship was a type of cultural and 
language exchange (growing into a closer friendship over time with most). 
They helped me by sharing their thoughts and experiences and by 
allowing me to become involved in their lives to varying degrees. In 
return, they were able to practice with me the ways of interacting, 
thinking, behaving and speaking as cosmopolitan subjects. 
! My relationship with Xiao Zhao was different. She introduced 
herself by her Chinese name and patiently put up with my slowly 
improving Chinese, only changing into English on my initiative or if the 
discussion was clearly too complicated for me. She took me for long walks 
around the various suburbs and inner city areas, where there was nothing 
significant to see, because walking was good exercise and did not cost 
anything. We ate at small, cheap restaurants, always splitting the bill, or 
sat at her friend’s coffee shop drinking hot water and smoking cheap 
cigarettes. During our walks, Xiao Zhao shared her experiences and 
thinking on various topics related to my research. She did not ask for my 
advice, and was not interested in my views about Chinese or Western 
cultures. What she did expect, however, was for me to relate some 
personal experiences and feelings, and was ready to contest my thinking. 
Unlike with some other informants, I felt that our relationship was not 
based on exchange, because while I had everything to learn from Xiao 
Zhao, she had very little to gain from me. 
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! This feeling became more familiar as I got to know more returnees. 
They did not need me to serve as an access point to a cosmopolitan 
identity. Nevertheless, also for them, our relationship and conversations 
were a site of articulating and negotiating proper cosmopolitanism. Xiao 
Zhao used her Chinese name consciously, and squirmed at people who 
use English names with foreigners, ‘It’s so stupid!’. She complained about 
the Chinese music scene that copies Western styles but has no real soul, 
telling me about going to a heavy metal concert in Beijing and feeling 
embarrassed because the Chinese audience did not know how to behave 
accordingly. They had been pogoing when they should have been head-
banging. A devoted fan of punk music, she dressed in Dr. Martens and 
bright coloured tights, showing disdain to the decorative, feminine styles 
worn by the majority of young women. ‘Some of my friends think I look 
like a man. Because of my behaviour too. Chinese women look so weak! 
Not at all independent!’, she commented. Xiao Zhao met a German man 
online, who later became her boyfriend. He had told Xiao Zhao that 
wearing Dr. Martens was dated and pretentious. This concerned her so 
that for the first and the last time, Xiao Zhao asked my, ‘the foreigner’s’, 
opinion about the boots. Xiao Zhao wanted to distance herself from the 
domesticated cosmopolitanism (Rofel 2007), which in her view was an 
embarrassingly incomplete imitation of the proper cosmopolitan 
subjectivity she had learned while staying abroad. In her view my flat 
mate Hannah was a representative of the first type.
! One night I told Hannah that Xiao Zhao and I were going to watch 
an Italian film at the cultural centre. Hannah decided to join us. We first 
walked to a small Xinjiang restaurant to have dinner, and by the time we 
got there, I knew it was going to be an awkward evening. Hannah, an 
aspiring student migrant with a very instrumental view on overseas 
study, was asking Xiao Zhao detailed questions about her studies abroad, 
about the university rankings, education methods, convertibility of 
credentials and so on. She was keen to get as much information as she 
could. Xiao Zhao, who was not a ‘good student’ or interested in detailed 
career planning, tried to avoid Hannah’s questions and change the subject. 
Her annoyance turned into embarrassment when during the dinner 
Hannah kept making comments that expressed her ‘wrong’ kind of 
cosmopolitanism. For example, she laughed at the flat shoes Xiao Zhao 
and I were wearing, and pointing to her stylish boots, said that she had 
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noticed at the airports that all stylish foreign women wore high heels. 
When we got to the culture centre, Xiao Zhao quickly went off with a 
German friend and we did not see her again that evening.
! Hannah and Xiao Zhao had both dated foreign men. For Hannah, 
foreignness signified progress, high quality, romance, and emotional and 
sexual sensitivity, all which were lacking in Chinese men, who in general 
‘need to improve themselves’. She did not date Chinese men, and 
decidedly declined the many pursuers she had over the years. Xiao Zhao 
had dated both foreign and Chinese men, but felt that it was difficult for 
her to find a Chinese man who would accept her music taste, tattoos, 
smoking, and unconventional ideas about marriage and sex. She 
explained that even though many of her Chinese male friends shared her 
interests and ideas, they wanted to find more conventional girls to date 
and to marry. For both women, dating a foreigner was about expressing 
and enacting their own cosmopolitan subjectivity. Since middle school, 
people around Hannah had told her that she was exceptional in her 
intelligence, beauty, determination and ability. ‘My classmates always 
said, you will marry a foreigner and have mixed-blooded babies’, she 
proudly remembered. Marrying a foreigner was part of her ambitious life 
plan. For Xiao Zhao, dating a foreigner meant wider horizons to explore 
ideas and greater freedom to express identities.
! For both women, the desire to be cosmopolitan was about stepping 
out to the world and becoming something else. They had already moved 
out of their original sociocultural circuit (Xiao Zhao by going abroad, 
Hannah by becoming a white collar urbanite) and through technologies of 
self-government (consumption, bodily practices and relationships with 
others), they tried to make sure they kept moving forward. Their 
geographies of desire were on a different scale, because their positions on 
the geography of power were also different. Xiao Zhao, the only child of 
two professionals living at the embassy section of the city, whose artistic 
parents accepted her unconventional behaviour, had very different 
resources in her display than Hannah, a daughter of rural multi-child 
family who had not lived abroad. While to Hannah cosmopolitanism was 
a means to access the middle-class urban life style, Xiao Zhao’s 
cosmopolitanism was alienating her from it.
!  The enactment of desire through consumption, bodily practices 
and romantic and sexual relations, is simultaneously a pursuit for 
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pleasure and freedom and a form of neoliberalist self-government with 
the aim of becoming a properly cosmopolitan Chinese. It is also a means 
of reflecting on and negotiating this subjectivity, but the ability to reflect is 
tied to the positioning vis-à-vis other systems of power, such as market-
driven consumerism (wearing the right kind of boots) or international 
mobility (going abroad vs. going to the airport). 
Conclusion
! The economy of affect that produces Chinese student migrant 
subjectivities consists of the continuum of the self, the family and the 
state, which I have explored in this chapter by looking at the 
interconnections between the state policies, family support and the 
individualistic projects of self-development (i.e. enterprising) and self-
realisation (i.e. desire). The emotional complexity results from the 
powerful and contradicting affects defining the self. A self-reliant, 
enterprising subjectivity is not only idealised, but also necessary in the 
competitive reform era Chinese society. Parents are devoted to supporting 
their only child’s development into such subject, in the case of the student 
migrants, through a cosmopolitan pursuit. This pursuit is articulated in 
terms of individual desire that to varying degrees revolves around 
tangible benefits (higher income, living standard, etc.) and intangible 
imageries of progress, freedom and pleasure. The fact that family care is 
such an integral part of these individualistic pursuits creates tensions in 
the reflexive work of subjectivity building. From these dynamics emerges 
a set of aspirations, modes of perception and anxieties that is historically 
and culturally specific to the Chinese student migrants. Even though these 
are shared by all student migrants from urban single-child families, 
gender shapes the particular forms of caring, desiring and enterprising. 
This will become apparent later when I explore in more detail the lives of 
the student migrants, their experiences and the negotiations over issues 
regarding education, work and sexual and romantic relationships. Having 
now drawn out the structural and cultural context from which the 
students embark on their journeys, I will next delve into the structural 
dynamics of the actual migration, i.e. the international education market 
and China’s involvement in it.
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2. COSMOPOLITICAL EDUCATION
! Between 1978 and 2013, around 2.6 million students left China for 
overseas study, over 90% of them since 2000 (China National Bureau of 
Statistics 2013). This makes China the main student sending country of the 
world for the past three decades. The top destinations of the Chinese 
students are the English speaking countries US, UK, Australia and Canada 
as well as Japan. Low tuition fees, less restrictive visa policies and high 
quality of education also make some European countries, such as France 
and Germany, relatively popular. At their main destinations, Chinese 
students form the largest overseas student group.6  The most popular 
fields of study are languages, business and management, physical and life 
sciences, and economics (Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic 
of China 2008). Overseas study is a considerable investment to the families 
of self-sponsored students. The expenses vary depending on the country 
of study, the level of the degree and the course, but typically range 
between 150.000 and 400.000 yuan per year, which is five to thirteen times 
the average annual income of urban households (China National Bureau 
of Statistics 2009). The first migrant students in the 1980s were 
predominantly sons of elite families and were funded by Chinese 
scholarships, but by the early 2000s, the majority of the students were self-
6  US: Institute of International Education 2011, Top 25 Places of Origin of 
International Students, 2009/10-2010/11, Open Doors Report on International 
Educational Exchange, http://www.iie.org/opendoors
UK: UK Council for International Student Affairs 2011, Top Non-EU Sending 
Countries, International Students in UK Higher Education: Key Statistics, http://
www.ukcisa.org.uk/about/statistics_he.php#table1  
 
Australia: Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2011,  Top Source Countries 
for Total Grants - 2009-10 (PY), http://www.immi.gov.au/media/statistics/study/ 
Canada: Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2011, Total Entries of Foreign 
Students by Source Country, Facts and Figures 2010 - Immigration Overview, 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2010/ 
sponsored, came from a variety of family backgrounds, and around half of 
them were women (Table 3).
! To understand how the student migration has reached such wide a 
scale and what keeps it going, this chapter outlines the macro and the 
median level contexts of the flow. This will help to understand the 
positioning of individual student migrants and families on the 
geographical scales of power, which I will explore in the following 
chapters. I will here look at the international education market, its 
connections to various state, suprastate and institutional level agencies, 
and finally, China’s engagement in it. The internationalisation of 
education pulls the student migrants while the problems of the Chinese 
education system work as a push, and the network of institutions facilitate 
and maintain the flow. In an effort to include all these elements in the 
analysis, I treat Chinese student migration as a migration system. The 
system approach became popular in migration studies in the late 1980s, 
when the focus on single flows came to be regarded as too restricted (see 
e.g. Kanaroglou et al. 1986; Fawcett and Arnold 1987; Fawcett 1989). It 
takes migration as a dynamic system that includes not only the population 
that moves, but various linkages that motivate, shape and restrict the 
movement. Among others, these include state-to-state relations, trade 
relations, mass culture connections, migration business, and intangible 
linkages such as economic dependency. 
! At the centre of the Chinese student migration system is the 
international education market. The different agents connected to it use 
the rhetoric of cosmopolitan education, based on the assumption that 
access to standardised education increases equality across political and 
economic boundaries, and benefits global interests. This discourse masks 
the interstate anarchy  (Cheah 1998) in the cosmopolitan field of education. 
Kant’s cosmopolitan right, a moral principle asserted in the name of 
common humanity, was directed against the inter-state anarchy of 
absolute dynastic states of the time. Pheng Cheah (1998) argues that the 
current interstate system has not come far in two senses: in the absence of 
any cosmopolitan sovereign authority or ideal institutional framework, 
states claim the absolute authority over their territories, and the interstate 
relations are governed by self-interest and self-help. It is clear that this is 
also the situation in the cosmopolitan field of education. With no moral 
principles or sovereign supranational institutions, the various agents try 
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to engage in this field for particularistic interests. To call this dynamic 
interstate can be misleading, because of the complex connections between 
the education and the business sectors of different countries, and the 
involvement of suprastate institutions means that the sovereign states 
only shape rather than control the dynamic. It is to highlight this power 
play that I have followed Cheah (1998) to call the internationalised 
education cosmopolitical. 
International education market
! Major international organisations, including the World Bank, 
WTO, UNESCO and OECD, sanction and mobilise the internationalisation 
of education. According to the general view they promote, higher 
education should no longer be focused on serving national interests, but 
the global economy. For this purpose, education should be standardised 
and student populations, funds, ideas, methodologies and facilities should 
be allowed to move relatively freely across the globe. This view is 
reflected in their policies, for example in the World Bank loan conditions 
for international educational exchanges that are in line with its Structural 
Adjustment Policies, and the OECD educational indicators and 
international comparisons (e.g. PISA). It is reproduced through the 
ranking systems (for example by the Shanghai Jiaotong University and the 
Times Higher Education Supplement). Even though the criteria for 
rankings has been criticised, for example for ignoring the specialisation of 
universities in certain disciplines and goals, they are influential. 
Educational institutions must take the standardisation and the 
commodification of higher education into account when they compete 
over students and resources. Institutions refer to ranking criteria when 
deciding the future areas of emphasis, which in turn contributes towards 
the further standardisation of higher education (Brooks and Waters 2011). 
For the main destination countries higher education has become an export 
commodity, and students have become customers who weigh their 
purchasing power (which includes money, academic credentials, country 
of origin) against the products available in the education market. To 
mediate these exchanges a professional group of experts, promoters, 
agents and brokers has emerged, fine-tuned to move between the different 
Cosmopolitical education
53
ideals, values and motivations attached to education by students and 
educators of different countries. 
! Many of these agents were represented at the 14th China 
International Education Exhibition Tour (CIEET) in March 2009 in Beijing. 
Organised by the Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange (CSCSE) 
and approved by the MOE, the 2009 expo toured 20 Chinese cities and 
drew around 89,000 visitors. Around 250 educational institutions from 25 
different countries were represented in Beijing, mostly universities and 
colleges but also secondary schools, language schools and institutions 
offering preparatory courses for universities, as well as Chinese private 
schools with international affiliations, embassies and various international 
or national institutions connected to educational exchanges. Students 
came to the exhibition with a clear idea of the country and the institution 
they planned to apply for, or with a few options and an aim to narrow 
them down. Some came with less clear objectives, to walk around, collect 
promotional materials and to talk to the exhibitors of various countries 
and institutions. Many parents came without their children, especially to 
collect information of the secondary and preparatory education abroad.  
! Most of the exhibitors I spoke to were seasoned promoters. They 
emphasised the importance of understanding what the students and the 
parents in each country want. All of them agreed that the interest in 
rankings and the quality of the institution was characteristic of the 
Chinese students and parents. In some countries they got asked about the 
physical study environment (including student housing and institutional 
facilities, and the safety, entertainment and scenery at the surrounding 
city/area) or the content of the programme, but Chinese students and 
parents rarely showed interest in these. The ranking of the institution and 
the programme, the transferability of the qualifications, fees and 
scholarships were their main interest. Understanding the general rationale 
of how Chinese students and parents choose an institution, the exhibitors 
tried to play on their strengths. A Canadian promoter said that it was 
difficult to explain to the students and the parents that rankings are not 
considered important in Canada. Her strategy was to emphasise that the 
choice of institution should mainly depend on the subject of study, not on 
the general ranking. Exhibitors were aware of the advantage the US 
institutions had in competing over applicants. They benefit from the 
general prestige attached to American education and the centrality of the 
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US in the imageries of progress and modernity, which places it at the top 
of the hierarchy in the geography of desire. A Dutch promoter emphasised 
the high international ranking of the university he represented, stressing 
to the students that despite having some of the best ranked universities in 
the world, US also has many institutions of poor ranking and quality. 
Apart from recruiting individual students and increasing general 
visibility, the promoters’ other objective was to make contacts and to 
establish partnerships with Chinese schools, agencies and other 
institutions. Partnerships enable more focused promotion at education 
institutions that have a student population directly in their target group. 
The promoters had scheduled talks at schools, negotiations about 
partnerships and interviews with students. These partnerships are part of 
the institutional network that not only facilitates, but drives student 
migration for the direct benefit the institutions get from the flow. 
! A notable part of the institutional network are the overseas study 
agencies. The internationalisation of higher education offers many 
opportunities for the business sector. One example are the standardised 
tests that are part of the application process for student migrants (IELTS, 
TOEFL, ESOL, GRE, SAT). The agencies offer consultancy services, 
language training, and preparation for the standard tests for potential 
students migrants. The agents I interviewed quoted charges between 
10.000 and 30.000 yuan for the agency services, which included preparing 
the visa application and the applications to the education institutions, 
making financial transactions, making travel arrangements and sometimes 
arranging an airport pick up and accommodation at the destination. On 
the language classes, the average student spent two to three thousand 
yuan, often during a few week period prior to the language test. For 
students who wanted private tutoring, each ‘VIP class’ could costs several 
thousand yuan.
! Overseas students are not only important to individual 
institutions, but an integral part of the wider political and economic 
interests of the destination countries. At the CIEET expo, several countries 
and regions were represented to increase their visibility as an overseas 
study destination. For example, British Columbia had a large section 
separated from the rest of Canada. Most institutions were exhibiting in 
China for the first time, and had joined a general government-supported 
project of promoting British Columbia as an overseas study destination.
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Destination country policies
! While the overseas study fever gathered momentum in China at 
the turn of the millennium, the main destination countries of the Chinese 
students drastically cut public spending on education.7  Fees charged on 
international students have come to constitute a major chunk of the higher 
education revenues. Even though all major destinations encourage 
student migration, there is variance in the policies. For example, US 
(especially after September 2001) has tight entry requirements, but is 
relatively lenient towards granting permanent residence. It is easier to 
enter the UK, but the opportunities for work and residency rights are very 
limited. Australia and Canada generally encourage permanent 
immigration of skilled migrants. 
! These policies are not permanent, but change according to the 
political and economic focus of each administration. Student migration 
also relates to wider political issues, especially to other types of migration. 
The recent policy change in the UK illustrates this. After a decade of trying 
to increase the number of non-EEA students and making UK the 
forerunner in the internationalised education market (Brooks and Waters 
2011: 41), the new coalition government announced a new policy in 2011. 
The aim is to reduce the annual total net migration (immigration minus 
emigration) from 250,000 to under 100,000 by the end of the parliament in 
2015. As part of this effort, new restrictions have been introduced to 
student visa regulations, including raised standards for English language 
proficiency and proof of sufficient finances, restricting the right to sponsor 
international students to institutions that are accredited as ‘highly trusted 
sponsors’, further restricting the hours students can spend working part-
time, restricting the number of years that can be spent on a student visa to 
three years at a non-degree level and five years at a degree level, and 
restricting the right to bring dependants to government-sponsored and 
currently enrolled graduate students. Perhaps most importantly, the Post-
Study Work visa (PSW, Tier 1) that allowed students to spend two years in 
the UK after graduation, has been abolished. The time allowed to look for 
work has been cut to four months, and only the people with a graduate 
level job offer with a minimum of 20.000 GBP salary, are eligible for work 
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7  World Bank data on Public expenditure on education, total (% of GDP). 
Accessed 4.6.2012 at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS 
visas (Home Office, UK Border Agency). According to the Immigration 
Minister Damian Green the aims of these changes is to ‘focus on quality, 
rather than quantity’ (in terms of both, incoming students and those who 
stay in the UK to work), to eliminate bogus institutions and bogus 
students, and to reduce the number of years students spend in the UK 
after graduation (Home Office 2012).
! For many student migrants improving their job prospects is an 
integral part of the overseas study project. The education promoters I 
interviewed at the CIEET expo agreed that issues that interested students 
and parents from all countries, including China, were visa issues, work 
permits and job opportunities after graduation. Better work opportunities 
can be defined in various ways, but the Chinese student migrants often 
hope to work abroad to earn higher income and/or to better their position 
in the Chinese job market (including multinational and foreign companies 
operating in China). The former can relate to earning back the money 
spent on overseas education, or a to a more long term goal to increase life-
time earnings and to achieve a certain level of living standard. Depending 
on the goal, a few years of working abroad might be enough, or the 
student migrant may wish to settle there permanently. Whatever the aims 
of the student migrants and the destination country government, they 
often conflict. The UK government tries to have the students in just long 
enough to add to the education revenue, and then, except for a select 
group of ‘highly skilled’ individuals and entrepreneurs, have the rest out. 
It is obvious that this kind of restrictive policy is against the interests of 
the student migrants, but the relationship between policy and migrant 
interests is not simple in terms of always following the ‘less restrictive - 
more in line with migrant interests’ rationale.
! This is illuminated by the Finnish case. The Finnish policy has been 
to have the free higher education8  to work as a pull for skilled 
immigration, with the intention that the international students will turn 
into tax payers and permanent immigrants to fill for the looming labour 
shortage as the population ages. For many Chinese student migrants, 
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8  A trial for introducing tuition fees for non-EU and non-ETA students is 
currently running (2010-2014) in a small number of higher education institutions. 
It is part of the debate of how to compete in the international education market in 
a way that benefits the Finnish economy. One suggestion is that students who 
stay in Finland to work will get their tuition ‘repaid’ in tax-reductions during the 
first five years. (Act of Parliament 91/2012)
however, studying in Finland is a way to get an overseas degree with 
reasonable financial cost, or a good quality education in one of the fields 
Finland is considered to possess special expertise (certain fields of design, 
IT, architecture, engineering, etc.). For some it works as a stepping stone to 
more desirable destinations, as the Finnish diploma is used to apply for 
work or graduate study in other countries. Of the ones who would wish to 
stay and work in Finland, many are reluctant to do the work required for 
the integration into the job market, most notably learning Finnish which is 
seen as a difficult and marginal language that adds little to general 
cosmopolitan competency. Unlike in Germany and France, where 
language competency is an entry requirement to most study programmes, 
in Finland studies can be conducted in English. This turns against the 
student when trying to enter the job market, as opportunities for those 
who do not speak Finnish are very limited.9
! The interests of the student migrants are often not in line with 
those of the destination country governments. Furthermore, it must be 
noted that different sectors of the destination countries also have differing 
interests. Going back to the UK case, the new restrictions have been 
widely criticised. A report by the Institute of Public Policy Research 
(Mulley and Sachrajda 2011) states that cutting the number of 
international students in the UK (in 2011 around 80,000, which, according 
to the Home Secretary Theresa May, the government plans to reduce by a 
fourth) will have a substantial negative impact on the financial and 
academic viability of education institutes and the general UK economy. A 
group of chancellors, governors and university presidents responded to 
the policy change with a a letter to the Prime Minister David Cameron, in 
which they described the devastating impact that the new restrictions will 
have on the universities. They requested that the international students 
would be classed as temporary rather than permanent migrants, which 
would remove them from the total net migration statistics.10 The current 
debate in the UK bears resemblance to debates in other main destination 
countries. Aihwa Ong (2006) notes that the higher education in the US has 
become so reliant on international students, especially from China and 
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9 My interview and ethnographic data among the Chinese students in Finland 
used as a basis for this section is in line with the results of a general survey 
conducted among international students in Finland (Kärki 2005). 
10 Guardian 30.5.2012
India, that any policy proposition towards a stricter visa regulation is met 
with an outcry from the education sector. Moreover, this dependency 
creates pressure to tailor education according to the needs of the 
international students (Ong 2006: 154). 
! The international education business that is at the centre of the 
Chinese student migration system connects the educational, commercial 
and supranational institutions, state governments, and the student 
migrants. I will now examine the development of Chinese student 
migration, looking at how these different agents are part of it, and how the 
Chinese state has tried to engage with the international education market 
in a way that serves particularistic interests. 
Chinese student migration
! Chinese migration for higher education started in the mid 19th 
century. The main destinations in the early years were US and Japan. 
These flows were interrupted when the Communists came to power in 
1949, and apart from the small numbers of students sent to USSR and 
other socialist countries for specialist training in the 1950s and 1960s, 
student migration was in standstill until the late 1970s.11
FIRST STAGE (from the late 1970s to the mid 1980s)
! Soon after coming into power, Deng Xiaoping started a campaign 
to resume international exchanges in science and education. In his 
speeches at the National Conference for Education in March 1978 and the 
National Conference on Science in May, he stressed the importance of 
learning from other countries to reform the Chinese education system. In 
June, he proposed sending students abroad to study subjects other than 
language, which was soon approved by the Ministry of Education (MOE). 
In 1979 the MOE set an annual quota of 3000 for students to be sent 
abroad in the next five years and later that year a decision was made that 
apart from scholars, also graduate students could be sent. The initiative of 
the Chinese government to resume student exchanges was 
enthusiastically received by many countries, and within the next three 
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11 For accounts of student migration in the late Qing, Republican and Maoist 
periods see Harrell (1992), Ling (1997) and Yao (2004).
years, agreements for exchange and cooperation in education and science 
were signed with the US, UK, Australia, Canada, Japan and several 
European countries. US decided not to limit the number of visas granted 
to Chinese students and opened access to fellowships and grants offered 
by American universities. As China joined the World Bank in January 
1979, new loans and funding for educational exchanges became available. 
Bureaucratic institutions proliferated under the MOE, universities and 
various administrative departments, to manage and to claim stake in the 
expanding flow of people, money and technologies (Zweig 2002: 164-8).
! Overseas student migration in the 1980s was characterised by a 
strong centralised control, which also influenced women’s proportion in 
the student flow. At first all leaving students and scholars were approved 
and funded by the MOE. In sending students abroad the government 
followed its policy of four modernisations (agriculture, industry, science 
and technology, and national defence), favouring students of natural 
sciences and engineering. The proportion of women in the student flow 
reflected the sex-ratio in domestic higher education. Roughly 10% of 
natural sciences and engineering students in China were female. In 
medical sciences and humanities the percentage was higher, ranging 
between 30% and 45% (Ling 1998: 152-3). Less than a fifth of the students 
who went to US before 1983 were female (Orleans 1988: 96-8). Of the 
student migrants to UK in 1980, only 12% were women (Table 3). 
Table 3. Chinese undergraduate and postgraduate students in the UK by 
gender
Year Male Female Total
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2010
126 88 % 17 12 % 143
563 83 % 113 17 % 676
1631 75 % 554 25 % 2185
1550 66 % 799 34 % 2349
5368 51 % 5209 49 % 10577
22745 45 % 28232 55 % 50977
Sources: Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS), UK
Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), UK12
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Table 4. Students going abroad and returning to China by year
Year
Number of 
Students Going 
Abroad
Number of 
Returned 
Students
Percentage of 
Returnees
1978
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
860 248 29 %
2124 162 8 %
4888 1424 29 %
4676 1388 30 %
4703 1605 34 %
3786 3000 79 %
3329 1753 53 %
2950 1593 54 %
2900 2069 71 %
6540 3611 55 %
10742 5128 48 %
19071 4230 22 %
20381 5750 28 %
20905 6570 31 %
22410 7130 32 %
17622 7379 42 %
23749 7748 33 %
38989 9121 23 %
83973 12243 15 %
125179 17945 14 %
117307 20152 17 %
114682 24726 22 %
118515 34987 30 %
134000 42000 31 %
144000 44000 31 %
179800 69300 39 %
229300 108300 47 %
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics 2010
! After 1981 self-sponsored (zi fei) overseas study was allowed, at 
first for a very limited number of people. Restrictions were further eased 
after the Second National Conference on Study Abroad in 1984, when it 
was decided that anyone with sufficient funding could go abroad to study, 
with the approval of their local Public Security Bureau (Zweig 2002: 
168-9). The proportion of women now started to increase and the range of 
subjects studied became wider. Orleans reports that women constituted 
around 40% of the self-sponsored students in the US by the mid-80s (1988: 
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96). Table 3 shows a 5% increase in the proportion of women students in 
the UK by 1985. Women’s overall proportion in the UK figures is lower 
because both self-sponsored and officially sponsored students are 
included. These statistics suggest that already in this period there were 
women who, when given the freedom to do so, were willing to go abroad, 
and notably, able to mobilise private financial support.  
SECOND STAGE (from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s)
! The decentralisation process in domestic higher education and 
student migration management continued in the following years and 
increasing numbers of students went abroad annually (Table 4). Towards 
the end of the 1980s, student protests and unrest, culminating in the June 4 
events at the Tiananmen in 1989, as well as the rising concern about brain 
drain resulted in the tightening of the policies. In short, the aim of the new 
regulations was to allow fewer students to go, motivate more return 
migration, and to send more older scholars than young students (Zweig 
2002: 171). The numbers of overseas students continued to drop until 1991 
(Table 4), but the number of applicants increased and more of those who 
went abroad chose to stay there. Student migration was used as a strategy 
to escape the political turmoil. At a birthday party I attended in Beijing I 
met several returnees who had left China soon after 1989. Their group of 
friends had played an active role in the student protests, and many of 
them had been arrested or placed under surveillance after the crack down. 
Those who managed to arrange a visa went abroad to study, only 
returning after gaining the citizenship of their destination country. 
! After 1992 the government renewed its focus on economic 
modernisation. Return migration was now encouraged by various 
preferential policies and special facilities, and schools and universities 
were permitted to set up their own procedures to select candidates for 
overseas study, which further decentralised the control on student 
migration (Zweig 2002: 172-5). The new slogan ‘Support overseas study, 
encourage people to return, give freedom to come and go’ (Zhichi liuxue, 
guli hui guo, lai qu ziyou) was declared at the Third Plenum of the 
Fourteenth Party Congress in 1993. Following these reforms, both the 
number of students going abroad and returning started to steadily 
increase.!
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! David Zweig (2002) argues that the internationalisation of 
education was instigated to rejuvenate the education sector, impoverished 
by the anti-intellectual Cultural Revolution, but its rapid growth was 
helped by the fact that despite the strong centralised control over visas, 
rights to use foreign capital to import equipment, etc., bureaucrats were 
unwilling to restrict the exchanges as their own children directly benefited 
from them. Apart from the new opportunities for overseas study, students 
in China also benefited from the inflow of equipment, investment, 
teaching materials, research methodologies and so forth. Moreover, as 
gatekeepers, the education and international relations bureaucrats quickly 
saw the opportunity for personal gain through the commoditisised 
international education exchanges, and were thus motivated to maintain 
and to expand the flow. Internationalisation of education, both in Chinese 
institutions and via student migration, thus became part of the social 
stratification process in the new politico-economic context. The first 
students to go abroad were mainly the children of the small political elite 
or the relatives of the overseas Chinese already settled abroad (Xiang and 
Shen 2009). In the 1990s the link between overseas education and class 
formation became even more apparent as the new rich started to convert 
their economic capital, often acquired by questionable means in the 
process of privatisation of the state assets, into internationally recognised 
cultural capital. The support of the party-state to overseas education and 
return migration legitimised their position in the new elite through the 
acquirement of political capital (Xiang and Shen 2009).
! In the late 1980s and the early 1990s the international education 
market was developing fast, and in the absence of effective regulation, 
irregular businesses and practices came to characterise this period. 
Language schools with poor teaching quality and resources proliferated in 
the destination countries, offering an entry (and sometimes a gateway to 
more desirable destination countries) and a diploma in exchange of fees. 
In China, agency business took off and illegal or inept practices such as 
forging documents plagued a part of the business. According to Xiang and 
Shen, overseas study in this period was sometimes seen as a means of 
purchasing a label without necessarily acquiring much substance in skills 
and knowledge (2009: 521). Student visas that were relatively easy to 
attain to many destinations in the 1990s were also used for labour 
migration. A Canadian promoter who has promoted and organised 
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educational exchanges in China for more than two decades, noted during 
our interview that the ‘disappearing students’ were a serious concern for 
Canadian institutions in the 1990s. In his view, the practice has since 
become less prevalent, but the Canadian institutions still avoid 
cooperation with agencies from Fujian (the main source of illicit labour 
migration from China to North America) because they expect most of the 
student visa applications to be refused. 
THIRD STAGE (late 1990s and 2000s)
! The turn of the millennium saw a dramatic expansion in student 
migrant numbers, which more than doubled from 2000 to 2001 (Table 4). 
Several factors contribute to this jump and the subsequent rapid increase. 
As argued by migration network theorists, migration flows tend to follow 
a cumulative, staged pattern towards increasing prevalence and diversity 
in socio-economic and demographic terms. This takes place as social 
capital is accumulated through the networks between migrants and the 
source communities (Massey et al. 1994). The first Chinese students to go 
abroad were mainly of elite background and male. As the migration flow 
matured, more information and alternative routes became available and a 
‘culture of migration’ (Kandel and Massey 2002: 982) emerged, other 
groups started to embark on the journey. This process was aided by the 
rising living standards and the family planning policies especially in the 
urban areas. The first generation of children born after the implementation 
of the one child policy were now entering universities, and more families 
had the means to invest in their child’s education abroad. 
 ! As the number of student migrants and returnees has increased, 
the migration flow has become more stratified and professional. Parents 
and students have become more focused and informed in their demands 
and expectations when dealing with the agencies and education 
promoters of the destination countries. Because of the devaluation of 
overseas diplomas, the university rankings have become important not 
only to the students and the parents, but also to the employers hiring 
returnees. At the same time, tighter visa policies and regulation of the 
international education business both in China and the destination 
countries have weeded out a good part of the irregular practices common 
in the 1990s (Xiang and Shen 2009). 
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! The student migrants of this third stage of migration system 
development are somewhat distinct from the migrants of the previous 
decades. Their migration is characterised by the cosmopolitan pursuit that 
emerges from the particular dynamics of the caring, the enterprising and 
the desiring subject. Fong (2004) describes this generation of urban 
singletons as first world children living in a third world country. Even in 
families of moderate economic means, parents have provided their only 
child with luxuries and lifestyles not affordable to themselves. One 
rationale behind the pampering is that nothing should distract the child’s 
focus away from study. Children thus grow up with high expectations 
about the future, partly because they desire and feel entitled to the elite 
lifestyle, and partly because of a sense of filial duty to pay back their 
parents’ sacrifices through enterprising and success. Student migration 
entails a prospect of becoming part of not only the national, but of 
cosmopolitan elite. Also the Chinese state has recently promoted the value 
of cosmopolitan skills and competencies by announcing its Talent 
Development Plan that views the overseas students and scholars as an 
indispensable part of transforming China from a manufacturing hub to an 
innovation economy (Wang 2010, 2011). 
! Chinese state instigated the reform era student migration but it 
soon propelled into a self-sustaining migration system with the education 
market at its centre. Apart from the practical benefits that the overseas 
diploma can bring in terms of job opportunities and higher income, 
geography of desire plays a major role in the rationale of push and pull. 
For many student migrants I knew the desire to study abroad had been 
evoked by imageries coming from Hollywood films, shopping at Wal-
Mart in China, etc. The final section of this chapter discusses the last piece 
of the migration system dynamics. That is, the Chinese education system 
and its problems that work as a push factor for tens of thousands of 
students every year who choose overseas study over domestic higher 
education.
Chinese education system as a push factor
! The current education system is riddled with a number of 
intertwined problems: uneven investment and unequal access, 
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competitiveness that puts an immense pressure on the young children, 
and teaching and testing methods that are oriented towards exam 
performance rather than creative ability and critical thinking were most 
often mentioned by the parents, student migrants and education 
professionals. A brief historical review of the education system will shed 
some light on how these problems have developed. Despite the variety of 
political and social trajectories education served during the Imperial, 
Republican and Maoist periods, the current education system has 
elements from all of them. 
STRATIFICATION
! The current education system is partly modelled after the 
Republican (1911-1949) system. In the late imperial China education had 
revolved around the civil servant exams that tested knowledge in 
Confucian moral and political theory classics. A network of state schools 
had existed but remained marginal in comparison to the classical training 
organised by lineage schools, private academies and tutors (Elman 1991: 
8-12). The goal of the Republican reformers was to establish a system that 
was more equal, encompassing and better adapted to the needs of 
modernisation. A new public school system was established but education 
remained divided into two strands, the underfunded and neglected public 
schools, and the privately funded and managed (by foreign Christian 
missions, lineages, returned overseas Chinese) schools for elites. In the 
1930s senior secondary education was divided into academic (college 
preparatory) and technical/vocational streams. The latter was especially 
directed to students from low-income families, who would not have the 
funds to continue to the tertiary level (Pepper 1996). 
! The focus of educational reforms of the Maoist period varied 
greatly during different political campaigns. Among the more consistent 
goals were the elimination of illiteracy, the universalisation of primary 
education and the emphasis on technical training. The early initiatives 
included nationalisation (or closing) of all private institutions, 
standardisation of teaching materials and curricula, and the use of 
Mandarin Chinese and simplified characteristics in teaching. The 
expansion of basic education was taken as the matter of most urgency, and 
impressively, enrolment in primary education went from 49% in 1952 to 
80% in 1958 (Hannum 1999: 195). This focus, however, did not leave 
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enough resources for a total reform at secondary and tertiary levels, and 
the old system that concentrated education above secondary level in 
urban areas, with some vocational and technical institutions in rural areas, 
was kept in place. As the need for skilled specialists increased, investment 
became even more focused, coming to prioritise a number of key point 
(zhongdian) institutions at the expense of others (Andreas 2004; Hannum 
1999). Until the Cultural Revolution, the policy of ‘walking on two 
legs‘ (Liang tiao tui zoulu) kept the two education systems fairly separate, 
the rural system aiming at eliminating illiteracy and training middle-level 
skilled labour force, while higher level training and more comprehensive 
education was concentrated in urban areas.
! Between 1966 and 1976 education was submitted to the radical 
political agenda of the Cultural Revolution. Education institutions were 
initially closed for a few years, and after reopening, the former curricula 
were replaced with ones that consisted largely of political propaganda and 
manual labour, the track system (academic and vocational) was 
eradicated, as was exam-based progression. The link between educational 
and occupational achievement was removed and political loyalty 
emphasised over academic achievement (Hannum 1999). Education 
management was decentralised from county level education bureaus to 
communes and production brigades (Pepper 1996). These reforms had a 
devastating impact on the quality of education, but at the same time, were 
successful in eliminating many of the institutional and social barriers that 
had previously stood in the way of the children of the workers and 
peasants in getting access to the same opportunities as their more 
privileged counterparts (Andreas 2004; Pepper 1996). 
! The objectives of education changed again drastically in the late 
1970s. Class struggle and egalitarianism were abandoned as the primary 
objectives and a more competitive, meritocratic system that was deemed 
better to serve the country’s economic development, was re-introduced. 
The new system (Table 5) built on the pre-1966 model, dividing secondary 
and tertiary education into academic and vocational tracks, bringing back 
the entrance exams, and focusing investment on key point institutions. 
Alongside the marketisation policies, private schools and multiple sources 
of funding were permitted, and various experimental forms of education, 
including short-cycle, correspondence and video courses and evening 
schools were introduced. A gradual process (still somewhat incomplete) of 
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universalising a nine year compulsory education was started from the 
coastal areas, moving to the less developed inner and western regions. 
Compared to the uniform and egalitarian schooling during Cultural 
Revolution, the new system was more complicated, selective and focused 
on training skilled experts to all levels of the labour market. The Soviet 
model used in the 1960s, which separates arts and sciences taught in 
comprehensive universities from technological subjects, engineering and 
medicine taught in single or multi-faculty colleges, and teacher training 
offered by normal universities, was kept in place. 
! The division into elite and regular education has been under 
criticism and debate since the early 1980s, and several provinces have 
officially abolished the key school system. Despite this, the system is very 
much alive with a few selected institutions harnessing a majority of 
funding and resources, the best teachers and the best students, and 
preparing them to pass the entrance exam to the best institutions at the 
next level. In every day language, the institutions are still referred to as 
key point and regular, and parents and students are very clear about 
which schools in their area belong into which category. Another basis of 
ranking institutions is the administrative level (national, provincial, 
municipal, county, etc.) that manages and funds them. This favours 
children from urban families with wealth and connections. As the best 
institutions are concentrated at urban centres and affluent areas, and 
children gain access to primary schools on the basis of their household’s 
registered residency (hukou), elite children automatically get into the track 
that prepares them to enter the top institutions at the next level. 
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Table 5. Current education system in China (not including private and 
adult education)
3-6 years
Higher 
education 
Gaodeng 
jiaoyu 
2 years
2-6 years
2-4 years
Secondary 
education 
Zhongdeng 
jiaoyu
3-4 years
5-6 years
Primary 
education 
Chudeng 
jiaoyu
Up to 6 
years of 
age
Pre-school 
education 
Xueqian 
jiaoyu
Doctorate 
degree (Boshi 
xuewei)
2+3 
Master’s 
and PhD
Non-
compulsory
Fees charged
Entrance exam 
(Kaoyan)
Master’s 
degree (Shuoshi  
xuewei)
Entrance exam (Kaoyan)
University 
(Daxue), 
4 year college: 
BA (Xueshi 
xuewei), 
Diploma (Benke 
wenping) 
Key/regular
Short cycle 
college (Duanqi 
zhiye daxue) 
2-3 year diploma 
courses (Zhuanke 
wenping)
Specialised/
Technical/
Vocational 
college 
(Gaodeng 
zhuanye/jishu/
zhiye daxue) 
College entrance exam (Gaokao)
Academic senior 
secondary school (college 
prep high schools), (Gaoji 
zhongdeng putong xuexiao) 
Key/regular
Specialised/ 
Technical/Vocational 
senior secondary 
school (Gaoji zhongdeng 
zhuanye/jishu/zhiye 
xuexiao)
Senior secondary school exam (Zhonggao)
Academic junior 
secondary school 
(Chuji zhongdeng putong xuexiao) 
Key/regular (zhongdian/putong)
Vocational 
junior 
secondary 
school (Chuji 
zhongdeng 
zhuanye 
xuexiao)
Compulsory 
education 
No fees
Primary school (Chudeng xuexiao), 
Key/regular (zhongdian/putong)
Pre-school and kindergarden (You’eryuan)
Non-
compulsory
Fees charged
Sources: MOE China, Education in China; UNESCO-IBE World Data on 
Education 2011
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! There are many strategies to cope with and manipulate the 
stratified education system, using money and connections. The families I 
knew had used various irregular of illegal strategies to get their child into 
a good school or to compensate for poor performance. Parents had made 
donations or paid extra fees (20.000-50.000 yuan) to key point schools in 
order to have their child accepted in spite of an insufficient exam score; 
bought a house in an area that belonged to the catchment area of a 
particular school; paid money to change their child’s hukou; changed the 
child’s ethnic registration to get extra points through a minority quota; 
paid bribes to the admission committee; and bought a forged school 
certificate.13  Aside from these backdoor strategies, most parents try to 
create optimal conditions for their child’s academic development and 
worry constantly about both, the child’s performance and the pressure the 
child has to endure while going through the system. The children are 
pampered with comforts and care, not permitted to do household chores 
and have little time for unsupervised play, all of which the parents hope 
will enable them to focus entirely on study. In addition to spending most 
of their time at school or doing homework under supervision, children 
take private classes in academic subjects and in arts during evenings and 
weekends, and some spend their school vacations at tutoring camps.
! The stratification of the Chinese education system shapes the 
student profiles and their migration motivations. Students of high 
academic ability have the choice of studying at top-ranked national 
institutions, or applying for scholarships abroad. Even though the 
scholarships allow students of low-income families to go abroad, the 
domestic disparity in educational quality and investment that channels 
children into different tracks from a very early age, makes it difficult for 
these children to develop their academic competence. Students from 
wealthy families with low academic performance can, on the other hand, 
use overseas study as a backup strategy in case they are unable to 
compete in the domestic system.
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13  These were relatively cheap and accessible. In 2010 I bought a forged 
university diploma for one of the country’s top 10 universities for the price of 300 
yuan. A group of women who gathered outside the university gates daily, 
accompanied by babies to avoid harassment from the city management officers, 
dealt various forged documents from exam results to diplomas, student IDs, etc.
EXAMS
! Entrance exams are at the core of the Chinese education system. 
The disparity in the education quality and investment further magnifies 
their importance. The exam scores largely determine the quality and the 
type of institution the student is admitted to at the next level. The exams 
thus give a chance of bettering one’s educational trajectories. But of course 
the quality and the type of education at the previous level influences the 
student’s  exam performance.  
! Education as a route to social mobility and a means of class 
consolidation has a long history in China. Exams that are (in theory) open 
to all have been the basis of this mobility since the Tang dynasty (618-906), 
when the early form of the examination system for imperial civil officials 
was launched. After successfully entering imperial officialdom, a person 
could expect to climb up the ladder of ranks in a bureaucratic process that 
was relatively independent from personal connections. The literati were at 
the top of the class structure, above peasants, artisans and merchants, and 
the examination system was virtually the only access point to the category. 
Education thus offered a real opportunity for social mobility (Elman 1991: 
8-12). References to the imperialist classical education and the civil servant 
examination system are regularly made in debates that surround the 
current education system in China. The student migrants and the parents 
often said that the knowledge-based education in China with its focus on 
exam performance (versus education abroad that is thought to emphasise 
problem solving and skills) had its basis on the Confucian classical 
education and was ill-adapted to serve the modern society. ‘I think the 
school wants you to be a scholar, rather than a manager. So you learn a lot 
of knowledge, but you don’t learn many skills.’, a 20 year old student of 
agricultural economics in one of China’s top ranked universities 
complained. ‘In China students only study for the exams, after the exam 
they forget everything’, stated a mother of a high school student whom 
she was trying to persuade to go to UK to study. Yet people also defended 
the exam system as the best alternative currently available to ensure equal 
opportunity and access to higher education. Also the long-standing 
tradition of valuing education is a source of nationalistic pride, and an 
integral part of the national identity. All Chinese, the poor, the rich, the 
urban and the rural people think education is important, simply because it 
is part of Chinese history and culture, I was repeatedly told. 
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! The college entrance exam (gaokao), is a defining moment in a 
student’s life. The pressure mounted on this one event is immense, it is 
said to determine the entire future of the student, and the three years of 
high school devoted to preparing for the exam are said to be the hardest 
years of one’s life. The student migrants remembered these years as being 
buried under school work, exhausted and anxious about the expectations 
of their parents and teachers. At the same time, they remembered the 
strong companionships with classmates, and the lengths their parents 
went to in order to support and to care for them. For those students who, 
in spite of the pressure and support, were not interested in study and did 
not perform well, the time was characterised by feelings of boredom and 
humiliation. 
! The psychological problems the rigid schedule, the workload and 
the exam pressure causes are widely discussed and publicised in the 
media. The news reports about student suicides and attacks against 
teachers peak around gaokao, as the students cannot cope with the 
pressure of preparing for the exams, or get disappointing results. Another 
common theme in the media is cheating scams. In 2010 a high school 
teacher was reportedly caught having sold (for 20.000 yuan each) his 
students electronic sensors that could be hidden in the mouth and used 
for receiving exam answers.14 Another example are the so called exam 
migrants, who are discovered every year taking the exam in a province 
that has a lower score requirement for a good university.15  The news 
stories about cheating or manipulating the system anger the parents and 
the students, as the only justification for the gruelling exam system is 
thought to be its fairness and egalitarian nature. The reported efforts to 
prevent cheating in 2009 included setting up surveillance cameras and 
wireless network signal jammers in the exam halls, using metal detectors 
for checking the entering students, and using wireless vehicle tracking 
equipment to seek suspected signals in the areas surrounding the exam 
halls. In some provinces, the students were not permitted to bring their 
own stationery, watches or mobile phones to the exam hall. The exams are 
organised by local authorities, but the process is monitored by the MOE 
that sends inspection groups to the provinces.16
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14 China Daily 7.6.2010
15 China Daily 7.6.2009
16 China Daily 5.6.2009
! On the actual days of the exam roads and construction sites near 
the schools quiet down and images of anxious parents waiting outside the 
school gates are spread through the media. After the exam, the students 
and the parents must wait for the results that will determine the success of 
their university application. The applications are filled in before the 
results arrive, which means that the students and the parents must 
accurately estimate the exam performance in order to put down subjects 
and universities that match the gaokao score. If the score is lower than 
expected, the student might not be admitted to any of the programmes 
chosen. If it is higher, she or he might regret not having applied to more 
selective programmes. Even when getting into a good programme, the 
entire process leaves many students feeling disoriented and not in charge 
of their future. The students I knew at the Renmin University had all done 
well in their gaokao and had relatively good career prospects waiting after 
graduation. Yet many of them confessed not liking the subject they 
studied, and found it difficult to find the motivation, the self-discipline 
and the right methods for university study, after so many years of having 
their time and activities comprehensively structured by others.
! For some parents, sparing their children from the pressure of the 
Chinese education and exam systems is a major motivator of sending 
them abroad. Parents of a seven year old girl who had recently been 
diagnosed with a deteriorating eye condition, were making plans to take 
her to Canada as soon as she finished primary school. Describing their 
daughter as sensitive and physically weak, they did not believe she could 
cope with the workload and the pressure of the Chinese education. The 
mother was planning to leave her accountant job to accompany her 
daughter abroad, while the father, an engineer, would stay in Beijing and 
support the family financially. Several of the students I knew who had 
gone abroad after high school had not sat the gaokao, but had prepared 
their applications for foreign universities while their classmates crammed 
for the exam. Others took the exam, but with the backup plan that if their 
score was not high enough to enter a prestigious programme in China, 
they would go abroad. Some students had initially planned to study in 
China, but scored lower than expected in the gaokao and had to enter a low 
ranking programme in China. Unmotivated by their studies, they started 
preparing their applications abroad and after a year of two, left the 
programme for overseas study.
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Graduate job market
! According to the MOE, 68.7% of the exam participants in 2010 
were admitted to institutions of higher education. That was a 7% increase 
from the year before.17 The rapid expansion of higher education since 2000 
allows more secondary school graduates to continue into higher 
education, and the job security formerly associated with a university 
degree has disappeared. This further emphasises the importance of the 
rankings of Chinese universities. Employers are most interested in 
graduates from prestigious institutions and programmes, and many 
consider getting a degree from a low ranked institution not worth the 
effort at all. 
! The expansion of domestic education contributes to another push 
factor for student migration, the competitive graduate labour market. 
New enrolments in regular institutions of higher education went from 1.2 
million in 1998 to 2.7 million in 2001. New institutions mushroomed 
around the country to facilitate this expansion. Having remained around 
one thousand for a decade, the number of institutions doubled between 
2000 and 2008 (China National Bureau of Statistics 2009). Coupled with 
the dismantling of the state job allocation system a few years earlier, 
unemployment became a real threat for new graduates. Until the 
abolishment of the system in the late 1990s, education institutions carried 
the main responsibility for allocating jobs to graduates. Higher education 
thus guaranteed a job at the high end of the labour market. Graduate 
employment rate dropped from over 90% in the 1990s to near 70% in the 
2000s18  (Li and Zhang 2010: 40-1). Although the expansion of higher 
education has in part been a response to the labour demands that result 
from the restructuring of the economy, another driving force has been the 
need to fuel domestic consumption. Until now, the Chinese have been 
more inclined to save than to spend money, and education and housing 
are among the few targets people are willing to invest on. In this context, 
more students are driven to seek a competitive edge and career security 
through an overseas degree. Moreover, graduate studies, both overseas 
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17 China Daily 8.6.2010
18 The employment rate, reported by the government has increased again after 
2009 (87%) due to a government campaign to create jobs for the graduates (Li and 
Zhang 2010: 40-1).
and in China, are pursued as an alternative to entering the uncertain 
labour market.
! The problems of the Chinese education system worked as a push 
factor for overseas study for most of the student migrants and the parents 
in my study. They hoped it would give access to a better quality education 
that focused on problem solving, creative thinking and adaptable skills, 
through the use of interactive teaching methods and research rather than 
memorising and lecturing for the sake of passing exams. They also hoped 
that overseas education would develop the student’s abilities, and give 
formal qualifications needed and respected in the current globalising 
labour market. Finally, the students hoped to study in a more relaxed and 
less competitive atmosphere, with a lighter workload. The parents and the 
students also saw the benefits of the Chinese education and the 
advantages it could give them while studying abroad. Many valued the 
Chinese primary and secondary education for the amount of knowledge 
and the degree of diligence it instilled in students. For example, once 
abroad, the students of maths and finance found that their maths skills 
were well ahead of their fellow students from other countries, and some 
found it easy to cope with the coursework because they were used to 
working hard. Not all expectations were fulfilled, however, and some 
became disappointed with the content and teaching quality of their 
overseas courses, or found it too difficult to adapt to different study 
methods. 
Conclusion
! Mao once stated that the three oppressive mountains the Chinese 
people must overthrow are imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic 
capitalism. In the post-reform China this popular saying has been 
rephrased to reflect the new challenges people struggle with, namely: 
education, housing and health care. As education is a major route to 
economic betterment and job security, many hope that conquering this 
mountain will help overthrow the other two. The Chinese education 
system and its problems constitute a part, the push factor, of the student 
migration system. At the centre of the current student migration system is 
the international education market, which I have here called 
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cosmopolitical, because the various state, suprastate, educational and 
commercial agents try to engage in this apparently cosmopolitan field for 
very particularistic interests. The neoliberalist perspective on education as 
standardised and commodified training of highly mobile and flexible 
workforce for the needs of either global or national economies underlines 
these trajectories. The Chinese state, depending on the economic and 
political project of the time, has effectively restricted or instigated 
migration for higher education. But as tends to happen with migration 
flows, once initiated, they easily become self-sustaining systems with a 
growing number of institutions and agents involved as beneficiaries. 
What is more, migrants develop their own strategies and interests, that 
can change the dynamics of the flow in a way that does not serve the 
initial state interests.19 Against the structural social and cultural contexts 
laid out in these first two chapters, the next chapter looks at how the 
individual migrants and families make decisions and experience their 
journeys within the migration system, enacting the caring, enterprising 
and desiring elements of their subjectivities. 
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19 For an example of ‘migration industry’ see for example Pieke et al (2004) on 
smuggling networks from Fujian to US. For an example on state initiated 
migration that has been taken on a different course by the migrants,  see for 
example Constant and Massey (2002) on Turkish guest workers settling in 
Germany in the 1950s and 1970s.
3. JOURNEYS ON THE FIRST MOUNTAIN
! The previous chapter looked at the dynamics of the migration 
system as a whole. I now turn to the individual migrants, asking: what 
plans they make and what they hope to achieve through migration; and 
then, how these plans, hopes and goals turn into actual experiences. The 
aim is to understand how the relatively simple rationale behind going 
abroad to study turns into a variety of experiences. This process in linked 
to the relationship between different sources of power and spatial 
mobility. For the analysis I will take Mahler and Pessar’s (2001; Pessar and 
Mahler 2003) entire model for geography of power, and apply its building 
blocks to the case of the Chinese student migrants. The first block is 
Doreen Massey’s (1994) ‘power geometry’. People are situated differently 
regarding access to flows and interconnections, and influence over them. 
For the Chinese student migrants their family background (parents’ 
income and education levels, social status and connections, rural/urban 
residency, etc.) is part of defining the geometry of power. The second 
block, ‘social location’ refers to the positioning on the hierarchies of 
kinship, generation, gender, race, class, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, 
etc., that shift with spatial mobility. It should be clear by now that much of 
what defines the student migration experience is not gender specific. 
Gender does, however, play a role in defining some parts of it, which will 
be discussed using the fourth block, ‘geographical scales’. This block looks 
at how ‘gender operates simultaneously on multiple spatial and social 
scales (e.g., the body, the family, the state) across transnational 
terrains.’ (Pessar and Mahler 2003: 815). For the Chinese student migrants, 
the main contradictions arise from the operations of gender on the scales 
of family, heterosexual relations, education and work. Finally, Mahler and 
Pessar draw attention to the contribution individual characteristics and 
social imaginary, or ‘mindwork’, in shaping migrant experience. For the 
latter, I take up the issue of cosmopolitan affect. It is not only familial 
affect, but the affect produced in the cosmopolitan encounters with people 
as well as physical locations, material objects, images and events, that 
shapes the student migrant experience. Let me start by briefly outlining 
the widely shared ideas about the goals and benefits of student migration, 
before going into the analysis of how they turn into a variety of 
experiences. 
The benefits of studying abroad
! In the discussions about their motivations for overseas study the 
following benefits were repeatedly listed by both female and male student 
migrants: improvement of language skills, better quality education, better 
career prospects both in China and abroad, higher earnings in the future, 
learning about other cultures and ‘broadening of vision’ (tuo kuan shiye). 
For some students, study abroad was seen as a starting point for a more 
comprehensive life plan of living abroad permanently and starting a 
family there. My surveys at the Renmin University and at the LSE support 
these ethnographic findings. A total of 12 possible benefits were listed in 
the survey. Students rated them as ‘very important’, ‘important’, ‘not 
important’, ‘not important at all’, or ‘there is no such benefit’. The seven 
listed in Table 6 were the most highly rated, with no significant difference 
between female and male respondents.20 Benefits that were rated high by 
90% or more students were the improvement of language skills and 
cultural understanding, better quality education and the broadening of 
vision. This set of benefits is integral to the pursuit of cosmopolitan 
subjectivity. They are at the core of cosmopolitan competency and 
orientation, giving the ability to move across sociocultural fields, to 
communicate effectively and to relate to people and conditions in various 
settings. In contrast, the slightly lower rated benefits: better career 
opportunities in China and abroad, and higher future income, are concrete 
benefits that will hopefully follow from such cosmopolitan subjectivity. 
! Of the top rated benefits, improvement of language skills appears 
the most concrete, easily measurable benefit of studying abroad. In the 
international education market it is treated as such through the 
standardised tests that are required as a proof of language proficiency 
when applying to universities (TOEFL, IELTS) or for jobs (e.g., TOEIC, 
Cambridge ESOL tests: CAE, BEC, BULAC). In effect, the language studies 
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20  The results of the LSE survey are not presented here as there was no 
statistically significant difference to the Renmin sample.
Table 6. The rating of the benefits of overseas study by gender (aspiring 
student migrants)
Female Male
Improvement of 
language skills
Very important or 
important
There is no such 
benefit
Education quality 
better abroad
Very important or 
important
There is no such 
benefit
Opportunity to 
work abroad after 
graduation
Very important or 
important
There is no such 
benefit
Better career 
prospects in China 
after return
Very important or 
important
There is no such 
benefit
Higher income 
after graduation
Very important or 
important
There is no such 
benefit
Understanding 
foreign cultures 
and lifestyles
Very important or 
important
There is no such 
benefit
Broadening vision
Very important or 
important
There is no such 
benefit
97 % 94 %
1 % 1 %
89 % 96 %
4 % 3 %
64 % 67 %
9 % 14 %
83 % 82 %
10 % 11 %
75 % 76 %
15 % 11 %
90 % 90 %
4 % 7 %
97 % 96 %
1 % 1 %
Source: Author’s survey at the Renmin University of China (Female 
n=112, Male n=91)
of the aspiring student migrants are usually aimed at passing the 
standardised exams, rather than being able to communicate in real 
situations. Most students I knew had taken preparatory classes for these 
tests in private language schools in China. They separated this type of 
learning, its methods and its aims, from what they hoped to attain while 
studying abroad. The ability to use language in real life interactions was 
not connected to the class-room learning, but to experience of such 
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interactions. Ability to communicate was the ultimate language goal of 
student migration.
! The better quality education was defined as a general Western 
emphasis on critical analysis and creative thinking, and access to cutting 
edge theories and methods in the fields still lagging behind in China (e.g., 
design, media and broadcasting, social and political sciences, business 
management). The knowledge and the ways of thinking, i.e. the 
cosmopolitan skills and competency, that could be gained from this kind 
of education were deemed necessary to anyone regardless of where they 
wanted to work in the future. To those who wished to work abroad, in 
multinational companies or in foreign companies in China, the value was 
obvious. But even those whose career plans were clearly tied to China, 
Chinese companies and markets, thought they would benefit from 
education abroad. In the view of the student migrants, cosmopolitan skills 
and competency would help to adapt to the rapidly transforming work 
environment in China, or to become an active contributor in China’s 
development. Skills and qualities that at the moment could only be 
acquired through cosmopolitan engagements, would in the near future 
become indispensable if one wished to succeed in China.
! The phrase ‘broadening vision’ was sometimes used when talking 
about education quality, especially in terms of access to new ideas, 
theories and methodologies. But more often it referred to the abilities, 
experiences and understanding that could be gained from living outside 
China, in a foreign society and culture, being exposed to foreign media, 
and interacting with people from other countries. Together with the 
benefit of understanding foreign cultures and lifestyles, it can be classed 
as cosmopolitan orientation (Vertovec and Cohen 2002); a form of self-
development and fulfilment that has value aside from its practical 
benefits. Lulu’s friend Storm explained why studying in Hong Kong 
would broaden his vision: 
Hong Kong is more developed than China, so I think I can 
learn many things. It will be good for me to see another side. 
Because you know, Hong Kong is freer than China is. So for 
example the press and the media, here it’s all censored. So 
maybe we can see some things but not everything. It will be 
good to see all things.
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! The broadened vision also related to how one perceived him or 
herself, or was perceived by others, in cosmopolitan encounters. When I 
talked with Jonatan and his father about the benefits of studying abroad. 
Jonatan said, ‘Father always says that one important thing is confidence. 
That when I meet with high status people, I don’t feel inferior. That we 
have a common topic and we can communicate. Studying abroad has had 
this benefit.’ 
! Broadening one’s vision was used in reference to how the subject 
relates to the surrounding political and economic environment, and acts in 
relatively superficial encounters in these contexts. Cultural customs and 
lifestyle, on the other hand, refer to the ways of acting in intimate and 
informal situations, such as spending time with friends, dating and family 
life. The complex processes of adaptation and alienation, and the affective 
urgency of experiencing them are discussed in more detail below. For 
now, suffice it to say that this was the area where students experienced 
some of the great self-developmental successes, but also had feelings of 
great anxiety and disappointment when their hopes and expectations 
were not met.
! The more concrete benefits: higher incomes and better career 
opportunities, were viewed with more ambiguity. First, a higher 
proportion of students thought that overseas study will have no such 
benefits. Students preparing and currently studying abroad are aware of 
the devaluation of the diplomas since the overseas study fever started in 
2000, and have heard many stories of returnees not having their 
expectations about jobs, salaries and benefits met. Most students thus 
know that an overseas degree no longer guarantees a significant 
competitive advantage in the job market. The high cost of studying abroad 
further decreases the advantage it might bring in terms of higher earnings. 
The survey respondents considered enhanced prospects in the Chinese 
labour market more important than the job opportunities abroad. These 
attitudes reflect the economic trends at the time of the surveys (the 
Renmin survey in early 2010, the time of the global economic crisis; the 
LSE survey in early 2012, during the Euro crisis). As seen in Table 4, the 
number of returning students has increased since the 2008 crisis started. 
The widely held view is that China currently offers better opportunities to 
overseas graduates than the destination countries. 
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! The student migrants hope to gain some concrete benefits through 
their overseas education, but the primary objective is the more intangible 
project of becoming a cosmopolitan subject. This all seems very 
reasonable, but only sets the general picture. The emphasis individual 
students put on different goals varies and some students are more 
successful than others in achieving them. Moreover, motivations emerge 
and goals are pursued from a particular position in the geography of 
power. I will start by looking at how the final element in Mahler and 
Pessar’s (2001; Pessar and Mahler 2003) model, personal characteristics, 
shape the experience of student migration.
Personal characteristics
! In line with their general attitude towards education and work, 
some student migrants viewed the project primarily in instrumental 
terms, with clear ideas about the role it would play in their overall career 
development. Others valued the experiential side more, having only very 
vague, if any, expectations about concrete benefits. Liu Zhu, a student of 
social work at the Renmin University, had plans to go to Canada to study 
for a business degree. She clearly articulated her project in terms of the 
concrete benefits, namely higher income level and better opportunities in 
the competitive Chinese labour market. Describing herself as a traditional 
(bu kaifang) girl, she had little interest in adapting Western habits and 
culture. The experience of living with European students in India had 
affirmed her disinterest, even disdain, toward their student lifestyle. Her 
ultimate goal was to work for the Chinese branch of a foreign owned 
company, thus benefiting from the higher pay and better terms of 
employment, while still being able to live and work in China. Liu Zhu’s 
friend Ben also wanted to study abroad and then return to China. A 
student of agricultural economics at the Renmin University, he had been 
disappointed with the content of his course and the teaching methods. In 
his view the course did not put enough emphasis on learning adaptable 
skills and knowledge. To get the kind of education he wanted, Ben 
planned study finance in the US and was preparing applications to UCLA 
and UC Berkeley. He explained these choices through the rationale of 
education as an investment. A degree from the most prestigious 
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university, from the country where education quality is considered to be 
the highest in the world, on a subject that would give the best possibilities 
for high earnings, would bring the best return for the investment. As for 
his plan to return to China, he explained: 
I’m used to China and I think it’s my home. And another 
reason is that now the economics of China is very good, gives 
you more chances. I think that if you haven’t been born in 
America and you are not American, then America will not 
offer you lots of chances.
! A sense of belonging and contacts that will help in integration can 
of course develop during the migration process. Liu Zhu and Ben were 
both still at the preparation stage, but both had experience of staying 
abroad for several months, Liu Zhu in India where she worked with 
European students, and Ben in the US where he had done two internships. 
Their time spent abroad had not evoked in them a desire for cosmopolitan 
orientation, but they remained focused on the cosmopolitan skills and 
competency overseas study could bring. Their attitudes were in contrast 
with those student migrants whose main interest was to live abroad, or to 
some, not to live in China. Meng was one of them. A rebellious child, she 
had not been a good student. In her memories high school was a 
humiliating experience, and she had found the methods of motivating 
students through comparison and competition particularly distressing. At 
the end of high school, unable to pass her exams, Meng had bought a 
forged high school certificate for 100 yuan. ‘The school wanted to get rid 
of bad students, so it was easy to find a certificate to buy.’ After high 
school she started a vocational course but dropped out before finishing. 
She then floated between casual jobs, living with her boyfriend of several 
years. At the age of 23, an opportunity presented itself to go to UK to 
study. Her boyfriend’s friend who lived in the UK offered help to make 
arrangements for the couple to live and to study there. In the end, only 
Meng went. For her, the motivation was not to further her career, to get 
good quality education or to ensure higher future earnings. 
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I went abroad not so much because I wanted to go back to 
studying, but because I wanted change. At the time I had 
started to meet foreigners, and I started to think I want to do 
something different. I also wanted to get rid of my boyfriend. 
Since a teenager I had felt very depressed and lonely, I wanted 
to change something. I felt that my parents didn’t love me, my 
boyfriend wanted to kill me, and no one was there to help me.
 
! Meng enrolled in a small private art school, but soon dropped out. 
According to her the school was one of the bogus institutions that had 
proliferated in the destination countries during the 1990s. The few courses 
that were offered were of bad quality, and Meng decided there was little 
more than a student visa to gain from this school. She ended up staying in 
the UK for four years, working and taking courses in design. At the time 
we met in Beijing, she was 33 years old, well past the ideal marriage age 
for women, but still unmarried. She worked as a freelance costume 
designer in film industry. Feeling anxious in this relatively settled life, she 
wanted to go travelling again. Soon she managed to arrange a visa, and 
left to stay with friends in Germany and UK for three months. After a 
short stop back in Beijing she was off again, this time to New York, with 
no clear plans other than staying with a friend, maybe joining a yoga 
school, and possibly rekindling a past romance with an American man. 
During the course of her migrations, Meng had undoubtedly developed 
some cosmopolitan skills and competencies through working and 
studying abroad. But she had little interest in turning this social and 
cultural capital into concrete benefits. Her initial motivation had been to 
escape the bounds of her sociocultural field, and she had achieved this by 
becoming cosmopolitan in her orientation, moving back and forth across 
sociocultural fields with relative ease and confidence.
! Between the two extremes of placing most of the emphasis on the 
instrumental aspect of overseas study, or focusing on its value to personal 
emotional and experiential side, were the majority of students who were 
to some degree motivated by both aspects. They talked about a desire to 
have new experiences and to see the world, while also making clear plans 
to gain tangible benefits from overseas study.
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Family background and power geometry
! Apart from individual characteristics, the characteristics of the 
family play an important role in shaping the student migration project. 
The position of the family vis-à-vis the flows of international education 
market are determined by factors that I call ‘family background’. Urban 
families in my study can be roughly divided into three categories that to 
some extent have different motivations for overseas education, ways of 
organising it, and conflicts that arise in the process. The first category, elite 
families, includes students whose parents have a high political and 
economic status in China (high level cadres and government officials). 
Also students whose parents belong to the new cosmopolitan elite (e.g., 
professionals and academics whose work involves travel and living 
abroad, those involved in international business and diplomats) belong to 
this group. The latter differ from the former in being able to mobilise 
overseas networks to facilitate their child’s migration. Parents I knew in 
this category were able to screen and choose a university for their child 
through connections or personal visits, arrange internships, make living 
arrangements and to mobilise various forms of support for the student 
through friends and relatives already living abroad. This was the case for 
Wang, whose mother is a university professor of international business. 
During her several visits to US she had got to know a high school vice 
director in Seattle. At the age of 16, Wang was sent to attend this school 
and lived with the vice director’s family. At the time he finished high 
school, his host took a job in the student recruitment department of a 
private college in Ohio. Wang applied to the same college to study 
economics and finance, was accepted and moved with the family. This is 
an example of the how the networks of the international education 
business develop not only through institutional, but also personal 
connections.
! It also shows that the cosmopolitan elite families are in a position 
in the power geometry that gives them the capacity to benefit and even 
shape the migration flows. Their relatively powerful position vis-à-vis the 
flows makes their engagement more proactive in comparison to most 
families who merely hope to find a way to benefit from the flows, not to 
actively shape them. To bring their children into the same cosmopolitan 
field of action with themselves, these parents often encourage their child 
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to work or even to settle abroad after graduation. Aihwa Ong’s (1999, 
2006) work on ‘flexible citizenship’ shows how accumulating passports, 
education and residential rights in different countries works as a 
neoliberalist strategy of (Hong Kong) Chinese cosmopolitan elite, to gain 
power and capital(s), while avoiding the constraints imposed by different 
state regimes.
! The families belonging to the domestic politico-economic elite also 
use social capital in the form of connections to various Chinese brokers of 
overseas education in the preparation. Even though sending a child 
abroad to study is not uncommon among the political elite, some of these 
families need to consider their public image in the process. I have 
described in Chapter 1 how Nicole’s family decided to keep her overseas 
study a secret even from close friends and relatives. Another student’s 
parents, both high level cadres, did not keep her overseas studies a secret, 
but made other arrangements to evade interest in their finances. The 
house they bought in the same year their daughter went to UK for a 
master’s degree, was bought under a relative’s name, to avoid drawing 
attention into two major investments in the same year.21!
! What is common for both elite groups, is that they posses the 
economic means to provide their child with the best opportunities 
available. This can take different forms. A child can be sent abroad for 
secondary education in one of the elite schools, so that she or he can start 
acquiring the cultural capital of the global elites at a young age and will 
have good chances at entering a top-ranking university. This is a similar 
process that takes place in China, where wealthy and well-connected 
parents are able to get their child on the track for prestigious education 
form an early age. For the students who do not do well in the domestic 
competition over places in respected universities, getting a degree 
overseas can offer a backdoor. With the general benefits associated with 
overseas study, a degree from a mediocre university abroad can offer more 
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21 The political elite’s transnational strategies of amassing wealth and privileges 
abroad has been much discussed in recent years. At the time of writing this, the 
highly publicised fall from grace of a Party leader Bo Xilai had expanded into a 
scrutiny over his son’s activities abroad. Bo Guagua was being held up as an 
example of the corrupt officials sending children abroad. In April 24, Bo Guagua 
released a public statement, defending his school records, his lifestyle abroad (‘I 
have never driven a Ferrari’),  and claiming that he has not been involved in any 
for-profit activities while abroad and his education has been funded with 
scholarships and his mother’s personal savings (Harvard Crimson 24.4.2012).
prospects than a degree from a Chinese university of similar ranking. Of 
course many children of elite families rely on their own hard work and 
academic ability to get ahead in the education system in China or abroad. 
But it is the students who need a backup plan who benefit the most from 
the good economic standing of the family. 
! The children of elite families can greatly benefit from the social and 
cultural capital of their parents, but it is also the source of many student-
parent conflicts in these families. As the parents are well informed and 
connected, they often wish to play a central role in the decision making 
and arrangements related to overseas study. For most student migrants, 
going abroad is a way to gain more independence and freedom, and to 
pursue their own dreams and goals. Conflicts over which subject to study, 
which university to choose, and whether to stay abroad or to return to 
China, were common in the families I knew, and the negotiations 
extended over several years. The outcome was usually a compromise of 
some degree. Lulu’s friend Mei Long, a daughter of an army officer and a 
university lecturer, was not interested in going abroad at all, preferring to 
study in Shanghai with her boyfriend. Under pressure from her parents, 
who had initially hoped she would obtain a degree abroad, she agreed to 
apply for a six month exchange programme in the US. Storm’s parents 
made plans for his graduate studies in Canada, where the family had a 
strong network of relatives and friends. Storm, however, had got a taste of 
freedom from familial control after moving to Shanghai for undergraduate 
study, and had found his place in the city’s queer scene. Unwilling to 
surrender this newly found independence, he was adamant not to study 
anywhere where he had family. Emphasising the benefits of being close to 
the mainland China and its southern economic centres, he made a case for 
graduate study in Hong Kong, which his parents agreed to support in the 
end. 
! Nicole wanted to study music, her father hoped she would study 
business, and eventually both settled for media and communications. As 
her final year started, Nicole confessed that she hoped to return to China 
after graduation, to look for work in fashion industry. Her parents, 
however, insisted that she would continue to study for a master’s degree. 
By the time of Nicole’s graduation, they had come to an agreement that 
Nicole would continue her studies, but not in the US as the parents had 
initially hoped, where earning a master’s degree would take two years. 
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She would stay in the UK, where a she could complete the degree within a 
year and then return to China to work. Father had initially planned to use 
his connections to arrange a job for Nicole at the CCTV (China Central 
Television) in Beijing, but as Nicole’s interest in fashion continued to 
develop, father helped to arrange an internship in fashion industry. The 
parents’ heavy involvement in all decisions regarding Nicole’s future 
required constant negotiations between them. While being a source of 
tensions and arguments, these negotiations were also constitutive of the 
familial cycle of exchange, which, as I will discuss in Chapter 5, had to be 
upheld in order to reproduce of family relations. 
! The second and the third category of students, those coming from 
the middle and low income families, are the beneficiaries of the one child 
policy. Their parents are able to support overseas education by focusing 
the limited family resources on one child. For the low income families I 
knew, the project of going abroad was initiated by the student, some of the 
parents opposing the idea at first, while others had neutral attitudes. The 
students thus had to persuade their parents to let them go. This was done 
through presenting the parents a convincing practical plan, or displaying 
enough motivation so that the parents could not refuse. Nelly’s parents, a 
retired factory worker and a truck driver, had at first opposed her plan to 
go abroad. She nevertheless continued to make preparations on her own. 
Her parents finally came around when Nelly got back the results from her 
first attempt at IELTS language test. She had failed to reach the required 
score and was upset to the point of crying. Seeing this, her parents said 
they understood how important this was to Nelly, and from then on 
supported the plan. Even though Nelly took the low cost route by only 
applying to low ranking colleges in continental Europe that offered full 
scholarships, her parents still had to cover most of the living and 
travelling expenses (all together 150.000 yuan). This pattern was common 
for the low income families I knew. The parents provided limited financial 
support and the students found creative ways to cover the rest. They 
relied on scholarships, chose countries with low tuition fees (e.g., The 
Netherlands, France, Germany and Scandinavian countries), and worked 
part-time to support themselves abroad. These families had no influence 
over the flows of the international education market, and tried to find 
ways to get access to them. Importantly, it was the students who drove the 
parents towards participating in these flows. As the elite parents were 
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themselves engaged in the flows, they also directed their children to study 
and work abroad. In the low income families, it was the students who 
were more engaged with the cosmopolitan flows through information 
distributed at schools, experiences of friends and acquaintances, and the 
virtual and imaginary forms of travel through foreign media.
! In contrast, middle income parents were more aware of the 
overseas study trend and considered it an option for their own family. 
Several parents told me that sending their child abroad was something 
they had planned for years. Lulu’s parents, an engineer and a shop clerk, 
had been planning to send her abroad since she was a child. They pointed 
to me that they had no car and lived in a small flat - choices that enabled 
them to pay for the preparatory language classes, agency fees and living 
expenses when Lulu went to study international business in Finland. The 
financial burden was manageable, as there was no tuition fee and Lulu 
partly supported herself by working part-time in a Chinese restaurant. In 
the social circles of both middle and low income families, having a child 
studying abroad was still relatively rare and a source of pride and prestige 
for the family. Students who had returned or were visiting from abroad 
were proudly taken to family gatherings, the parents distributing the gifts 
they had brought. The gifts included foreign delicacies, decorative 
souvenirs and consumer goods such as clothes, accessories and 
electronics. On several occasions I witnessed relatives consulting the 
student migrant on matters relating to their own child’s education, or 
asking him or her to talk to their child about the importance of education.
! This section about the positioning of families vis-à-vis the flows 
around international education market has touched upon the conflicts 
between the student migrants and their parents. The spatial mobility of 
the student migrants often shifts their position in the generational 
hierarchy, as they gain more autonomy with the geographical and 
sociocultural distance to their parents. Generation, however, is only one of 
the hierarchies that constitute the social location of the student migrants. 
Others include nationality, race, ethnicity, gender, etc. As Abbas has noted, 
it would be a mistake to assume that the movement of even the elite 
cosmopolitans is always voluntary and that their interaction with other 
cultures and societies is negotiated on equal and favourable terms (Abbas 
2002: 210-11). The way a person’s positioning in these hierarchies shift 
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with migration is illustrated by the following example of one student 
migrant’s experience in London. 
Shifting social location
! Nicole’s friend, Chen, found it particularly difficult to adapt to the 
different teaching methods and the use of English language in his studies. 
Failing several of his exams, he did not graduate with his course. He had 
the opportunity to retake his exams the following year. While waiting, 
Chen looked for work, but without a UK degree and limited skills in 
English, he failed to find work related to his field of study and ended up 
temping for his Chinese friends. He lived a marginalised and modest life 
in the Chinese ethnic niche of London. Chen felt he had lost the social 
status he automatically had in China as a Chinese national and as a man. 
He wanted nothing but to return to China as soon as possible. Chen 
however felt obligated towards his parents to succeed in his cosmopolitan 
pursuit. As he said: ‘I can’t go back, I haven’t achieved anything! I have 
nothing to show to my parents.’ This sense of failure was not only evoked 
by filial obligation, but also by the gender model that assumes men’s 
higher status in heterosexual relationships. Chen liked Nicole, but she was 
embarrassed by Chen’s interest, and said to me: ‘How could I like him? 
He has no ability at all.’ Chen stayed in London, continuing his struggle to 
find work and to graduate. Eventually he graduated after having retaken 
some of his courses. This had meant a considerable addition to his course 
fees and Chen hoped to earn some of this money back before returning to 
China. But by then the new immigration policy had been launched, with a 
stricter criteria for a post-study work visa. As Chen could not find a 
graduate level job, he did not qualify for the visa and had to return to 
China. 
! Chen’s positioning in the power hierarchies shifted with his 
mobility. The geography of power put him in a disadvantageous position 
in the UK on the basis of his nationality and student migrant status. Chen 
did not acquire cosmopolitan competency that would have helped him to 
integrate in the job market. He lost the privilege and power he had drawn 
from the hierarchies of gender and kinship in China but at the same time, 
it was his positioning in these Chinese hierarchies that motivated him to 
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stay in the UK, despite his marginalised position there. In the end, the UK 
state policies that aim to engage in the international education market in 
terms that serve national interests, forced him to return to China.!
Cosmopolitan affect
! Central to Chen’s experience is what I call cosmopolitan affect. The 
concept of affect here has a somewhat different emphasis from the 
‘economies of affect’ (Richard and Rudnyckyj 2009) that I have used to 
analyse the forging of subjectivities through emotional relationships in the 
continuum of the self, the family and the state. Drawing here from the 
work of Yael Navaro-Yashin (2009) and Kathleen Stewart (2007) I look at 
the emotional impacts that arise from the engagements with people, 
material objects, ideas and images at the different geographical locations 
throughout migration. It relates to the processes often termed as 
adaptation and alienation, but I use affect to highlight the emotional work 
involved. As Maruška Svašek (2010) has argued, differences between the 
imagined, actual and remembered emotional encounters are crucial in 
constituting the emotional side of migration. These differences are the 
source of much of the feelings of alienation, and also account for some of 
the disparity between the imagined and the actual experiences of living 
abroad.
! Chen had an engineering degree from a relatively prestigious 
Chinese university, and had had a good chance of getting into a good 
graduate programme in China. But at the time, he had been certain that 
overseas education would yield far superior career prospects, and in his 
words, ‘raise me to the high class of the society’. This imagery was so 
strong that as Chen’s parents did not have the financial means to support 
his studies, he came to England as a labour migrant to work for a business 
of Chinese friends. After saving money for two years, he first enrolled in 
an English language preparation programme, and then on a master’s 
program at a university in London. Now the very things that had 
motivated him to study abroad, i.e. the different education methods, 
English language and interacting with people from different cultures, 
raised negative affective responses in him. He felt embarrassed when the 
lecturer asked him a question and shy in the class room discussions; the 
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jokes of his class mates did not make him laugh, and he did not find 
having drinks at the pub relaxing. The emotional impact these interactions 
had on him increased his feeling of isolation and difference. He felt like an 
outsider and did not form close friendships. 
! In her discussion of the tensions between immigrant groups in 
Sydney suburbs, Amanda Wise (2010) has argued that their main source is 
not racist ideology or prejudice. People from different cultures ‘feel 
uncomfortable’ with each other because of the improper affective 
responses that arise in everyday interactions (ways of greeting, touching, 
speaking, eating, etc). Chen felt so uncomfortable in these interactions that 
he isolated himself to a small circle of Chinese students and labour 
migrants. In effect, he never became fluent in English, which further 
worked against him in the job market. In the two years after finishing his 
coursework, still waiting to retake some of his exams but no longer 
participating in classes, his use of English was limited to short encounters 
with shop clerks, his landlord, etc. What made the emotional burden 
heavier, was the pressure Chen felt as a Chinese son and a Chinese man, 
to succeed. Importantly, Chen had almost entirely supported himself 
during his time in England. Therefore the obligation he felt towards his 
parents did not arise from their investment in his overseas education, but 
from a general filial duty of the only son to succeed. To put this 
complicated dynamic in one sentence: Chen’s failure to achieve his 
imaginary of cosmopolitan subjectivity resulted from the negative affect 
evoked by the interactions in the new sociocultural field, but it was 
further defined as a failure by the negative affect arising from the Chinese 
sociocultural field. 
! The example of romance further illustrates how the improper 
affective responses to people, objects and ideas, in this example to food, 
can create distance in cosmopolitan encounters. The sharing of food is a 
central medium of enacting emotional attachment in China, and the type 
and the amount of food indicates the closeness of the relationship (see for 
example Stafford 2000a, 2003). Food reflects the affective attachments 
between people, but moreover, it affects those sharing the act of 
commensality. 
! For many student migrant women, the ideal of romance was 
strongly tied to the imageries of American popular culture they had 
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consumed in China. They imagined foreigners22 to be more romantic and 
sensitive than Chinese men, and some hoped to find a foreign boyfriend. 
For many, the actual experience of dating foreigners was a 
disappointment. The disparity between the imagined and the actual 
romantic encounters came from the differences in affective responses. 
! Hannah hoped to eventually marry a foreigner, so much so that 
she refused to date Chinese men. Her pursuit was not helped by the fact 
that she lived in China, and she was excited when a handsome American 
man who worked in the same building struck up a conversation with her 
in the elevator. The two started chatting online, talking on the phone and 
sending text messages. Hannah was happy to discover that the man 
seemed to have high career ambitions and a lively personality, in 
Hannah’s terms, very much husband material. It was obvious that the 
interest was mutual, but what concerned Hannah was that she was not 
sure if the man was looking for a serious relationship with an objective of 
marriage. He was sometimes slow to respond to text messages or missed 
Hannah’s calls. But most of all, he kept asking Hannah out for drinks, not 
for a meal. Surely this meant that he was not interested in a proper 
relationship? Hannah asked my opinion, as a ‘foreigner’, about the man’s 
intentions, and I told her that many of the relationships of my friends and 
acquaintances had started from a date in a bar or a cafe, rather than a 
restaurant. Maybe it was just cultural difference, Hannah concluded, but 
remained wary. Then one day the man called Hannah around lunch time, 
to ask her out in the evening. He told her that he was having lunch with 
colleagues at a restaurant that was around thirty minute subway trip from 
our home. After the call, Hannah was upset. The man had not asked 
Hannah to join them for lunch, or at the least, asked her if she had already 
eaten or what she planned to eat! The fact that he had not shown concern 
over Hannah’s eating, while having lunch himself, showed that he did not 
care about her at all. This decided it for Hannah, and she stopped all 
contact with him. 
! Many of the student migrants I have known abroad have shared 
Hannah’s perception. As one of them said: ‘If a man asks you out for 
drinks, he’s after sex. If he asks you out for dinner, he cares about your 
wellbeing, and really likes you.’ For them, with regards to dating 
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22 In this context meaning white Euro-Americans. See Chapter 4 for a more 
detailed discussion on ‘dating foreigners’.
relationships, affects that revolve around sharing of food include care, 
generosity, emotional closeness, love, and permanent attachment, in 
contrast to the affects reflected and evoked by the sharing of drinks: 
selfishness, sexual interest, and temporary attachment. Even though parts 
of these associations might also hold in different Euro-American cultures, 
the ways of showing romantic and sexual interest vary cross-culturally, 
and create difficulties for communication, sharing and evoking emotions 
– all the stuff of cosmopolitan affect.  
Gendered geographical scales
! I have argued that on the geographical scale of family, gender does 
not influence the ability of women, as daughters, to pursue overseas study. 
Parents want their daughters to succeed, and are willing to support this 
pursuit in practice. There are, however, two geographical scales, where 
gender does matter for the student migrants: job market and marriage. 
Researchers have pointed to the occupational gender segregation in the 
reform era China, as well as to the increased discrimination against 
women in the job market (Broaded and Liu 1996; Jacka 1990; Li and Zhang 
2010; Wang and Cai 2008; Xiang and Shen 2009; Zheng 2000). The 
existential gender model that associates aggression and strength with 
men, and passivity, weakness and altruism with women (Evans 1995) 
influence ideas of suitable jobs for men and women. This gender model 
carries on to the field of heterosexual affect through a belief that the 
education, income and status of a man should be higher than a woman’s. 
In marriage women as wives and mothers are expected to carry the main 
responsibility for performing familial care in practice, and should thus be 
able to devote much of their time and energy to this task. In this context, 
women are drawn to occupations that are considered relatively stable and 
low risk (e.g., teaching, government official jobs, nursing, administration).
! The parents often emphasise the importance of stability and 
security when advising their daughters about education and career 
choices. Mr Wu, a consultant with a PhD in engineering has a daughter 
currently in primary school. The parents plan to send her abroad to study 
in the future. Mr Wu and his wife support their daughter’s educational 
success in many ways. They managed to enrol her in one of Beijing’s best 
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primary schools. Part of her evenings, weekends and holidays are spent 
taking extra classes in maths and English or being tutored by her mother, 
also a teacher. On Saturday mornings Mr Wu and his wife take their 
daughter to an Olympiad maths class. I sometimes met them for lunch 
after the class, and we spent the afternoon together. The young daughter 
was encouraged to take the opportunity to practice her English, and each 
time she confidently exchanged with me the few phrases she knew. She 
then focused on her maths exercises, and while we talked, the parents 
timed her performance and occasionally helped her with a problem. In my 
view, there was little more the parents could have done to support their 
daughter’s education, and nothing more the parents of sons I knew, did. 
Knowing my interest in the attitudes towards sons and daughters in 
single-child families, Mr Wu often stressed to me that these days there 
was no difference in raising a daughter and a son. But when we talked 
about the future career direction he hoped for his daughter, the gendered 
expectations came across. 
Mr Wu: Because of women’s position in the family, people 
think that women should do a little more housework, have 
time to do that. So often people think that girls should have a 
stable job. Like a teacher, doctor, a civil servant. These are all 
quite stable. But for men, people think they should go and do 
business, start their own business. These jobs are not 
necessarily very stable. But all men want to give it a go. Of 
course they hope that in the household there is a wife who is 
very stable. Because if the wife is stable, the household is 
stable. Whatever they face outside doesn’t matter, the 
household will be stable. If a woman’s job is not stable, 
people’s feeling might not be very good. It’s a psychological 
thing, people feel that it’s better when a woman has a stable 
job. 
AK: Do you also hope that for your daughter?
Mr Wu: I also hope that she will have a stable job. 
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! None of the parents of female students I knew wished their 
daughter to become a housewife or to be financially dependent on her 
husband. But many tried to direct their daughter towards subjects of 
study and jobs that were considered relatively stable and undemanding. 
Such careers were considered to support both, women’s needs and 
qualities that arise from their existential nature, as well as the proper 
enactment of their gender roles as wives and mothers. 
! In the early 1990s, Broaded and Liu (1996) saw the acquirement of 
overseas credentials as women’s strategy to tackle the increased 
discrimination they were facing in the Chinese job market. In my study I 
found no evidence of female student migrants viewing their overseas 
pursuits in terms of conscious strategy against gender discrimination. This 
is not to say that my informants were not aware of the discrimination. 
Hannah, for example, worked in a male dominated industry, being the 
only woman employee in her office and often the only woman participant 
in conferences and networking events. A very ambitious and career 
oriented person, she made use of her beauty, youth and social skills to 
build guanxi. ‘Men control business, and they care about beauty’, Hannah 
claimed, ‘and I think, now that I’m still single and beautiful, men want to 
make friends with me! But after 30 or something, nobody will care. So it’s 
good to make these friends now.’ Hannah had several male friends who 
were her senior in their field of business and able to provide useful advice, 
connections and resources. She chatted with them online, sometimes 
sending pictures of herself when they requested or meeting them for 
dinners, but firmly rejected any dating and marriage proposals. She 
viewed their possible romantic or sexual interest in very instrumental 
terms, as a way to motivate initial contact and willingness to help, then 
trying to build a relationship on common interests and shared business 
ventures.
! Many other female informants were also aware of the gendered 
assets they had in the job market, but to those who were not as skilful and 
determined as Hannah in using them to their own advantage, they were 
more of a burden. Kate, a 26 year old returnee who worked as an 
administrator often had to accompany her boss to dinners and karaoke 
nights with business associates. The practice of inviting young women, 
often junior employees of the company, to business related meetings to 
make the atmosphere ‘more lively’ is very common, and more than once I 
Journeys on the first mountain
96
found myself filling in for such role when accompanying informants to 
dinners and karaokes. At the meetings I attended very little business was 
discussed. Men challenged young women to drinking games and to 
singing duets, and engaged in light hearted banter with them. Kate 
accepted these meetings as part of her job and did not feel they included 
an expectation sexual engagement. ‘Men, especially government officials, 
enjoy having dinners with young girls, drinking and joking with them, 
but they will not do anything else because it would harm the business’, 
Kate said. Nevertheless she did consider the meetings burdensome and to 
have very little benefit to herself. 
Sometimes it’s fun to know people in high positions, to make 
myself more sophisticated, but I think there’s just too much 
drinking. And most of these guys are very nice and kind, but 
some like to make dirty jokes and all that. But for a secretary, 
or if you work in sales or in marketing, it’s very important you 
can drink!
Apart from being a burden for young working women, the practice of 
cultivating business relations in these types of settings where women are 
recruited to provide entertainment or services, has other implications. 
Hsiu-Hua Shen (2005) calls this the masculinisation of business, which 
produces the idea that only men have the potential for full career 
development, as only they are able to take part in these relation-building 
events, and moreover, are not as restricted as women by their familial 
obligations to do so (2005: 421). 
! The gendered assets women have in the job market do not help 
them to get into high positions of power. Zheng Wang (2000) has written 
about the ‘rice bowl of youth’-jobs at the bottom end of the urban job 
market (e.g., promoters, assistants). Women, often migrant workers, with 
few skills and educational credentials can use these jobs as access points to 
higher paying clerical and managerial jobs (2000: 73). Zheng argues that 
even though women have to perform the role of ideal femininity in these 
jobs, they give women one possible route to upward socioeconomic 
mobility the young, unskilled men do not have. The situation at the top 
end of the job market, where my informants aim at, is different. There are 
certain fields that almost exclusively hire women who through their youth 
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and a beauty embody ideals of modernity, but these have very limited 
prospects for upward mobility. 
! Two female graduates I knew hoped to become flight attendants. 
The recruitment events had several stages. I attended a recruitment event 
of one airline, which was organised at a shopping centre. Hundreds of 
young women, preselected on the basis of their applications, gathered at a 
fenced square. While waiting for their turn they changed into dresses, 
skirts and high heels, and applied make up. They then lined up and were 
given number tags. They proceeded in groups of ten to the stage, and as 
the audience of hundreds watched, each took their turn to step forward 
and introduce themselves to the judges. On the basis of this introduction 
that very much resembled a beauty pageant, the judges selected women to 
the next round of the recruitment process, which included interviews and 
group assignments. Doll and Sally, both graduates in their early twenties, 
sent applications to different airlines and were invited to the next rounds. 
Despite several attempts, Doll failed to pass the recruitment process. An 
exceptionally beautiful woman with good language skills and an outgoing 
personality, she still failed to fine tune to the ideal image of femininity the 
airlines looked to present. The feedback she got from one airline said that 
she had worn too much make up and had laughed too much during the 
interview. Doll finally abandoned this dream and returned to her job at 
the English language nursery. Sally passed the recruitment process and 
was hired by a Hong Kong based airline. Fluent in four languages, she 
soon became an in-flight interpreter and was often asked to mediate 
‘cultural differences’, for example, explain rules about smoking to the 
Chinese passengers, or to explain their requests to the European crew 
members. Sally’s cosmopolitan skills and competency were thus useful in 
this job, but within a couple of years she came to feel it was unrewarding 
and with few prospects, and gave it up to pursue graduate study in 
Amsterdam. 
! Women can use their gendered assets to advance their career, as 
Hannah has done, but not everyone has the skill, the opportunity or the 
willingness to do so. For most highly educated women their gender gives 
few advantages in the job market. Even though the female student 
migrants I knew did not consciously view overseas study as a strategy to 
tackle discrimination, many graduates and returnees felt that the 
experience had developed their ‘independent ability’, social skills and self 
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confidence in ways that made them more aggressive and confident in the 
job market, and importantly, in negotiations with their parents. Nelly was 
one of them, explaining to me:
 
So sometimes I question if it was the right choice to go 
overseas to study. But I think it was, because it opened my 
mind, I changed a lot. I went to many places, got to know the 
people and the habits, made lots of friends. It changed my 
personality. I used to be very quiet and always listened to 
what my parents said. Now I’m very outgoing and open 
minded, and I like to do marketing. Before I could never had 
imagined to do marketing, I was very quiet. But now I love it. 
My mother says I’ve changed a lot. When I came back, I 
moved in with them. The first three or four months we just 
argued all the time. For example, when I was looking for a job, 
my mother said that I should find something in 
administration. She thinks this kind of job is very stable, and 
suitable for a girl. But I didn’t want to, I wanted to do 
marketing.
! Nelly was one of the several students I knew who had initially 
followed their parents’ advice in choosing a field of study, but during her 
time abroad developed interests in other fields, which she would have 
initially considered too demanding or challenging. Upon graduation, she 
had gained enough confidence to pursue the new direction despite facing 
some parental opposition. Nelly went on to find a marketing job and a few 
years later she won another important conflict with her parents, by 
managing to get their approval for her marriage to a man who did not 
match the parents’ ideas of a good husband.
! While ambitious female students face gendered obstacles on the 
mountain of education, my research suggests that the cultural model of 
gender can also allow women more freedom than men to choose their 
route. Even though much emphasis is put on education success in 
securing a prosperous and happy future, good marriage is also considered 
an integral part of it for both sexes. For men, securing a good marriage 
match rests largely on their high economic status, entrepreneurial spirit 
and potential, often referred to as ability (nengli). These qualities are also 
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seen as assets for women, but due to the ideal and common practice of 
hypergamy, women can further their socioeconomic position also through 
marriage. Women’s success in the marriage market is therefore not linked 
to their educational and career achievements to the same degree as men’s. 
The stress of finding a good job after graduation was felt particularly 
strongly by the male graduates I knew, both returnees and those who had 
stayed abroad. The female graduates who struggled to find satisfying 
employment anguished about their financial situation, visa issues, and 
whether they would be able to find a job worth their efforts that would 
bring personal satisfaction. These concerns were shared by the male 
graduates in a similar situation, but unlike the women, they stressed the 
feelings of losing face and disappointing their parents if unable to 
succeed.
! Women may feel less pressure to achieve and succeed than men, 
but the other side of the coin is that ambitious women who want to 
succeed, must take into account the disadvantage this may bring them in 
the marriage market. A popular belief among students is that women with 
undergraduate education are best positioned in the marriage market. Men 
want to marry women of similar or lower educational background, and 
women want to marry men of similar or higher background. A bachelor’s 
degree is an asset, but a graduate and postgraduate degrees decrease the 
pool of potential husbands. Apart from the model for a good match, for 
many young educated men I knew, a woman’s high education level was 
an indication of qualities that in excess are not desirable in a wife, such as 
ambition, career orientation, critical thinking and independence. Xiao Wei, 
a particularly outspoken 21 year old university student explained to me:
 
Xiao Wei: I want to find someone who has a job, but doesn’t 
earn more money than me. For education level, she should be 
a university graduate. If I have a masters degree and she does 
too, I can accept that. But if she has a PhD, that’s very terrible. 
It’s a very bad element for the family. Because education is for 
making money, and if she has a higher education, and then 
also a better job, it’s bad for the family. Maybe the wife will 
look down upon the husband.
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AK: So what about the husband, will he look down upon a 
wife who is less educated or doesn’t have as good a job?
Xiao Wei: Because of our traditional culture, the husband will 
always look down upon the wife. So it doesn’t matter. Maybe 
these days he doesn’t look down, but also doesn’t see her as an 
equal.
! Xiao Wei’s expression may be brash, but it reflects a real situation 
in the marriage market, of both men and women wishing to act out the 
hierarchical gender model. The statistics show that the model has 
influence beyond the level of ideas. In Table 7 the proportion of never 
married urban women increases with the education level (28% of women 
with high school education, 33% of undergraduates, 36% of post-
graduates), while the men’s likeliness to be unmarried decreases with 
higher education (31% of high school graduates, 28% of undergraduates, 
23% of post-graduates).
Table 7. Never married urban population (>15 years) by gender and 
education level
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, 2005 National 1% Population 
Sample Survey, table 6-2a
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! Not all women, however, are put off from doctorate study by this 
pressure. The female PhD students I knew were well aware of the 
negative view most men would have on their education. An added 
concern for them was age, as most people postpone marriage until they 
have finished their education and there is a strong idea of an ideal 
marriage age, which for urban women is around 25. Those with the least 
to worry about were the ones who were already in a long term 
relationship before the start of their doctorate studies, with plans to marry 
after graduation. Those who were single admitted to worrying about their 
situation, but believed that one way or another, they would eventually get 
married. Some hoped that they would find a man with very high 
attributes, while others contested the hierarchical gender model 
altogether. They all agreed that the disadvantage they suffered in the 
marriage market was not enough to stop them pursuing doctorate 
education. As one student of sociology, studying for her doctorate in the 
UK put it: ‘Women should not lower themselves to fit the men’s 
expectations.’
! On top of their own concerns, these women have to deal with the 
pressure to marry coming from their parents. The child’s education and 
marriage are the two principal concerns of urban Chinese parents, and it 
is thus difficult when the two come into conflict. Many parents told me 
that they would discourage their daughter from getting a doctorate 
education, because it would make it difficult for her to find a good 
husband. The parents I knew whose daughter studied for a PhD, were all 
supportive of her studies. They had resolved the conflict by alternating 
their focus on education and marriage. ‘First worry about education, then 
worry about marriage’, one parent told me. Some students dreaded their 
graduation because they knew the pressure to marry would then become 
immense. Parents could also take an active role in helping their ‘too 
successful’ daughter to find a match. On several occasions I was asked by 
parents if I knew any suitable candidates to introduce to their daughter 
(or a daughter of a friend or a relative) who had recently earned her 
doctorate.
! After finishing their education abroad, the students enter the 
gendered marriage and job markets. As education greatly influences their 
future positioning in these markets, the gendered constraints, 
opportunities and expectations inevitably influence the decisions they 
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make regarding education. In their cosmopolitan field of action, however, 
student migrants can draw from different symbolic resources. They also 
have the choice of entering the job and marriage markets of their 
destination countries. Even when the students return to China, they can 
use their cosmopolitan competency to tackle some of the barriers of the 
gendered job market.  
! The contradiction for the female student migrants arise form the 
fact that gender simultaneously operates on multiple geographical scales, 
such as schools, family and job market. The equal focus of urban 
singletons, boys and girls, their parents and teachers, on the importance of 
school performance is not matched by equal opportunities in the job 
market. What is more, gender operates in contradictory ways even within 
these scales. ‘Family’ is obviously not some fixed set of relations, but a 
person’s positioning in its hierarchies and roles shifts throughout life. In 
the light of my material, it seems that in the position of daughters, women 
are encouraged to pursue self-development and success as much as sons. 
But their anticipated roles as wives and mothers shape the way their 
success is defined. The same, of course, goes for men. Their anxieties, 
concerns and aspirations are influenced by the cultural model of 
masculinity that encompasses the role of a son and a husband. 
Conclusion
! In many respects, the process of going abroad is not influenced by 
gender. Differences such as the family background are more characteristic 
of groups of students and their access and control over the flows of 
international education market. Personal characteristics shape the 
aspirations and imageries attached on the journey and the way it is 
experienced. The student migrant subjectivity is constituted not only 
through the affective ties with those in China, but through cosmopolitan 
affect that arises from the encounters during the journey. For some more 
than others, these are marked by disruptions in the understanding of each 
others emotional responses, and the differences between the imaginary, 
actual and remembered encounters. 
! Finally, the experience of student migration, including the 
emotions attached to the process, practical decisions about what subject to 
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study and where to work, and the emphasis this pursuit has in the more 
comprehensive life trajectory of the student, is influenced by the workings 
of gender on different geographical scales. On some of these scales 
(parent-child nexus in the family) gender has little influence on the 
educational aspirations and achievement. But on others (job market, 
marriage), gender matters. As these are interconnected scales, individuals 
must negotiate the contradictions in their own experience. Furthermore, 
as these geographical scales extend to transnational space, a partial 
unification of symbolic markets (Bourdieu 2007) takes place. This is not 
some general integration of different gender and kinship models into 
Chinese culture, but occurs in individual experience, which in turn has 
effect on the surrounding society. I will now go on to explore some of 
these individual journeys through looking at the Chinese marriage 
market, how student migrants are part of its transformation, and how 
individuals resolve some of the contradictions in their experience.
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4. LEFTOVER WOMEN
! On a Saturday afternoon just before the Spring Festival, Helen sits 
in a tea house in one of Beijing’s trendy neighbourhoods. A stream of 
single men is guided to her table by the matchmaker of Touyuan dating 
agency. After introductions she leaves the couple to chat for a good half an 
hour, then they either exchange contact details or move on to the next 
candidate. The upcoming Spring Festival and the adjacent home town 
visit puts extra pressure on some of the singletons taking part in the 
match-making event, as they dread the questions and urges from worried 
parents. In Helen’s case the parents’ worry is somewhat justified. A 31 
year old professional woman with an overseas master’s degree, a decent 
salary and good career prospects, she has many things working against 
her in the urban Chinese marriage market. In popular discourse she is 
called a ‘leftover woman’ (shengnü), a woman of three highs: high 
education, high salary, and high professional status (sangaonü: xueli gao 
shouru gao zhiwei gao de nü), who is over the ideal marriage age for urban 
Chinese women and has difficulties finding a suitable husband. As is well 
known, the family planning policies of the past four decades have resulted 
in a high sex ratio and the problem of involuntary rural bachelorhood has 
been widely addressed by both researchers and worried policy makers.23 
How does it then occur that there are women marked by success in other 
areas of life left without husbands? 
!
Béarn bachelors and Chinese leftover women
! In this analysis of the urban Chinese marriage market and the way 
the student migrants are part of its transformation, I draw from 
Bourdieu’s (2007) analysis of non-marriage in post-war rural France. To 
summarise very briefly, Bourdieu discusses the problem of involuntary 
23 On security concerns see for example Edlund et al. forthcoming; Hudson and 
den Boer 2004; Jin et al. 2012; Ross 2010; on sexual health concerns Tucker et al. 
2009; Tucker et al. 2003; on abduction and trafficking of women see Chao 2005; 
Gates 1996; Zhao 2003.
bachelorhood in his native rural Béarn after the war. The eldest sons, the 
primary inheritors of the family property, used to be at the top of the 
marriage market and finding an appropriate match was of primary 
concern for the continuity of the patrimony. The ideal was to marry a 
woman who could bring enough dowry to provide for the marriage of the 
other siblings, but not too much to pose too high a risk in the occurrence 
on repayment, that is, if the marriage broke down before any children had 
been born. This logic collapsed in a process that started with economic 
changes. Because of the post-WW1 inflation, no-one could pay dowries 
that would match the value of the patrimony. The link between marriage 
and land was weakened, and it became more a matter of social status and 
lifestyle. Moreover, as the rural economy became more dependent on the 
urban economy, and the development of transport and education made 
the population more integrated, a unification of symbolic markets 
followed. This was not an egalitarian process, but dominated by urban 
views and devalued the ‘peasant way of life’. Unlike women and younger 
sons, the eldest sons remained attached to the land and could not take up 
the new opportunities of education and employment in the urban areas, 
or adapt the new lifestyles. Parental authority over marriages declined 
and courtship was left to individual initiative. The eldest sons now had 
two things working against them. The land had become a burden because 
women were reluctant to attach themselves to a lifetime of obligations to 
the parents-in-law and the patrimony. What is more, the eldest sons 
embodied the devalued ‘peasant way of life’ in their habitus and bodily 
hexis, which made it even more difficult to attract a bride.
! The book Bachelors’ Ball (2007 [2002]) is a republication of three 
works (originally published in 1962, 1972 and 1989 respectively), drawing 
together Bourdieu’s treatment of the subject from three paradigms, first 
using structuralist approach, then his theory of practice (habitus), and 
finally the symbolic market. He identifies the two fundamental 
oppositions, women vs. men and great houses vs. small houses, at the 
basis of the values marriage holds up in rural Béarn: male supremacy and 
primogeniture (protection of the patrimony). He then argues that these are 
embedded in people’s matrimonial strategies through their habitus, and 
even in the midst of social change, people’s manoeuvring follows these 
underlining principles learned in childhood. Finally, he shows how 
symbolic change drives the process. Bourdieu argues that the non-
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marriage of the eldest sons, as detrimental as it was to the ‘peasant way of 
life’, upheld the important cultural principles of male supremacy and 
primogeniture. !
! The case of the Béarn bachelors shows that in the midst of 
sociocultural change a part of the population whose position is produced 
by the old system and who are unable to fit the standards of 
marriageability in the current system, can fall into the trap of involuntary 
non-marriage (for another account, see Scheper-Hughes 1979). This is the 
case for the Chinese bachelors at the bottom end of the marriage market 
(i.e. men from poor rural families, those living in underdeveloped regions, 
migrant workers in the cities). A long-standing patriarchal belief in the 
Chinese marriage market is that a man’s socioeconomic position should 
be similar or higher than a woman’s. As this logic is coupled with the high 
sex ratio and the recent sociocultural transformations, which include later 
marriage age and the higher education level of young women and their 
higher earning power (increasing the value of daughters to their natal 
families), the power in marriage negotiations has shifted in favour of 
women and their families (Yan 2003, 2009). Young women in the middle 
and bottom ranges of the marriage market hierarchy are the main 
beneficiaries of the intensified practice of spatial and socioeconomic 
hypergamy. As they ‘marry up’, the men at the bottom of the hierarchy 
have difficulty finding a wife. 
! In the urban areas where sex ratio is smaller, a different problem 
arises. Having grown up as the single child of their parents, young 
women of marrying age have had similar support and opportunities as 
men. Patrilineage, one of the central values marriage has upheld in China, 
has become unsustainable in urban areas after the one child policy, and its 
main institutions: inheritance, patrilocality and ancestor worship, have 
largely been discontinued. Marriage has become more about the conjugal 
couple than the lineage. The second principal value upheld by marriage, 
patriarchy, has also been undermined with the increase of youth autonomy 
in general, and in spouse selection in particular (Jankowiak 1993; Yan 
2003). But here is the paradox, the value of male supremacy is still being 
upheld, at least at the level of an ideal model. Apart from a few 
exceptions, all female student migrants I knew hoped to marry a man of a 
similar or preferably higher socioeconomic status, and many considered a 
good marriage instrumental not only to their emotional, but also material 
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well-being. As I was explained to: ‘You marry a chicken, you follow the 
chicken, marry a dog, follow the dog’ (Jia ji sui ji, jia gou sui gou). Being so 
outstanding (youxiu) themselves, the ‘leftover women’ want a man of 
matching ability (nengli). This sets high, at times impossible, standards for 
the men they are willing to marry. For men, on the other hand, the ideal is 
to marry a woman whose objective qualities are as high as possible in 
absolute terms, while not too high relative to their own. 
! The current conflict in the Chinese marriage market bears some 
resemblance to what Bourdieu describes in post-war rural Béarn. Change 
in social practices and values challenge the economic and the value base 
of marriage. But unlike the Béarn bachelors, the Chinese ‘leftover women’, 
and especially the student migrants, are among the instigators of the 
unification of the symbolic markets. Their challenge is to negotiate the 
different symbolic resources, i.e. values and ideas, that at times are in 
conflict with each other and do not fit well with the current demographics. 
While abiding to new ideas of romance, intimacy, and women’s role in the 
family and society, the women also aim to act out the hierarchical gender 
model in their selection of a spouse. The same variety of symbolic 
resources that creates this dilemma also comes to the aid of individuals 
when they try to resolve it. When the Béarn bachelors encountered the 
changing marriage market, they found no other solution but to stay 
unmarried. The cultural model for marriage that the bachelors failed to act 
out was preserved in their non-marriage. The Chinese ‘leftover women’ 
can develop more varied strategies, and the student migrants among them 
draw from their cosmopolitan field, orientation and resources. Before 
discussing these strategies, let me outline the ideal model for a good 
marriage match, which is shared by the urban youth to a striking degree.
Good wives, good husbands
! Lets sit back at Helen’s table at the dating event. Confidently she 
lists her requirements for a potential husband: he should have a good 
family background, at least a master’s degree and be tall. He should earn 
a monthly salary of at least 20.000 yuan and own ‘a house’ (apartment) 
and a car. It is difficult to find a man who fits all of Helen’s requirements, 
but she cannot settle for less because of her own background and status. 
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She herself owns a car and an apartment, and has a monthly salary of 
10.000 yuan. Her parents are highly educated, a university professor and 
an engineer. She wants to find a husband whose background and current 
situation is better than hers. Being over thirty, Helen realises that many 
men already consider her too old for marriage. To add to the pressure, her 
parents constantly worry about her situation and urge her to get married 
soon. After seven years of studying and working in Australia, Helen has 
recently returned to Beijing. She explains that the need to find a husband 
was one of the main reasons for her return. Not willing to marry a non-
Chinese, she thinks she will have a much better chance of finding a 
Chinese man of her high standards in Beijing where the level of education 
and income is generally high, than among the Chinese migrants in 
Australia. Her search is a time-consuming effort, in the two months that 
she has been a member of the Touyuan agency, she has taken part in ten 
match-making events, has been on several individual dates, and has 
communicated with potential men via email and telephone.
! I catch a moment with Mr Wang, the busy manager of the Touyuan 
agency. Showing me the lists of personal information his customers fill up 
upon joining, and explaining their most common requirements, he 
confirms the impression I have already got during my fieldwork. The 
ideas about what makes a good wife and a good husband are strikingly 
uniform in contemporary urban China. The same list of objective 
standards recurs in discussions with student migrants, their parents and 
other urban youth, and in TV shows, pop songs and internet discussion 
forums. When choosing a spouse, the main considerations are (in random 
order): family background, occupation, education, income, ownership of a 
house and a car, age, appearance and personal character. Even though the 
list is the same for both women and men, the attributes have gendered 
content and they are differently emphasised by women and men, as well 
as their parents. While parents emphasise the importance of similar family 
background, many young people consider it advantageous but in 
importance well below the more personal attributes of the potential 
spouse, such as his or her income and education level. That is, apart from 
the family’s place of origin (rural - urban, interior - coast, big city - 
medium city etc.), which is considered to greatly influence an individual’s 
outlook and habits. Women emphasise income and assets, while men 
value beauty. Occupation is linked to income, but also to other 
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characteristics desirable in a spouse. Stable jobs, such as positions in 
teaching or state owned enterprises, were mentioned as good for women 
because they leave more time and energy to be devoted for the family. For 
men, challenging jobs in the private business sector with good prospects 
to increase earnings were thought particularly good. 
! In this model we can see the traditional rationale for conjugal 
exchanges, in which material care mainly flows from husband to wife, and 
reproductive care mainly from wife to husband. Nevertheless this is not a 
model determined by some timeless cultural rationale, but clearly shaped 
by the current emphasis on the individual over family (Kleinman et al. 
2011; Rofel 2007; Whyte 2003; Yan 2009). This cultural logic of marriage 
does not quite work in the current marriage market, or more precisely, at 
its top end, the highly educated urban population. When looking at the 
continuum of the marriage market, we can see that it is the very mobility 
of women in general that leaves the ‘leftover women’ unprotected in the 
marriage market.
! With China’s high sex ratio and the increasing power of women 
and their families in the marriage negotiations, it may seem surprising 
that among my main informants, the educated urban youth, I found a 
strong sentiment that it is the men who have more choice in the marriage 
market. While the young women I knew often worried about finding a 
good husband, the men of the same age group told me with satisfaction 
that they had more choice and more time than women, and thus needed 
not compromise on their demands. Women’s demands, on the contrary, 
were mere hopes and if they stuck to them for too long, it may happen 
that no man would want them. 
! Bourdieu (2007) argues that the non-marriage of the Béarn 
bachelors resulted from the disintegration of the protective economic and 
value mechanisms of the marriage market, exposing it to the anarchy of 
individual lovers’ choice (2007: 173). In China, the marriage market was 
protected by the value principle of patriarchy and the economic principle 
of patrilineage (enacted in living arrangements and inheritance). The 
family planning policies disrupted this logic. As the ideal of hypergamy is 
still in place, women in areas with high sex ratio simply have more choice 
and migrate to more desirable locations for marriage. Those left 
unprotected in this upward circulation of women, are of course the men at 
the bottom and women at the top of the hierarchy. Apart from this basic 
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rationale, there are some other factors that contribute to the tensions at the 
urban end of the marriage market.
! The main bridewealth in urban China is ‘the house’. On the current 
property market, its acquirement has, however, become almost impossible 
to many young men and their parents. At the time of my fieldwork, the 
Bureau of Statistics of the Beijing Municipality reported a 27:1 price-to-
income ratio, 5 times the world average (China Building Industry 2010). 
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2009) estimated that 85% of 
urban residents could not afford to buy a house at the current market. 
Despite these adverse conditions, all my informants agreed that a newly 
married couple needed a house, usually meaning an apartment, strongly 
preferring this to living with the in-laws or renting. As the families with 
daughters do not need to save money for the marriage of sons, many have 
the ability to share the financial burden of starting a marriage. In these 
conditions, many young women and their parents still hold the ideal that 
the groom should provide the house and the car upon marriage, but are 
aware that in reality it will require some input from both families. The one 
child policy and the property market bubble in urban China thus 
contribute to a situation where urban families with sons can expect the 
bride’s family to share the financial burden of marriage. The daughters of 
urban single-child families are thus not benefiting from the increase of 
women’s power in the marriage negotiations to the same degree as their, 
in many other respects more disadvantaged, rural counterparts. 
! Finally, the gender model that informs ideas about appropriate age 
for marriage, works as a further check against the power of women in the 
marriage market. The educated urban youth I knew were very consistent 
in their opinions about the ideal age for themselves and their partner at 
the time of marriage, namely, mid-20s for women and around 30 for men. 
The explanations men gave to the preference for younger women were 
their physical beauty, simple (jiandan) minds and lack of status and power 
(quanli) that tend to increase with age. The age bias works for men’s 
favour in the marriage market, as they can find a spouse in their own age 
cohort or in the next one, but women’s best window is limited to their 
twenties. 
! The ideal gender model for marriage is difficult to enact in 
contemporary China, particularly so for the ‘leftover women and men’. 
Now we get to the interesting question of what the ‘leftover women’, 
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more specifically the student migrants among them, do when they face 
the disparity between the ideal and the real conditions. First, there are two 
qualities that can be emphasised to compensate when the partner or the 
relationship falls short of the ideal. These draw from the two central 
aspects of the subjectivity of the urban youth, desire and enterprising. The 
latter is realised through the quality of nengli, which means ability, 
potential and ambition, a conveniently vague term to be adapted in 
various circumstances. For example, facing the reality of having to 
participate in financing the house and the car upon marriage, women and 
their parents emphasised that a man’s nengli was more important than his 
current assets. Romantic love, a reflection of the desiring subject that is 
expressed through affects that centre around the individual (Rofel 2007), 
also mediates the gap between the ideal model and the reality. 
! The grown emphasis of both of these qualities is part of the 
unification of the symbolic markets. This process should not be viewed 
simply in terms of the adaptation of Western ideas of individuality, 
sexuality and romance, and rejecting Chinese social norms. Individual 
desire is very much part of the particularly Chinese subjectivity of the 
student migrants, and has its origins in the current politico-economic 
conditions as well as in the collectivist era. The retreated welfare state and 
the unequally distributed wealth and opportunity that have given rise to 
the self-interested, enterprising individuals encouraged to express 
identities through consumption, have accelerated the sociocultural 
transformations that were already under way before the reforms, such as 
the ‘romantic revolution’ (Yan 2003). It is from this background, as well as 
from the symbolic resources drawn from their cosmopolitan encounters, 
that the student migrants draw from when contesting and negotiating the 
Chinese models for gender and romantic and sexual relationships. 
Love
! In Béarn the unification of symbolic markets was largely a one-
directional process of the urban way of life replacing the peasant values. 
But the idea of romantic love among the student migrants (and the urban 
youth in general) shows that what has taken place in China is not a 
replacement of Chinese values with the Western ones, but a unification 
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that combines ideas and values from different sources. The idealisation of 
romantic love has a long history in China, elaborated in the works of art 
and literature through different dynasties. Songs, stories and popular tales 
also served as cautionary tales, to warn people about the tension between 
love, which was considered an individual desire, and social obligation, 
such as filial duty. A common theme was thus the ability of romantic love 
to inflict suffering on those involved (Jankowiak 1995). In contemporary 
China, individual desire is an accepted, or even a required, part of a 
properly modern and cosmopolitan identity, but at the same time, the 
tension between that desire and social obligation remains, as can be seen 
in the negotiations between parents and children about dating and 
marriage. 
! The current idea of romance has been influenced by American 
popular culture, which emphasises public displays of affection in speech 
and behaviour that are not overtly sexual (Jankowiak 1995). Informants 
used the word romantic (langman de) when referring to these Western 
forms of behaviour, e.g., giving gifts, arranging surprises and talking 
about love. Other words (often love, ai, and care, guanxin) were used when 
talking about more traditional Chinese ways of expressing affection in a 
romantic relationship, which include paying interest to the small details of 
each others’ daily activities, being concerned over each other’s health and 
well being, and accompanying each other in activities. Many women 
considered ‘foreigners’, in this context referring to white Euro-Americans, 
as the model for romantic behaviour and attitude that Chinese men 
should learn from.
! These two ideas of love and romance are combined in the TV-
dramas, films and pop music produced in Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and 
in the recent years most notably, South Korea.24 The young people I knew 
had little interest in Chinese TV, sanctioned by the State Administration of 
Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT). Instead, they downloaded and 
watched shows from the internet, or bought cheap DVDs from street 
corners. The Korean TV-dramas often show a beautiful, kind-hearted 
woman of no wealth and status to overcome the obstacles of parental 
disapproval and class prejudice to be with her true love, an heir of a rich, 
notable family, who expresses his love by grand romantic gestures. The 
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24 For the Korean wave see for example the edited volume East Asian Pop Culture. 
Analysing the Korean Wave (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008)
traditional East Asian themes of romantic love: suffering, filiality and 
destiny, are combined with the current cosmopolitan themes of overseas 
study, premarital sex, cohabitance, homosexuality, etc., in a setting that is 
utterly desirable, modern and cosmopolitan. 
! Romance in its overt, dramatic forms was greatly idealised and 
appreciated by my young informants. Grand gestures were used to 
express and evoke romantic feelings especially at the early days of a 
relationship. Jonatan, a good singer and a piano player, arranged a 
surprise for a woman he had been dating for a while. On the Gregorian 
New Year’s Eve, he took her to a bar that had live music. Jonatan got on 
stage to serenade to the woman and handed her thirty-three red roses. The 
meaning of the number, as he explained, was that as three roses carried 
the message ‘I love you’, thirty-three meant that they would be together 
forever. Another informant, a 21 year old student, approached the girl he 
liked by inviting her to a classroom in the evening. He decorated the room 
with candles and flowers, arranging them to the shape of her name. In 
front of a group of their friends, whom he had invited to witness the 
occasion, he asked her to be his girlfriend. Overwhelmed by this romantic 
gesture, she happily accepted. 
! Young urban couples are not shy to physically show their affection 
in public. Couples holding hands, kissing, embracing, sitting on each 
others’ laps, cutting each other’s nails, combing hair, correcting make up 
or clothes and making other similar intimate gestures are a common sight 
in the public spaces of Beijing. When I asked students and their parents 
about this phenomenon, both attributed its increase to ‘learning from the 
West’ during the past decade or two. The reason these public displays of 
affection seemed remarkable was not only their degree of intimacy but 
also their frequency. Shopping centres, cafes, bars and university 
campuses are conspicuously populated by young couples engaging in 
affectionate behaviour. There are at least three possible explanations for 
this. Chinese students in secondary education are strongly discouraged 
against dating by their parents and teachers. At this time, nothing should 
interfere with their focus on study, which is ensured by almost constant 
supervision by the school and the parents. Of course the more rebellious 
and the less studious youth find the time and opportunities for dating, but 
most of the students only start dating after they finish high school. Away 
from their parents’ supervision, with a great deal more unstructured time 
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in their hands than before, informal socialising and dating becomes an 
important part of the university experience. Second, dating relationships 
are intense and intimate. Couples I knew spent most of their free time 
together and showed great interest in each others’ well-being and 
everyday activities. Finally, there are few private spaces available for 
students, who live in single-sex dormitories, sharing a room with up to 
twelve others. Couples loiter at public spaces or go to the hourly paid 
hotels near university campuses for more privacy. Others rent a room or 
an apartment together outside campus, usually without the knowledge of 
their parents who live in a different city. Cohabitance before marriage is 
disapproved by many parents. The young couples are reluctant to openly 
act against their parents’ wishes, but the fact that many students leave 
their hometowns to study and to work, only seeing their parents once or 
twice a year, facilitates non-compliance without direct conflict. 
! The youth autonomy in spouse selection increased rapidly after 
the 1950s in both rural and urban China (Jankowiak 1993, 1995; Parish and 
Whyte 1978; Yan 2003). Even though it is extremely rare these days for 
marriages to take place against the will of the young couple, parental 
involvement in the process prevails. Several of my informants stressed 
that it would be very difficult for a couple to stay together without the 
approval of the parents of both sides. I did not know any couples, dating 
or married, who were together despite parents’ direct opposition. 
Jonatan’s romantic gesture at the bar did not have the outcome he had 
hoped for. The woman’s mother saw Jonatan walk her daughter out while 
she waited in the car outside the bar that night. The next day the woman 
called Jonatan, saying that her mother had asked questions about him, 
and disapproved the relationship. Jonatan worked for his father’s 
business and the mother thought that businessmen were unreliable. She 
also thought Jonatan was too short for her daughter and they did not look 
good together. In a tear-filled meeting the couple agreed not to meet 
anymore. Jonatan often emphasised the stress and anxiety that 
surrounded dating. The difficulty, in his view, was not to find a woman he 
liked, but to gain the approval of his and her parents. The importance of 
parents’ opinion was not only due to filial obligation, but his financial 
dependence on them. Abiding to the ideal model, Jonatan explained the a 
man was expected to provide a house and a car upon marriage, but the 
astronomical sums required for these assets force men to depend on their 
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parents for assistance. If his parents did not like his girlfriend, they simply 
would not pay for the house, the car and the wedding. Jonatan’s mother 
explained to me that it was the duty of the parents to help their child to 
make a good choice, a woman who would be good to him and to the 
whole family. She thus planned to pay close attention to the background 
and the personality of any woman Jonatan was to introduce. 
! Delaying the introduction between boyfriend or girlfriend and the 
parents is a common practice in China. Couples can date for several years 
before meeting each others’ parents. For many, the motivation is that they 
do not want to involve the parents before an engagement and marriage is 
planned. For some, however, it is a strategy against parental disapproval. 
Of the couples I knew, those who had formed relationships against 
conventions of age and status and expected opposition hoped that the 
endurance of their relationship would prove its value to the parents. The 
parents’ opinion is important in the process of partner selection, but the 
youth are not completely without strategies were they to disapprove. 
From the young people’s perspective, an agreement needs to be reached 
with the parents, but some are more willing than others to test its 
boundaries, as will be shown below. 
Sex
! Another field in which the unification on symbolic markets is 
taking place is sex and sexuality (Zhang 2011). In the midst of rapid 
transition, attitudes and practices range on a wide scale. A 2006 survey 
covering both rural and urban districts of Shanghai shows a significant 
change even within a short time span of nine years. The respondents were 
divided into two age cohorts (16-19 and 20-28), which were then 
compared in terms of the percentage of females and males who had 
experienced dating, fondling and coitus before the age of 18. Across the 
rural and urban, male and female categories, all these behaviours nearly 
or more than doubled between the older and the younger cohorts (Zabin 
et al. 2009). None of my young urban informants disapproved premarital 
sex, but their attitudes, knowledge on the subject and experiences ranged 
between two extremes. At one end were the informants who only wanted 
to have sex with a person they planned to marry. Some of these 
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informants had very little knowledge about the technicalities of sex or 
contraception. A few used our conversations to ask questions on the topic. 
They found the subject embarrassing, but felt able to ask questions either 
because I was older and married, or because I was foreign and therefore 
presumably open (kaifang) in my thinking. 
! At the other extreme were the informants who had curious or 
unabashed attitudes toward sex. They engaged in sex relationships that 
did not involve emotional commitment. Kate, a 26 year old returnee had 
sex relationships with various men, including her ex-boyfriend, a married 
friend and a middle-aged businessman, while at the same time dating 
men she would potentially want to marry. Her arrangement with the 
businessman is an example of a much publicised practice of young 
women, often students, having sexual relationships with older men, 
businessmen and government officials, in exchange for material benefits. 
These arrangements are referred to as being a kept mistress (baoyang/
baoernai), living off a rich man (bang dakuan), and compensated dating 
(yuanzhu jiaoji). They are usually long-term arrangements and the terms 
are negotiated between the two individuals. In contrast to more direct 
forms of prostitution (solicited on the streets, in hair saloons, karaoke bars 
and restaurants), the compensation is often given through sponsoring an 
apartment or giving material gifts rather than giving money. Kate had no 
formal agreement with the man, but upon their mutual understanding, 
she occasionally accompanied him on business dinners and he visited her 
in her apartment for sex, and in exchange he bought her designer clothes 
and other expensive gifts. She saw this relationship as a harmless 
experience that could offer some excitement and material gain, but would 
have no significant impact on her future, including her marriage plans. 
The attitudes and the experiences of most informants fell somewhere in 
between these two extremes. They had some knowledge about the subject, 
discussed it with close friends, and considered sex a natural part of a love 
relationship, both during dating and marriage. 
! The openness of attitudes toward sex did not follow gender lines, 
both male and female informants ranged from the conservative to the 
liberal extremes. Yet ideas about proper sexual behaviour and how it links 
to the existential characteristics of a woman and man were gendered. Xiao 
Wei, a 21 year old male student, who had had various sexual partners and 
had dated a woman who was previously a kept mistress to a 
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businessman, said that he could not consider marriage with her, or a 
woman with many sexual partners. He believed that he would make a 
good husband in the future, because his sexual experiences would help 
him to ‘know what he likes’ and he would no longer have interest in other 
women. In contrast, a woman with similar experiences would not make a 
good wife, because she would no longer be a good woman. Both men and 
women used the patriarchal discourse to explain that the differential and 
hierarchical gender roles originated in the Chinese cultural ideology, 
history and traditions. But while the men cited the cultural traditions to 
articulate their own views, women used them to explain the expectations 
the society and men have on women. Even when acting in accordance 
with these expectations, they did not fully adapt them as their own. Kate 
hoped to eventually settle down with a wealthy man. Despite her various 
sexual relationships with men, single and married, her idealisation of 
marriage included fidelity, but only from her side. She explained her 
double standard for fidelity in marriage with the patriarchal model.
Because of the dependence. It’s just like that. I think it’s like 
that, men are supposed to be strong and hard, women are 
supposed to be soft. So women can rely on men and men will 
take care of them. So I think, if women can rely on men, then 
men can have some privileges. [Laughs surprised] It sounds so 
strange! When I explain it like this, I think, what a strange 
idea!
! Kate’s confused statement shows that she is aware of the 
patriarchal discourse and cites it with relative distance, without 
internalising it in full. Kate is a daughter of two high level cadres, her 
family is wealthy and well connected. They were able to buy Kate an 
apartment at the prestigious part of the city, and supported her 
extravagant lifestyle. Kate herself earned a starting salary of 10.000 yuan 
at a job she had started only recently. Her wealthy background and good 
job did not mean Kate would forfeit the ideal of hypergamous marriage. 
On the contrary, her number one requirement was that the husband 
should be able to bear the full responsibility of the family finances, 
offering the lifestyle that Kate was accustomed to and Kate’s own assets 
and earnings would be a mere bonus. In turn, she would be a loyal wife 
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and allow her husband ‘privileges’. This is what Kandiyoti (1997) would 
call a ‘patriarchal bargain’, men paying money to buy their wives’ loyalty 
and silence about extramarital affairs, and women trading their positions 
for financial security.  
! It is notable that all female informants who had particularly liberal 
views on sex and sexuality were returned student migrants. This was not 
the case for male informants. Moreover, most of these women claimed that 
staying abroad had had a significant impact on their views. They did not 
link the change to having lived in a sexually more liberal society, but to 
the experience of increased independence. Surviving on their own abroad 
had made them more self-assured and less concerned with other people’s 
opinions. This shows that there is more to the transformation of the 
marriage market than the introduction of new symbolic goods through 
actual, virtual and imaginary travel. With their individual journeys, the 
student migrants’ positioning in the hierarchies of generation, kinship, 
gender, etc., shift (Mahler and Pessar 2001), and many experience an 
increased sense of autonomy from these power systems. In addition, the 
cosmopolitan orientation and competency (Vertovec and Cohen 2002) they 
develop, helps them to situationally treat cultures as ‘artworks’ (Hannerz 
1990), view them from the distance (Szerszynski and Urry 2006) and 
compare them. The cosmopolitan orientation and competencies, the 
geography of power, the emphasis on romantic love and nengli, and the 
new symbolic resources adapted from abroad, are all part of the 
experiences of the student migrants as they negotiate their difficult 
position in the marriage market. Their courses of action can be categorised 
as compromises, non-compliance and engaging in the marriage markets of 
other countries. 
Compromises
! Compromising on either romantic love or on the objective 
standards was the most common strategy of the student migrants I knew 
who were not able to find a spouse to match their ideal. Kate and Nelly 
both had Chinese boyfriends while studying abroad, but broke up with 
them upon returning to China. Kate met her boyfriend in Holland where 
the two studied and lived together for three years. After earning their 
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bachelor’s degrees, they took different directions, Kate going to UK to 
study for a master’s degree, and her boyfriend enrolling in a university in 
Amsterdam. As Kate returned to Beijing to work, her boyfriend found a 
job at a multinational IT company in Amsterdam. On Kate’s account, the 
two never officially ended their relationship, but in addition to her sex 
relationships with various men, she also dated men with the objective of 
finding a husband. When I first got to know Kate, she viewed the prospect 
of marrying her university boyfriend with disdain. She claimed that their 
relationship lacked passion and feeling, and hoped to fall in love with a 
man who would also meet her objective requirements of wealth and 
success. Kate’s university boyfriend, on the other hand, seemed more 
interested in maintaining the relationship and directing it towards 
marriage. He came to visit Kate in Beijing, but she went out with friends, 
only returning to her apartment in the morning after he had left for the 
airport. He suggested that he would arrange a transfer to the company’s 
Shanghai office, and asked Kate to move there with him. Kate refused on 
the excuse that she liked Beijing more and all her friends lived there. She 
told me that the real reason was that she liked her ‘single life’ in Beijing, 
and did not want to marry him. Despite avoiding intimacy and finding 
excuses against his attempts to move the relationship forward, Kate did 
not completely end the relationship. Fulfilling all of Kate’s objective 
criteria for a good husband, he was her backup plan, in case she failed to 
find a man of similar attributes but also mutual attraction. A few years 
later, after various relationships of both sexual and romantic nature, which 
had left her disillusioned with love and romance as a basis of 
relationships, Kate was starting to seriously consider marriage with her 
university boyfriend. ‘I am a materialistic and practical person’, she 
explained,‘I like to enjoy life, so I pursue a stable and secure lifestyle.’ 
! Nelly made a different choice. She had met her boyfriend while an 
undergraduate in China. When Nelly went abroad for two years to study 
for a masters’ degree, the couple stayed together with the plan to marry 
upon her return. The parents of the couple met for negotiations, and the 
boyfriends’ family bought an apartment and a car in preparation for the 
marriage. But the time abroad had a profound impact on Nelly, and when 
she returned, she wanted to cancel the marriage plans. Unlike Kate, who 
had sought comfort and security from a relationship while studying 
abroad, citing that as her main motivation to stay with her boyfriend, 
Leftover women
120
Nelly grew more independent, outgoing and open-minded. While abroad, 
Kate mainly socialised with other Chinese students, spent most of her 
time with her boyfriend and relied on him in taking care of practicalities. 
Nelly, in contrast, actively engaged with the surrounding student 
community and the local society by making friends, attending parties, 
adapting new ideas, style of dress, and ways of interacting with people. 
But upon returning to China, it was Kate whose quest to find a new 
relationship(s) was motivated by the desire for symbolic goods associated 
with the West: romantic and sexual passion. Nelly’s separation from her 
boyfriend was motivated by the Chinese cultural logic of a good match. 
Having increased her nengli through self-development, she felt, in line 
with the hierarchical gender model, that her boyfriend’s attributes no 
longer matched, let alone surpassed, hers. Against the wishes of her 
boyfriend and the parents of both of them, Nelly ended the relationship.
! During the following three years, Nelly dated several men and 
often agonised over the difficulty of finding a decent man with whom she 
‘had feeling’ with. She then started to like a man, a friend’s friend, who 
did not match half of her requirements. Having quit his career in business 
to take care of his parents, he owned a small shop for selling his own 
artwork. ‘The feeling together is very good, but he has no money! That’s 
the only problem!’ Nelly lamented upon meeting him. After some time of 
dating, Nelly concluded that the man’s nengli was high and he had simply 
become a victim of unfortunate circumstances of his parents’ illness. After 
a year together, the two got married without any marriage transactions 
taking place, with the reluctant approval of Nelly’s parents. They now live 
in a rented flat in the outskirts of Beijing. As the husband’s mother has 
now passed away and his father requires less care, he is able to devote 
more time to develop his skills as a carver, and his shop and online store is 
running better. Nelly works as a manager for an IT outsourcing company. 
In Nelly’s words, she has grown more mature and is willing to work 
together with her husband to build a good life, as long as the feeling 
between them is good.
! Kate and Nelly’s experiences show how the cosmopolitan 
subjectivity of the student migrants in enacted in complex ways. The 
lifestyles and the degree of integration while abroad does not predict the 
way students live and make decisions once they return to China. Both 
Nelly and Kate claimed that the experience of studying abroad had 
Leftover women
121
influenced their values and personalities. Nelly linked her process of self-
development directly to adapting new ideas and ways of behaving while 
abroad. Her marriage appears to match the Western ideal of a ‘pure 
relationship’ (Giddens 1992) better than Kate’s planned marriage to her 
university boyfriend. But Nelly articulated her decision to break off her 
first engagement in terms of the Chinese logic of a good match. She also 
drew from it when rationalising the new relationship, deciding that the 
man’s nengli and the love between them were enough to compensate for 
his shortcomings on the objective criteria.
! The migration experience attached Kate more strongly  to the 
Chinese sociocultural field, as she came to realise that she was most 
comfortable working, dating and socialising in a culturally, socially and 
linguistically Chinese environment. But her attachment was now a choice, 
and the way she reattached herself was influenced by her cosmopolitan 
experience. She contrasted her party lifestyle with the boring life in 
Europe. Getting drunk at the clubs, having sex relations without 
emotional attachment and in exchange for material compensation, and 
dating married men went against social norms in China. Kate nevertheless 
viewed them as specifically Chinese ways of acting. She therefore did not 
account these behaviours to ‘learning from the West’, but on the contrary, 
explained them with the practical nature of the Chinese society, and 
herself being a Chinese person. What she did account to her cosmopolitan 
experience, however, was her courage to engage in such behaviours. 
Student migrants thus not only introduce new symbolic goods to the 
Chinese sociocultural field, but also engage in already existing modes of 
behaviour, which they would have avoided before their migrant 
experience. Bruce Robbins (1998) has noted that cosmopolitanism is not a 
mode of detachment, but of attachment and reattachment, multiple 
attachment, and attachment at a distance (1998: 3). As the student 
migrants attach to the Chinese sociocultural field, their cosmopolitan 
existence becomes part of it.
Non-compliance
! Some returnees question the cultural models for gender and 
marriage altogether and have relationships that are in a clear conflict with 
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them. Nelly’s best friend, Sarah, was one of them. While Nelly dated men 
with the objective of finding a husband, Sarah was not interested in 
marriage. When I first met Sarah, I asked if she had a boyfriend. ‘No’, she 
laughed, ‘I don’t have boyfriends, I have lovers.’ Similarly to Kate, Sarah 
maintained several sex relationships at the same time, one of them with an 
Austrian man she met regularly when travelling to Europe for business. 
Unlike Kate, Sarah did not see this as a passing stage of experimenting 
before finding a culturally sanctioned match for marriage. 
! The only time she seriously considered marriage was when one of 
her sex partners of several years proposed to her. The two had grown 
emotionally attached, and the man wanted to either get married or to end 
the relationship. A hairdresser eight years her junior, his status was below 
Sarah’s by all standards from age to education, occupation, income and 
family background. He was also very handsome, while Sarah possessed 
few of the features considered attractive by Chinese standards. These ill-
matched characteristics prompted Sarah’s friends to advice against the 
marriage. Sarah also knew that she would have her work carved out in 
trying to gain her parents’ approval. After pondering the situation for 
months, she finally decided against the marriage. In our discussions 
during this time, Sarah’s main concern seemed not to be the differences in 
qualifications and income. She emphasised his nengli, and said that 
despite the differences, they had similar views and personalities. Sarah 
felt that socioeconomic mobility through marriage was the strategy of 
women who came from disadvantaged backgrounds, or did not have 
nengli. Her own success rendered her free to choose a spouse by other 
than material considerations. By this, Sarah clearly rejected the cultural 
model of gender hierarchy. But she showed her awareness of it in her 
considerations of the age difference. Sarah worried that even though the 
age difference did not seem a problem now, it would become such in the 
years to come. ‘When I’m forty, he’ll be thirty-three. I’ll be old and he’ll 
still be attractive. Many girls will flirt with him, and I will have to worry 
about it. I don’t want that.’ Even though Sarah rejected the gender model 
that values men’s higher status and women’s youth and beauty, it was 
part of her subjectivity, influencing her motivations and anxieties in the 
decision making. After her decision, Sarah did not start to search for a 
better matching candidate for marriage. At the age of 34, she is still 
unmarried. 
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! The couples I knew whose relationships strongly conflicted the 
cultural gender model, experienced immense pressure from their friends 
and families. Many gave in eventually, ending the relationship. The 
practice of delaying the introduction between the parents and the dating 
partner for several years allows the youth to push the boundaries of 
cultural norms. But crossing them by marriage is another matter, and for 
most these relationships remain experiences of the youth, before a more 
‘mature’ choice is made for marriage. The physical distance created by 
migration somewhat changes this dynamic. As the students’ immediate 
living environment is controlled by different social norms, they feel less 
pressure to follow the Chinese conventions. Even after returning to China, 
the cosmopolitan orientation allows some student migrants to maintain 
some distance to the local power systems.
Dating and marrying foreigners
! Marrying a foreigner is one of the cosmopolitan strategies of the 
‘leftover women’. Social mobility through marriage across national 
borders has its roots in the traditional practice of women’s spatial 
hypergamy in China. In patrilocal societies, where the bride has to adapt 
to the new living conditions after marriage, it is logical to aspire to marry 
to a location that is similar or more desirable than the natal place (Oxfeld 
2005: 19). In the reform years, the distances travelled for marriage have 
grown and brides increasingly cross provincial and national borders. 
‘Marriage scapes’ that link fantasies of gender, race, sexuality and 
modernity with certain sites, have formed (Constable 2005b). For the 
student migrants, the most desirable destinations for study are also the 
most desirable sources of non-Chinese marriage partners. Women’s wish 
to marry a foreigner is linked to both, the project of finding a husband of 
higher status by objective standards, and to the cosmopolitan desires that 
equate foreign men with romance, freedom, independence, progress and 
modernity. 
! The nationality and race of foreigners at times overrides other 
objective standards in the marriage market hierarchy. Economic wealth, 
global political power, cultural heritage, natural environment, civil society, 
social welfare and crime rate are among the indicators of development 
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that are used to rank countries. For example, while US is considered to be 
at the top in terms of global economic and political influence, some 
European countries are valued for relatively clean environment, safe cities 
or rich cultural heritage. Apart from nationality, race is a marker of status. 
The Chinese discourse of race, in both its scientific and folk forms, is 
based on the lineage model and a racial hierarchy where the ‘white and 
yellow races’ are placed above the ‘brown, black and red races’, in 
competition with each other (Dikötter 1997). A citizenship of a developed 
country and a ‘white’ racial status can sometimes compensate for the 
other objective criteria when a Chinese woman marries a man whose 
status in his home country does not match her high status in China. It 
must be noted that the value of these assets seems to be in decline with the 
expansion of China’s global economic and political power, and the 
increased prevalence of cosmopolitan encounters of its young urbanites. 
Foreign men are increasingly assessed by the same standards as the 
Chinese men. Many of the young, highly educated women who had plans 
or experience of living abroad told me that they were not interested in 
dating the foreigners in China, who were mostly young drifters, language 
teachers with no proper careers, or old divorced men looking for young 
beautiful wives, all of low social and economic status in their home 
countries. This shows that the unification of the symbolic markets is a 
constant process, and the value attached to symbolic goods (here 
nationality and race) continues to evolve as they become more integrated 
into the local symbolic market, and moreover, as the unification of 
economic markets develops.
! Marrying white Euro-Americans has been a practice of Chinese 
women rather than men (Constable 2005b). One explanation is the racial 
discourse in the West that feminises Asian men, rendering them 
undesirable partners (Mahler and Pessar 2006: 38). Another perspective is 
given by Bourdieu (2007), who argues that objective attachment to a place 
creates subjective attachment to its culture (habits, lifestyles, fashion, etc.). 
In the case of China, there is no doubt that the patrilineal institutions have 
attached men more strongly than women to their home places. But does 
this hold for the student migrants, the sons and daughters of the urban 
single-child families?  In the light of my research, much of the importance 
of the patrilineal institutions has waned. But at the same time, 
patrilineality and its complement patriarchy remain powerful discourses, 
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and I found that male student migrants used them alongside the racial 
discourse to rationalise why they themselves or Chinese men in general 
did not want to marry foreigners. Chinese women were described as more 
adaptable to new customs and skilful in languages and thus able to have 
successful cross-cultural marriages. On the flip side, men often told me 
that because of the higher status of men in Chinese society, the women 
had less to lose if they married a foreigner. If a man married a woman of 
high racial, national and economic status, he would feel great pressure to 
retain an appropriately high status to ensure a well balanced marriage. A 
woman, on the other hand, did not have to compete with her foreign 
husband, but could climb up on the socioeconomic ladder through 
marriage. My impression was that men preferred to use this discourse 
rather than the racial one, which they were also aware of. Even though 
very few used the racial discourse as a primary explanation of why they 
did not want to marry foreigners, some commented that finding a foreign 
girlfriend would be difficult, that they would not dare to approach foreign 
women, or that dating a foreign woman would ‘give face’.
! Bourdieu gives another conceptual tool that helps to understand 
why the cross-cultural marriage still remains mainly a women’s strategy. 
He argues that the force of attraction the new sociocultural field exerts and 
the force of inertia of different agents against it varies according to their 
attachment to the old field (2007: 171-3). There are at least two factors that 
can increase the force of attraction the cross-border marriages and 
permanent settlement abroad have on female student migrants more than 
on the male student migrants. These are the Chinese job market and the 
marriage market. The gendered job market not only pushes women 
toward certain, less prestigious occupations, but also limits their upward 
mobility (Broaded and Liu 1996; Li and Zhang 2010; Wang and Cai 2008; 
Xiang and Shen 2009). The logic of the marriage market, in which women 
circulate upwards, drives the women at the top to extend their field across 
national borders, importantly, to countries higher up in the geography of 
desire.
! As I have noted, male student migrants tended to articulate their 
choices, pressures, and concerns in terms of filial obligations more than 
the female student migrants. The question of the continuity of their 
stronger attachment to the old field through the patrilineal institutions 
and ideals is thus difficult, and in need of more research. Indicative of this 
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complexity, or even change, are my survey results. The surveys included a 
set of questions about the students’ attitudes towards dating and 
marrying foreigners. To my great surprise, in both surveys (the Renmin 
sample of the aspiring student migrants, and the current student migrants 
at the LSE) men showed more positive attitudes than women. In all 
categories (dating a foreigner, marrying a foreigner, dating an ethnically 
Chinese foreigner, marrying an ethnically Chinese foreigner), a larger 
percentage of men than women responded ‘willing’ or ‘very willing’. 
Even though their practices do not currently match the attitudes, these 
results contest the image of the unadaptable Chinese man who is 
concerned with the racial purity of the lineage and resistant to cultural 
adaptation.
! I can only offer some tentative thoughts on these surprising results, 
but one thing they suggest is that men feel that factors that are not 
controlled by themselves render cross-cultural relationships difficult. The 
racial discourse is of course one of them, and even though seldom used by 
men when talking about dating and marriage, discrimination in general 
was one of the central concerns for male student migrants. For example, 
some men gave their disadvantaged position in racial hierarchies as a 
major reason to return to China after graduation. Female student 
migrants, in contrast, did not show much concern over discrimination. 
Men’s higher gender and kinship status in China results in a greater 
decline of status through migration, than what women experience. To the 
men, their positioning in the Chinese gender and kinship hierarchies was 
significant to their experience of status abroad. In contrast, women 
primarily articulated their status abroad in terms of their positioning in 
the local hierarchies of gender and race. In this context, the 
hypersexualisation of the Asian women, or in the words of my informants, 
‘the popularity of Chinese women in the West’, was interpreted positively.
! Nevertheless, the results also suggest an ongoing change. As the 
cosmopolitan encounters of the young Chinese men become more 
prevalent, the significance of the idea of the asexualised Chinese man in 
the West (Mahler and Pessar 2006: 38) decreases as its place is taken by 
other competing discourses, ideas and personal experiences. In fact, this 
racial discourse was rejected by those male informants who had dated 
foreign women. These men were still an exception among the student 
migrants, often those whose parents had sent them abroad at a young age 
Leftover women
127
for secondary education. Wang was one of them. Having dated several 
foreign women both in China and in the US, he claimed that the reason 
why romantic and sexual relationships between Chinese student migrant 
men and White Euro-American women were still relatively rare, was not 
the prejudice of the women, but the misconceptions and the lack of 
confidence of the Chinese men.
Conclusion
! The conflict in the Chinese marriage market results from the 
tension between cultural ideas of gender and the new social practices. The 
high sex ratio, changed family composition, increased investment in 
daughters’ education and economic inequality all contribute to the 
situation where large numbers of men and women have difficulties 
finding a spouse. Being high achieving women with exposure to a variety 
of cultural ideas about sexual and romantic relations, marriage is not a 
simple matter for the female student migrants. Their gendered positioning 
in the marriage market renders the men who meet their objective 
standards relatively few. Complicating the matter is their desire for a 
relationship with romantic and sexual intimacy. They are free to go about 
the search for a husband on their own, but know that the approval of the 
parents needs to be gained eventually. The complexity of this dynamic 
justifies the question of how anyone actually manages to marry. But unlike 
the Béarn bachelors, the Chinese student migrants do get married. This 
suggests two things. First, these women have more room to manoeuvre 
and more varied strategies at their disposal than the Béarn bachelors. 
They draw from the enterprising and the desiring part of their 
subjectivities to emphasise nengli and romantic love to compensate the 
falling short of the ideal model for marriage. They can also engage in the 
dating and marriage markets of their destination countries. Second, the 
ultimate principles of primogeniture and male supremacy were preserved 
in the non-marriage of the Béarn bachelors. When the Chinese ‘leftover 
women’ do marry, they challenge the values held up in the cultural model 
for marriage. The challenge on patrilineage and patriarchy is of course not 
new in China, but the student migrants are part of this transformation 
through their individual journeys. They draw new ideas and practices 
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from their cosmopolitan encounters thus contributing to the unification of 
the symbolic markets. Their cosmopolitan orientation gives them 
reflexivity over different values and models that are part of their 
subjectivities. Finally, their mobility across spatial and sociocultural fields 
shifts their positioning in the geography of power, at times in ways that 
gives them a sense of relative autonomy from different systems of power. 
! The Chinese marriage market is part of the student migrant 
subjectivity, as the cultural models for gender and romantic and sexual 
relationships are enacted in affective relationships. At the same time the 
cosmopolitan subjectivity of the student migrants becomes part of the 
Chinese marriage market and its transformation. I have shown how the 
cosmopolitan skills, orientation and politics work in particular settings of 
education and marriage markets. In the next chapter, I aim to explore how 
the different aspects of cosmopolitanism are manifested in the lives of 
individual student migrants as a whole.
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5. COSMOPOLITAN LIVES
! In the early days of my research, I understood the back and forth 
movement of student migrants in terms of migration and return 
migration. Within a few years of their graduation, I thought, the student 
migrants make a choice (voluntary to varying degrees) of either settling 
abroad or returning to China. I often asked students and their parents 
questions that posed these as the two, mutually exclusive choices. But in 
the course of my fieldwork, it became clear that dividing the process of 
migration into such sections, and conceiving the choices of the student 
migrants in terms of settlement and return did not best illuminate their 
experiences. Some of them got stuck in the preparation stage of migration, 
never actually managing to leave China but sustaining their dream of 
migration; others went abroad, graduated, started working and got 
married, but periodically moved between their new country of residence 
and China; still others returned after graduation to start a career in China, 
but remigrated after some years. Whatever choices made after graduation, 
their mode of being-in-the-world had become cosmopolitan in nature 
(Szerszynski and Urry 2006). Different cultures and social environments 
coexist in their individual experience (Hannerz 1990: 239), a condition that 
Ulf Hannerz describes so well that I quote it here in full:
Perhaps real cosmopolitans, after they have taken out 
membership in that category, are never quite at home again, in 
the way real locals can be. Home is taken-for-grantedness, but 
after their perspectives have been irreversibly affected by the 
experience of the alien and the distant, cosmopolitans may not 
view either the seasons of the year or the minor rituals of 
everyday life as absolutely natural, obvious, and necessary. 
There may be a feeling of detachment, perhaps irritation with 
those committed to the local common sense and unaware of its 
arbitrariness. Or home is really home, but in a special way; a 
constant reminder of a pre-cosmopolitan past, a privileged site 
of nostalgia. This is where once things seemed fairly simple 
and straightforward. Or it is again really home, a comfortable 
place of familiar faces, where one's competence is undisputed 
and where one does not have to prove it to either oneself or 
others, but where for much the same reasons there is some risk 
of boredom. (Hannerz 1990: 248)
In this chapter I will describe the cosmopolitan lives of three student 
migrants, Lulu, Jonatan and Nicole. Through the discussion, I want to 
draw attention to the different aspects of cosmopolitanism that drive, 
facilitate, shape and discipline their experiences. 
!
Lulu – Cosmopolitan mastery
! Lulu came to Finland in 2007 to study international business. An 
average student in school, she could not compete for a place in the most 
popular programmes (international business, finance, etc.) in the most 
prestigious universities of China. She thus rationalised that she would get 
a better footing in the competitive job market by studying a subject that 
gave a specialised skill, than getting into a popular programme in an 
average Chinese university. Lulu started studying statistics in one of the 
universities in her home city Chengdu. She planned to finish her degree 
and possibly apply for a master’s abroad. But her mother continued to 
actively search for opportunities to send Lulu abroad, and soon after Lulu 
had started her studies, found an agency that specialised in sending 
students to Finland. Most importantly, the family found out, Finland did 
not charge tuition fees, which left only the living expenses to cover. After 
more research on the education and living conditions, Lulu and her 
parents decided to pursue this direction. International business was 
chosen as a field for two reasons. First, it seemed like a logical subject to 
study abroad, and second, the choice of courses taught in English in 
Finnish colleges and universities was limited. Lulu passed the entrance 
exam and was offered a place. Her start of the course was however 
delayed as the agency failed to confirm her acceptance of the offer. They 
gave as an explanation the disorder caused by an underground 
earthquake that had hit Chengdu at the time, but Lulu suspected they had 
simply forgotten to complete the paperwork. She was offered a chance to 
go to Finland as scheduled, to start her studies part-time at the open 
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university. The agency also arranged her to retake the entrance exam. She 
passed again, and was able to start her degree studies one term late of the 
initial schedule.
! After four years of study, Lulu graduated with a BBA degree. As 
the graduation approached, she pondered between applying for a 
master’s degree or looking for work. Staying in Finland, going to another 
country like UK or Sweden, or returning to China were all initially within 
her range of options, which narrowed down when she met her boyfriend 
David during her final internship. David is British but as his daughter 
from a previous relationship lives in Finland, he is committed to staying in 
Finland. Two years after Lulu’s graduation, the couple are married and 
have started a consulting company together, offering services to Finnish 
businesses planning to launch in Chengdu, Lulu’s home city, and to 
Chinese investors in Finland. As their business is yet to take off, Lulu still 
works at a Chinese restaurant, a job that supported her through her 
studies. She feels constant pressure as working in the restaurant leaves 
very little time to devote to their business ventures, but at the same time, 
the couple need her income. David receives unemployment benefit and 
devotes his time to networking, developing and marketing their company, 
as well as looking for other opportunities for work and business. Last 
year, Lulu and David traveled to Chengdu to visit family and to negotiate 
partnerships and connections. They came back convinced that they need 
more time in China to develop a strong guanxi network and to learn more 
about the Chinese business environment. Lulu and David started 
planning to move to Chengdu for a few years. Meanwhile, they also 
started pursuing alternative plans. David planned to launch a multi-level 
marketing company to sell English handicrafts in Finland, or to set up a 
secondhand books store. Lulu applied to do a degree in social services, 
applied for translating jobs and developed connections to brokers in 
migration business.
! After seven years, Lulu is relatively settled into a life in Finland. 
She knows her neighbours, shovels snow in the winter mornings and 
knows where to buy what she needs. But her orientation remains 
cosmopolitan, with several sociocultural fields coexisting in her 
experience. This is illuminated by her use of language. Lulu has not 
learned to speak Finnish fluently. She and David speak English together, 
and at the restaurant she speaks Chinese with her colleagues, and basic 
Cosmopolitan lives
133
Finnish and Swedish with the customers. She speaks English with her 
group of friends, which mainly consists of other student migrants from all 
over the world, notably few from China. In a sense, the restaurant job is a 
benefit Lulu got through her cosmopolitan connections and competency 
as a Chinese person in Finland, but with its low pay and low status, it is 
an example of the less favourable positioning of a cosmopolitan at the 
host society that Abbas (2002) refers to. In fact, it is precisely Lulu’s 
cosmopolitan mode of relating to a place, that works against her in the 
Finnish job market. Her new plan of studying social work in Finland 
requires a step up with her engagement with the Finnish society, as the 
admission pends on passing a Finnish language test, and the programme 
is based on the Finnish model of civil society. Lulu thinks that she will be 
able to combine her business studies with the social work knowledge, by 
for example starting a private day care centre. Again Lulu’s perspective is 
cosmopolitan, she hopes to either make use of her Chinese language skills 
and immigrant status in the Finnish environment, or take the knowledge 
acquired of the Finnish social services system and civic society to China. 
Aware of the prospects the social services field in China will offer in the 
future, Lulu has conceived several plans of how she could market her 
skills and expertise there as a consultant or a private entrepreneur. 
! Another way of directly drawing from cosmopolitan resources are 
Lulu’s attempts to become a migration broker. I discovered this when a 
relative of mine was selling a company. A private physiotherapy clinic, 
operating locally in Western Finland, was bought by a Chinese couple 
with no prior connections to Finland. When I mentioned this to Lulu, she 
told me that buying a small or medium sized family business was 
becoming a common strategy for migration. She had in fact acted as a 
broker in similar negotiations. The idea was that buying a well established 
small company would be a safe route to gaining a residence permit. This 
resembles the flexible citizenship strategies of the Hong Kong families in 
Aihwa Ong’s (2006) work, but there are notable differences. These are not 
Chinese elite families involved in international business ventures, but 
middle class families with no considerable prior connections abroad, who 
have enough capital to invest in a small business, such as a cafe, a bakery, 
or a physiotherapy clinic. The families Lulu had negotiated for, were not 
from any of the major migrant sending areas in China. Lulu explained that 
investing capital abroad played a part of the motivation, but ultimately 
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this was migration for education rather than work. The families had a 
young child, whom they hoped to educate in Finland. Via residence 
permit, their child would have access to the free Finnish education at all 
levels. 
! Several student migrants I knew became brokers and agents in the 
international education business after graduation. Some worked for 
overseas study agencies in China, while others, like Lulu, worked as 
contacts in the destination countries. Apart from providing information 
and acting as brokers for individual migrants and families, they also 
worked to build institutional connections. Lulu’s most recent venture is to 
become a contact point in Finland for the agency she originally used to 
arrange her migration, to work out new exchange programmes between 
universities and colleges in Finland and her in home province in China. 
! As these examples show, Lulu lacks no ideas on how to build a 
career on the basis of her cosmopolitan resources, skills and competencies. 
Her orientation is not towards integrating into the Finnish job market, but 
to making use of her particular mode of cosmopolitan existence. These 
endeavours make her the model for the mode of cosmopolitanism the 
Chinese state currently promotes. Moving away from the focus on 
encouraging return migration, the state now promotes the building of 
continuing international links and connections that can contribute to 
economic development (Wang 2010, 2011). Whether Lulu will be able to 
make a successful transition from a client to a broker in the international 
education market is yet to be seen, but without a doubt it will be aided by 
her skills to draw from various resources, or in Hannerz’s (1990) words, 
her cosmopolitan mastery.
! The distance Lulu and David have to their respective native 
societies, cultures, families, and to the Finnish host society, allows them to 
treat these cultures as ‘artworks’ (Hannerz’ 1990), which they can observe, 
appreciate and criticise, and selectively adapt. Lulu and David 
situationally distance themselves from the Finnish cultural norms and 
customs. For example, they see themselves as two foreigners, trying to 
find their feet together in the Finnish business culture that is alien to them. 
Situationally they also set Chinese and English cultures together against 
Finnish culture. For example, in their view Finnish culture places extreme 
value on independence and equality, which results in distant family 
relations and the eradication of positive gender differences. On these 
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issues, they find similarity between their Chinese and English cultural 
backgrounds. These examples are of mediating symbolic resources in 
superficial cosmopolitan encounters. An example of a more profound use 
of cosmopolitan mastery (Hannerz 1990) is Lulu’s negotiation with her 
parents to gain their approval for her relationship with David.
! When Lulu started seeing David who is eleven years her senior, 
has a daughter from a previous relationship and no stable job, she knew to 
expect the disapproval of her parents and friends. The physical distance, 
however, had transmuted into a relative emotional independence, and 
Lulu pursued the relationship with the belief that her parents and friends 
would eventually come around. Over the years Lulu convinced her 
parents that David’s unemployment was not due to his lack of nengli, and 
the two would combine their cosmopolitan skills and competencies to 
eventually run a consulting company. Lulu’s parents were also worried 
about the financial strain David’s child would put on the couple. Lulu 
explained that the cost of raising and educating a child in Finland and in 
China was not comparable. She also explained the sociocultural 
environment in which out-of-wedlock children and separation carried 
little stigma. Lulu repeatedly told her mother that her concerns were 
grounded on the norms of the Chinese society, which she should ignore 
altogether when judging Lulu’s situation, as Lulu did not live in China. 
! Lulu’s strategy of slowly gaining her parents’ approval worked. 
When Lulu and David visited China two years later, mother suggested 
that they get married. After a few months, Lulu and David married in a 
civil ceremony in Finland, and later had a wedding celebration in China. 
In retrospect Lulu commented the negotiations by saying that living 
abroad was significant, not so much for determining her ideas of a good 
relationship, but for giving her the strength to persist against the 
opposition of the family and friends. Lulu drew from her cosmopolitan 
mastery to reflexively, and selectively, explain values and norms to her 
parents. The geography of power also worked to her advantage, as the 
spatial and sociocultural distance weakened her parents’ authority in 
commenting and influencing her choices. Lulu and David yielded to one 
compromise. David’s daughter was to be kept secret outside the 
immediate family circle for the time being. Lulu said that she agreed to 
this not for her own sake, but for her parents’, as it was them who would 
have to deal with the gossip and criticism on a daily basis. David accepted 
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not introducing his daughter to the wider circle of family and relatives as 
he did not want to make his young child a point of arguments and gossip. 
Both hoped that the situation might change in the future. Despite the 
relative autonomy Lulu gained from the Chinese systems of power 
through migration, the affective ties with her parents kept her connected 
to them. The awareness of how the gossip and criticism would affect her 
parents was enough for her to agree to keep David’s daughter a secret. In 
this way, affect indirectly reached across the physical distance.
! In Hannerz’ (1990) terms, Lulu shows a great deal of cosmopolitan 
mastery and reflexivity over Chinese, Finnish and British cultures. The 
skilful but often less than conscious nature of this mastery is well 
exemplified by the dynamics between Lulu and I during a trip we made 
together in China. Lulu had been in Finland for two years when she came 
back to visit China during 2008 Christmas holidays. I was in Beijing at the 
time, conducting my fieldwork. Lulu first stayed with me in Beijing for a 
week, and we then travelled together to Shanghai to meet her high school 
friends, and finally to her hometown to visit her family. When Lulu 
arrived, I was struck by how ‘European’ she seemed. Since we had last 
seen each other, Lulu had adapted new ways of conduct, talking and 
dressing. Right a way she told me how she had been taken aback at the 
flight when a Chinese passenger sitting behind her and her friend had 
asked them not to disturb his leader with their chatting. Lulu took this to 
be an example of the difference between the hierarchical Chinese society 
and the more egalitarian West that she had now become used to. She 
made several such irritated or amused observations during her first few 
days. When talking about her experiences of studying in Finland, she 
praised the Finnish education system, the social welfare, the liberal society 
and the political system. I asked if she had missed China and if it felt good 
to be back. No, she was now quite used to living in Finland, Lulu 
responded, and had actually felt sad to leave. On Lulu’s initiative, we 
spent our days sightseeing, visiting all the major tourist spots of Beijing, 
standing together in front of them having our picture taken. I wrote in my 
field notes that the feeling was very much of two European tourists 
traveling. 
! This dynamic changed when we got to Shanghai. Although 
unfamiliar with the city, Lulu was now surrounded by old friends from 
high school. She enjoyed her time immensely, chatting and laughing with 
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her friends in her own dialect. She was now less interested in touring the 
city, and seemed to forget my presence for long periods of time. During 
her first week back she had told me several times that she had not missed 
China much, and did not plan to move back for several years. While in 
Shanghai, however, she started to consider the possibility of doing an 
internship there, to be close to her friends. We met with Lulu’s mother’s 
friend, a business executive in Shanghai, to discuss Lulu’s opportunities to 
work in there. At this point of our trip, Lulu no longer criticised the 
Chinese customs and the society. Instead, she started explaining aspects of 
it to me.
!  Further change took place after we arrived at Lulu’s hometown, 
Chengdu. We now turned from two traveling friends into a host and a 
guest. Lulu showed the sites to me and explained the customs and the 
character of ‘us’, now meaning the people of Chengdu. She took up ritual 
behaviour of taking care of me as a guest, creating further distance 
between the two of us: she put food into my bowl, switched on the desk 
light when I wrote notes, filled up my tea cup, and even covered me with 
an extra blanket for the night. She took pride in the customs and the 
character of ‘us’, the Chengdu people, and explained them in a way that 
implicitly set them in contrast with Finnish culture and customs. On the 
Christmas Eve we walked the crowded streets of the city. Lulu was in a 
great mood and explained that this was the evening when everyone came 
out to the streets to have fun. ‘We like crowded places, when there is a lot 
of people, we feel very happy. I think in Chengdu the suicide rates25 are 
the lowest, because there are so many things to keep you busy. Like 
talking, always about the same things, small details. Like we talked with 
my classmates in Shanghai. We Chengdu people, we talk a lot, but just 
bullshit, we can talk bullshit all day!’, Lulu laughed.
! The gradual reintegration of Lulu into the Chinese sociocultural 
setting took place on several levels: geographical, social, cultural and 
temporal. On all these levels, the distance was greatest at the start of her 
trip in Beijing, an unfamiliar city where I was the only person she knew. In 
turn, the distance to Finland at all these levels was the greatest at the end 
of our journey, in her home town among family and friends. Lulu showed 
a high degree of cosmopolitan mastery in moving across spatial and 
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25 Popular discourse links Finland’s notoriously high suicide rates to the culture 
of silence and solitude.
sociocultural space. Even when acknowledging the often less than 
conscious nature of this mastery, Hannerz’ (1990) view of 
cosmopolitanism is very agent centred. To use Vertovec and Cohen’s 
(2002) conceptualisations, this is cosmopolitanism as a ‘mode of orientation 
to the world’ and as a ‘set of competencies’. In these senses, cosmopolitanism 
is a resource that can be enriching in an abstract sense, as well as cultural 
and social capital convertible into other forms of capital. Other forms of 
cosmopolitanism facilitate, shape and restrict the actions of the 
cosmopolitan agent. Flows and connections between locations in the 
compressed time-space produce a particular cosmopolitan ‘socio-cultural 
condition’ (Vertovec and Cohen 2002; see also Appadurai 1996). 
Institutions have been set up to mediate these flows often using 
cosmopolitan rhetoric but serving the interests of the market and 
particular nation states, as in the case of the international education 
business. Individuals are situated differently regarding access and power 
over the flows, according to their social location and position in power 
geometries (Pessar and Mahler 2003; see also Massey 1994).
! Lulu’s engagement with the international education market 
worked relatively well for her. The overseas study agency did cause a 
delay in her plan by failing to confirm her acceptance of the place. But as 
we will soon see in Jonatan’s story, this was a relatively small hitch, as 
eventually Lulu was able to go abroad to the country and institution of 
her choice, and graduated with the degree she had planned to obtain. 
After graduation she and David started their company, which gave Lulu 
also a residence permit. After marriage, her permit transferred into that of 
a family member, as David holds a permanent residency in Finland. 
Lulu’s mobility between Finland and China has thus not been restricted 
by the policies of either state. Her positioning on the geography of power 
nevertheless shapes her mobility. David now plans a trip to the UK to buy 
handicrafts and Lulu has decided not to accompany him. Apart from the 
difficulty of fitting the trip into her work schedule, she finds the paper 
work required for a visa too troublesome. Another factor that puts her off 
of traveling to the UK, is the humiliating experience of being questioned 
by the sarcastic customs personnel upon arrival. ‘I don’t want to put 
myself through that, to humiliate myself again and again’, Lulu said. 
Cosmopolitan affect discussed in Chapter 3 does not only arise in 
individual encounters between migrants and the locals, but in the 
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institutional settings such as border crossings. As Svašek (2010) points out, 
in these hierarchical encounters migrants are constructed in ways that 
push particular modes of emotional interaction. For example the discourse 
of ‘threat’, which constructs migrants as posing potential danger to the 
legal citizens, influences the emotional interaction, evoking negative 
affective responses in the migrants, such as fear, humiliation or annoyance 
(Svašek 2010: 872; see also Hall 2010).
Jonatan – Reluctant returnee
! Jonatan is a 24 year old returnee who studied in Austria and now 
lives with his parents in Beijing. In the 1990s his father left his factory job 
to start a private business, first in real estate, and later owning a pawn 
shop. The family’s moderate wealth stands out among their relatives and 
they are proud to have been able to send Jonatan abroad to study. As 
Jonatan was not a particularly good student in school, his grades only 
gave him access to a vocational high school where he studied English and 
business. His ambitious father was determined to have Jonatan study 
business at a university level, so he decided to send his son abroad. 
Jonatan’s main interests were music and languages, but his father wanted 
him to continue in his own footsteps. He decided to send Jonatan to 
Austria, where the family had a friend who could give advice and help 
with practical arrangements. Jonatan was ready enrol on a BBA course for 
the Fall term 2003, but because of the SARS outbreak, was not granted a 
visa until January 2004. This hitch in the plan offered him a short window 
to pursue his own interests, and for the Spring term 2004 he enrolled on a 
German language course at a college in Vienna, where he also studied 
music and performance. After the Spring term, he followed his father’s 
wish and transferred to a business school. A year into his BBA degree, 
Jonatan was forced to return to China, as his residence permit was not 
renewed. On Jonatan’s own account, this was due to the malpractice of the 
agency that had handled all official paperwork for his school applications, 
transfer, visa and residence permit. In 2005 the agency got caught having 
forged documents for students’ applications. This lead to a careful review 
of all the renewal applications of students who had used the agency’s 
services. In Jonatan’s opinion, his transfer from a German language 
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programme to an BBA degree that was taught in English raised further 
suspicion, and as a consequence his renewal application was denied. He 
returned to China after eighteen months abroad, without a degree. His 
father was obviously disappointed.
! Jonatan had enjoyed his time abroad immensely. Gifted in 
languages, he had become fluent in English and German. He had 
embraced the new sociocultural environment, making friends of different 
nationalities, dating a local girl, and adapting local habits of eating, 
dressing and socialising. Having grown up under a strong influence of his 
parents, Jonatan felt that living abroad gave him a chance to be 
independent and free. This shows that the positioning of an individual in 
the geography of power does not only depend on extra-personal 
characteristics, such as gender and nationality, but also on the personal 
characteristics of the migrant and those who have influence over her or 
him, namely here, the father. Jonatan quickly acquired a high degree of 
cosmopolitan competency, i.e. language skills and cultural knowledge that 
allowed him to move across socio-cultural fields relatively freely. Because 
of this and the strong patriarchal authority exercised by his father, Jonatan 
felt that he gained power upon leaving China. After his return, Jonatan 
thus wanted to go abroad again, perhaps to study in the US. Father 
however decided that it would be best to focus on getting work 
experience and later study for a diploma in business administration or 
accounting through adult education. 
! In the following years Jonatan and his father constantly negotiated 
the limits of his autonomy. Jonatan would not openly oppose his father. 
Father drew his authority from the patrilineal and patriarchal models that 
regulate not only the intergenerational, but also heterosexual relations. 
Connection to the former is obvious, it would have been unfilial for 
Jonatan to oppose his father openly. As for the latter, father held 
significant power over Jonatan’s status in the marriage market, which 
partly depended on his ability to provide ‘a house’ and a car upon 
marriage. This rendered Jonatan financially dependent on his parents, 
giving father further leverage in the negotiations. He said that Jonatan 
was free to do what he wanted, work where he wanted, or even to go 
abroad, but the financial support was subject to following his advice. 
Unwilling to risk his ability to marry in the near future, Jonatan gave up 
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his plan of quick remigration, and focused on gaining some autonomy 
over his career development.
! Father had used his guanxi to arrange an administrative job for 
Jonatan at a language school. Jonatan wanted to find work by his own 
means, and persuaded father to allow this. He found a job at the ticket 
sales of Air China. ‘That’s when I really found myself. At Air China I 
discovered my skills and realised I had power.’ His exceptional skills in 
languages and communication made an impression on the office manager, 
who praised Jonatan to his superior at the head office. Jonatan was given a 
commission of the sales, a rare use of performance based incentive in a 
state owned company. But even with the bonus, the monthly wage only 
came to just 1300 yuan. Father thought this was too little, and suggested 
Jonatan would take one of the limousines from the pawn shop and 
become and driver. Jonatan’s wage was not even enough to cover his 
personal expenses: petrol, phone bill, nights out at bars and restaurants. 
Facing the risk of having father withdraw his support, Jonatan regretfully 
left Air China and went to work for his father. Father had him trained in 
various aspects of the pawn business, such as evaluating jewellery, but 
Jonatan’s eye was constantly on the job market. As he repeatedly told me, 
he desired to find his own path to success, discover his abilities, and to be 
more independent. But without a degree and refusing the help of his 
father’s guanxi, it was not easy to find a job his father would approve of. 
Despite short periods of employment in advertising and accounting, 
Jonatan always returned to his father’s company. The last time we spoke, 
he was working for his father, had received a diploma in accounting as his 
father had wished, and was dating a girl his parents approved of. 
! During these years, Jonatan continued to dream about going 
abroad. He maintained his cosmopolitan identity by socialising with 
foreigners and styling himself in American fashion, complete with baggy 
jeans and long hair that made him stand out. He took great pride in the 
fact that he was often mistaken for an American born Chinese by 
American tourists. He liked to spend his free time at the bars frequented 
by tourists, where he could chat with foreigners using English and 
German. Father promised that after he got married he could go to US with 
his wife, but Jonatan knew that several obstacles might stand in his way. 
He might be too old to study by then and it would be difficult to get a job 
and a work permit. As his parents would age, he would feel more 
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obligated to stay close to them. In his typical figurative manner, Jonatan 
told me: ‘Well you know, going to the US is just a dream. Like hand cream, 
disappears very fast from your hands.’ 
! When comparing Jonatan’s story to Chen’s, which I discussed in 
Chapter 3, it is clear that Jonatan’s life in Beijing was more cosmopolitan 
in orientation than Chen’s life in London, and he showed a higher 
cosmopolitan mastery of moving across sociocultural fields. This brings us 
to the important point that cosmopolitanism as an orientation and 
competency is not bound to a locale, nor does it necessarily increase with 
mobility. For Jonatan himself, the events that best testified for his high 
cosmopolitan competency were the ones that distinguished him from the 
rest of the locals in China, i.e. his ability to serve well the foreign customers 
at Air China, and the fact that he was mistaken for an American tourist in 
China. His cosmopolitan competency thus gained some of its strength 
from the fact that he exercised it in China, not abroad.
! Jonatan’s mobility was profoundly shaped by the geography of 
power, more specifically, his positioning in the hierarchies of gender, 
generation and nationality in different locations. His migration was 
initiated by the patriarchal authority of his father. The plan was 
interrupted when, as a Chinese national, Jonatan got caught up in the 
political muddle that followed the SARS outbreak, involving both nation 
states and the suprastate World Health Organisation. The contingencies 
resulting from one hierarchy disrupted the dynamics of another, as the 
initial refusal of his visa gave Jonatan a chance to pursue his own interests 
for the Spring term in Austria. The disadvantage of being a Chinese 
national gave him, even if only momentarily, an advantage in the 
generational hierarchy, as he was able to supersede his father’s position as 
a key decision maker. Unlike Chen, who lacked cosmopolitan competence 
and felt that he lost status and power through migration, Jonatan quickly 
developed new skills. Eventually, his cosmopolitan pursuit was cut short 
because of the conflict between its brokers, i.e. the overseas study agency 
and the Austrian immigration authorities. Upon his return to China, he 
regained the privileged position of a citizen, with the rights to reside, 
work and to study, but lost the relative autonomy he had gained through 
geographical distance from his father.
! Comparing the migrant experiences of Jonatan and Chen, it 
becomes clear that filial obligation can motivate students to stay abroad as 
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much as to return to China. Even though many student migrants feel 
pressure to return to China to be close to their parents, in Chen’s case this 
filial obligation was overrun by his filial obligation to succeed in London. 
The student migrants often told me that their parents wanted nothing 
from them, only to see them live happy, secure and successful lives. This 
can be seen to illustrate the emphasis on individual desire among the 
contemporary urban youth. But from another angle it is also a form of 
filial obligation. Urban parents do indeed need  little from their only child. 
They devote a great deal of energy and resources, often at the expense of 
their own comfort, to support their child. The child’s success is not only a 
privilege, but a duty to pay back the parental support. Both daughters and 
sons have this sense of duty, but as the gender model articulates men’s 
success more in terms of personal achievement than women’, male 
student migrants more often express this anxiety than women. 
! In this account of Jonatan’s migration, return and aspiration to 
remigrate, parental pressure and the desire for autonomy plays a far more 
central role than in Lulu’s story. In fact, even though the involvement of 
parents in the process varied across the gender lines, it was rare for female 
student migrants to cite parental pressure as a motivator when talking 
about their decisions to stay, to return and to remigrate. In contrast, it was 
very commonly mentioned as a major motivator by the male student 
migrants. Even though Lulu’s parents, particularly her mother, played a 
major role in initiating and implementing the migration, Lulu cited career 
considerations, her relationship with David, and personal liking for a 
place, as the main motivators for migration, settlement and remigration. 
! Steven Sangren (2003) has modelled the dynamics of the Chinese 
family (as the ideal patrilineal, patrilocal type) in terms of obstructions 
that evoke particular gendered desires in daughters and sons. The 
unrecognition of daughters as agents in the official patrilineal model, or in 
Stafford’s (2000a, 2003) terms, the inevitable separation between parents 
and daughters, is an obstruction that evokes in (some) daughters the 
desire not to be separated, and to be recognised. The discourse of ‘more 
filial daughters’ is one of the avenues for women to express this desire. 
With the discourse of ‘gender equality’, it also provides the rationale for 
equal parental support for sons and daughters. Sending daughters abroad 
to study, thus investing familial resources in their future, can in fact be 
seen as an act of parental recognition. While daughters seek recognition, 
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Sangren argues, sons desire autonomy and freedom. Even though the 
patrilineal system guarantees their privileged position, their attachment is 
obligatory and unchosen. Their power only becomes effective upon the 
ultimate separation from the father, i.e. his death (Sangren 2003). As many 
of the official institutions of patrilineality (patrilineal inheritance, 
patrilocal residence and ancestor worship) that give men their agency in 
the model have been discontinued in urban families, the discourse has lost 
some strength as the dominating model for value and agency. Yet the 
greater obligation male student migrants seem to feel towards their 
parents, testifies for the continuity of the patrilineal model. 
Nicole – Family ties across distance
! I have explored the various ways familial affect, obligations, 
hierarchies and exchanges shape, facilitate and restrict migration and 
forge migrant subjectivities. In this final section, I wish to draw attention 
to the other side of cosmopolitanism and family relations, that is, the 
conflict between intimacy and spatial distance. I will do this by looking at 
how relatedness is enacted across distance, and how the emotions of 
separations and reunions are managed.
! Nicole’s parents took an active role in planning and making 
decisions that concerned her studies abroad. The negotiations over which 
subject to study, at which university, whether and where Nicole should 
pursue graduate study, and where she should settle eventually have been 
ongoing since the planning first started, and the periodical decisions are 
usually compromises between their different ideas. In 2009, a few months 
before Nicole left China for London, we visited her parents in their 
hometown, and the disagreements over these decisions surfaced again. 
During one argument, Nicole’s father proposed that he will give Nicole 
ten million yuan as a one time payment, and no longer yang (care, raise, 
support) (Stafford 2000b) her. Nicole and her mother were so upset by his 
proposition that they started crying. Nicole refused, saying that this sum 
would be less than what father would spend if he continued to yang her 
by paying for her studies, housing, living expenses and marriage in the 
future. Comparing the amount of money father would give in each case 
was a way to turn his proposition into a joke, and the family went on to 
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humorously debate the cost of Nicole’s future yang. I later asked why 
Nicole and her mother had been so upset, and Nicole explained that even 
if father was joking, they could not bear him talk such way, saying that 
they would no longer be a father and a daughter. 
! A few months later when Nicole left for the UK, her parents came 
to Beijing to see her off. The last night before her flight, we had dinner 
together and again talked about Nicole’s future, the possible challenges of 
adapting to the life abroad, and the likelihood of her returning to China 
after graduation. Nicole listened in silence as her parents alternated 
between saying that she could do whatever she wanted and they would 
support all her decisions, and telling their very detailed opinions of what 
she should do (study for a graduate degree in the US, return to China to 
work, marry a Chinese man). Nicole’s father then brought up the first 
disagreement the family had had to negotiate when starting the 
preparations for her overseas study. After graduating from high school, 
Nicole spent a gap year living in Beijing and making preparations for 
going abroad. During this time, much of her time was spent pursuing her 
interest in singing and song writing. She made contacts with record 
companies, recorded demos, wrote music and performed in local clubs. 
She was offered recording deals by two companies and was torn over a 
choice between going abroad to study and pursuing a music career in 
China. Over discussions with her parents, they persuaded her to abandon 
any plans of staying in China. In their opinion university degree was a 
basic requisite for an economically secure and socially respectable future. 
Nicole decided to follow their advice, hoping that she would be able to 
focus on music again later, either in UK or in China. As we discussed 
Nicole’s future the night before she left for UK, her father again brought 
up this issue. Declaring that Nicole could make her choices freely as her 
parents needed nothing from her, he went on: ‘Our wealth is her wealth. If 
she doesn’t want to go to university, she can still have ten million yuan.’ 
Nicole broke her long silence with a shocked laugh, exclaiming to me in 
English (knowing her parents could not understand): ‘What? I don’t think 
so! I don’t think I would get that money!’. Mother and Nicole then 
silenced father by laughing and telling him to stop joking.
! The negotiations between Nicole and her parents illustrate two 
things. First, as Stafford (2000b) has argued, the exchange of care is so 
central to family relations that as a metaphor of relatedness it can take 
Cosmopolitan lives
146
precedence over lineage and descent. Even in a form of joking, the idea of 
father severing the ongoing yang relationship with Nicole was very 
upsetting to her and her mother. Posing this threat gave father power in 
the negotiations over Nicole’s future. What is important here, is that at no 
point father threatened not to support Nicole financially. The sum he 
proposed to pay would have been more than enough to cover Nicole’s 
tuition fees, living expenses abroad, and expenses related to marriage in 
the future (wedding, housing, car). The issue was, whether the financial 
support would be given over the years, or as a one time payment. The 
ongoing support would not only mean that continuous transactions 
would maintain a relationship between the parents and Nicole, but that 
each transaction would involve parental input in the decision making 
about education, housing, jobs, etc. Despite the irritation and pressure 
Nicole often felt over her parents’ heavy involvement in the decision 
making, the idea of severing this relationship was shocking and upsetting 
to her. It would mean that they would no longer be father and daughter. 
This brings us to the second point, that the material support the parents 
give to the student migrants, is not a mere reflection of their affective 
attachment, it is directly constitutive of it. When the student migrants and 
their parents talk about money, food, clothes and other materia that flow 
between them, they are talking about affective attachment. The continuity 
of exchanges is a way of doing family across geographical distance.
! Stafford (2000a, 2003) has argued that the moments of creating 
distance between family members, and again cutting across it, have 
particular importance in China. The partings and returns of family 
members usually take place without fuss, sometimes without a word. The 
more distant the relationship, the more elaborate often the rituals of 
greeting and sending-off. Stafford argues that this is not a simple issue of 
honouring the relationships to important people with rituals, although 
that is certainly sometimes the case, but the unity of families is held so 
strong that separation is impossible. ‘That is, mere physical departure 
should not be allowed to threaten the underlying, and fundamental, unity 
of kin. Friendships, by contrast, are inherently more fragile, and the unity 
of friends may sometimes need to be publicly declared.’ (Stafford 2003: 7) 
Yet the partings and reunions between parents and the student migrants 
easily evoke strong emotions, considering that months, sometimes years, 
pass between the meetings. What is more, other strong emotions, such as 
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the worry of sending a child alone to a foreign country, or homesickness 
felt by the student while abroad, are entangled in these moments. I came 
to see how these difficult moments were managed when I was present at 
the partings and reunions between the student migrants and their parents. 
! I accompanied Nicole and her parents to the airport to see her off. 
We were joined by close family friends, closeness marked by the use of 
kinship terms between the families. During the next hour, the ‘uncle’ and 
‘aunt’ took charge of the sending off while Nicole’s parents took a more 
passive role. They pushed Nicole’s luggage trolley, found the right check-
in desk and uncle queued with Nicole despite being told not to by the 
airport personnel. The rest of us waited behind the separating line. Not 
much needed to be said as aunt’s incessant, cheerful chatter filled the 
silence. Nicole had extra carriage and had to repack her luggage at the 
desk. It was not the parents, but uncle and aunt who first rushed to her 
aid. We then walked to the security check, where goodbyes were said. As 
Nicole took her hand luggage from aunt and uncle, preparing to take her 
leave, mother started crying. ‘My mother, she’s crying!’, Nicole yelled 
distressed. Aunt quickly took charge of the situation, laughing: ‘She’ll be 
back in no time, no need to worry at all! Give me those bags and give 
mother a hug!’ As she held the bags, Nicole and mother gave each other a 
short, stiff hug. Aunt did not let the awkwardness of the situation last 
long, and went on with her laughing and fussing, ‘Will I not get a hug?’. 
The two gave each other a much stronger and more relaxed hug. She told 
Nicole to hug her father, and even shorter and stiffer embrace followed, 
father keeping his head turned away. Uncle then took Nicole’s bags, and 
started walking her to the security check. The two had arms around each 
other’s shoulders. As Nicole went through the gate, she turned back a few 
times to wave. Mother was still crying, covering her mouth with a 
handkerchief. Father walked in circles and whistled, not looking Nicole’s 
way. Uncle and aunt smiled and waved back. Then she was gone and 
uncle and aunt started ushering us out. 
! To me it seemed clear that aunt and uncle’s role at this moment of 
separation was to act as distractions; to lighten the emotional heft of the 
moment; and to properly enact a cheerful sending off. The moment of the 
child's departure for overseas study cannot easily be passed without a 
mark, but aunt and uncle’s presence gave the parents a chance not to 
become too involved in the fuss of their daughter’s departure. The 
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displays of affection at the moment of separation could be more relaxed 
between Nicole and uncle and aunt, than between her and the parents. For 
as Stafford (2000a, 2003) suggests, separation between parents and a child 
is ultimately impossible, and should therefore not be drawn much 
attention to. It is notable that at the dinner on the previous night, the 
atmosphere between Nicole and her parents was tense and few words 
were exchanged between them, but the food was lavish and the restaurant 
was arguably the best one in Beijing that offered the cuisine of their home 
province. As Stafford (2000a, 2003) notes, collective commensality is an act 
of greeting, sending off and honouring, and a proper avenue for 
expressing familial emotions in the moments of separation and reunion. 
! I observed the same pattern of distraction at the reunions of 
parents and their returning student migrant children. Family members 
were accompanied by aunts, uncles, cousins and friends to receive the 
arriving student, and these relatives often took the main role in the 
conversation and handled the practicalities. An act of commensality 
always followed, a meal with friends and relatives, who kept the 
conversation lively. My own presence also influenced the greetings. When 
I accompanied students on their home visits, I was a guest and was 
greeted accordingly. I often visited homes of students who studied in 
China, but lived in the university dorm or in a different city. In these 
occasions, the attention upon our arrival was directed to me. The parents 
ushered me in without greeting their child. This happened regardless of 
the time since the last meeting between the parents and the student, which 
could be anything from hours to months. But the reunions between 
student migrants and their parents were more marked with public 
displays of emotions and exchange of greetings, and the attention was 
divided between welcoming the guest (myself) and welcoming the child. 
When Lulu and I arrived at the Chengdu airport on Christmas Eve, two 
years after Lulu had left China, we were received by her parents and 
maternal uncle. Lulu ran to hug her parents with tears in her eyes and 
they embraced without an air of awkwardness. After this short moment of 
emotional greetings, Lulu’s parents turned their attention to greeting me. 
Mother put her arm around me and walked me to the car. She then 
insisted on sitting between us, and while continuing a friendly 
conversation with me, held her daughter’s hand. 
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! The behaviour of parents and children in these moments of 
separation and reunion marked the depth of emotions evoked by the 
geographical dispersion. Nevertheless an effort to downplay these 
emotions, thus properly enacting a close parent-child relationship, was 
made. This suggests that the geographical distance was seen as a threat to 
the ideal emotional closeness between the parents and the child, which 
should be so self-evident that the rituals of separation and reunion, as well 
as the strong emotional displays at these moments, threaten their taken-
for-granted nature (Stafford 2000a, 2003). The expression of these 
emotions was not completely restrained, but other people could act as 
welcome distractions to lighten up the atmosphere and to draw attention 
to the public rites between more distance relations. The proper avenue for 
the expression of familial emotion was the sharing of food that always 
preceded separations and followed reunions. The conversation between 
the parents and the child could be sparse at this point, but the food itself 
was always plenty and often ritually passed from the mother to the child. 
In fact, when Lulu came to visit home, her mother took a week of unpaid 
vacation ‘to cook all her favourite dishes’.
Conclusion
! Negotiating distance that is integral to cosmopolitan existence 
becomes part of the family relations of the student migrants. The families 
find ways to maintain ties across the distance and to deal with the 
emotions that the distance evokes. Both the physical and the sociocultural 
distance also influence the familial power dynamics. Many student 
migrants develop some sense of autonomy from both the parental 
authority and the Chinese sociocultural conventions. The cosmopolitan 
orientation enables them to selectively adapt new ideas and norms, or to 
abide to cultural models while retaining a degree of reflexivity. The 
individual’s cosmopolitan mastery over sociocultural fields is nevertheless 
shaped and restricted by the complex intersections of hierarchies that are 
not only familial, but also political and economic. Cosmopolitanism in its 
different forms can thus be as much progressive as regressive, give 
individuals more freedom as much as create new constraints, be the 
driving force behind people’s mobility as much as restrict it. But 
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regardless of their decisions of return, remigration and settlement, the 
cosmopolitan mode of existence is manifested in the skills, competencies 
and the orientation of the student migrants. 
! Recent scholarship has emphasised that also people who are not 
themselves mobile engage in the cosmopolitan flows (Notar 2008). The 
agents of the international education market, the individual student 
migrants and the media bring symbolic goods that promote 
cosmopolitanism, within the reach of those who are not directly 
participating in the flows. These include foreign credentials in the Chinese 
job market, information about overseas study, imported education 
methods and technologies, imageries of the destination countries, etc. In 
the final chapter of this thesis, I tell the story of Hannah, who left her 
village to study in Beijing and soon developed a dream to go abroad. The 
negotiations of familial support and Hannah’s movement between the 
sociocultural fields of the urban middle class and her family’s rural 
background bear some resemblance to the processes the urban student 
migrants go through. But her situation differs from theirs in two 
significant ways. She has two brothers, and her parents rely completely on 
the support of the children upon their retirement. This thesis is a story of 
the Chinese overseas student migration, but in the final chapter, I want to 
draw attention to some interesting things that happen in the sidelines of 
the main flows.  
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6. BEING THE FIRST TO GET RICH
! When I set out to do this research on the familial investment in 
daughters’ overseas education, I did not expect my field site to extend far 
beyond urban space. Given the high cost of overseas study and the 
traditional preference for investing in sons’ education and career, I 
thought that only the daughters of urban single-child families would be 
able to embark on this journey. However, as a testimony to the fuzziness 
of rural-urban borders that are constantly crossed and redefined, the 
reality I encountered soon exposed the limits of my view. For the most 
part of my fieldwork, I ended up living, in fact, with Hannah, a young 
woman of rural background who has two older brothers but is the only 
one in the family to have received higher education. She came to Beijing to 
study in one of the country’s best universities, and now has plans to one 
day study for an MBA in the UK. The practical arrangements, investment, 
conflicts, interests and motivations involved in her project differ 
considerably from those of her urban counterparts. Yet this atypical case, 
perhaps more clearly than any of the others, illuminates the way tensions 
and opportunities unfold amidst the unification of economic and symbolic 
markets (Bourdieu 2007), not only between China and other countries, but 
also between rural and urban China. 
! Chinese society is highly stratified in four aspects relevant to this 
research: family size, economic development, quality of education, and 
welfare services. The divisions are between regions, and between rural 
and urban areas. In spite of the initial plan to implement the one child 
policy in all regions26, strong resistance by the rural population has forced 
later modifications. Due to the various exceptions and alleviations in the 
policy and its considerably more efficient implementation in cities, one 
child in urban families and two to three children, at least one of them a 
boy, in rural ones, have become the norm (Mueggler 2001: 292-98; 
Greenhalgh 1993: 245). Rural resistance to the family planning policies is 
linked to the lower living standards and the lack of social security system 
and economic opportunities in the villages. The gap is further intensified 
26 Among the dominant Han-population, national minorities enjoy preferential 
policies (youhui zhengce) in this aspect.
by differences between regions. Despite the various campaigns to spread 
industry and investment from the coast to the interior, the coastal areas 
have remained the focus of economic development since the opening of 
the Treaty Ports (1842) in the aftermath of the first Opium War. The 
direction of national and especially foreign investment to these areas has 
been further accelerated through the establishment of Special Economic 
Zones since the 1980s (Broadman and Sun 1997; Chen, Chang and Zhang 
1995; Fan 2005) The uneven economic development in China today must 
be seen in the light of the specific conditions at the start of the reform era. 
To enable a rapid recovery of industry, economy and education after the 
turmoil of Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), scarce resources were directed 
to a few key regions, industries, educational institutions, fields of science, 
technology and so forth. This policy was reflected in Deng Xiaoping’s 
slogan ‘Let some people get rich first’ (Rang yibufen ren xian fu qilai). While 
the reform-era government has had some success in poverty alleviation 
and the raising of living standards in the rural areas, the gap between the 
rural and urban areas, as well as between regions, has widened (Piazza 
and Liang 1998; World Bank 2000). The household registration system 
(hukou) determines people’s permanent residency and therefore access to 
services and employment elsewhere, restricting both physical and socio-
economic mobility. 
!  Yet numerous accounts show that the rural and urban worlds are 
far from separate, best exemplified by the presence of an enormous 
temporary rural labour force in Chinese cities.27 Perhaps it thus ought not 
to come as a surprise that despite the apparent obstacles of having to 
spread the already scarce economic resources thin between a number of 
siblings, and the low quality of primary and secondary education, some 
rural students find themselves in a position where higher education 
abroad is within their horizon of strategies. During fieldwork, I came 
across several students like this, and while every person’s story is unique, 
theirs shared some characteristics that set them apart from the main 
population of this research, the urban student migrants and their families. 
The involvement of urban parents in the project of overseas study ranged 
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27 It is impossible to know the exact number of this floating population (liudong 
renkou), but recently it has been estimated that around 211 million people of rural 
registration live and work in the cities. (National Population and Family Planning 
Commission 2010).
from being the prime planners, facilitators and decision makers, to 
providing emotional and/or economic support. But to these students of 
rural background, it was an individual project that they had to pursue at 
times in secret or in conflict with family members’ interests. 
! During the year we lived together I came to know the details of 
Hannah’s situation, and continued to follow its development through 
regular contact. Having been surprised and intrigued by her story, I here 
wish to lay it out in detail to explore the reflexive work of subject 
construction that involves conflict between its different elements. To do 
this, I will first describe Hannah’s journey of becoming an educated 
urbanite with aspirations to enter the national, maybe even the global elite 
through education abroad. I then examine the web of familial obligations 
that she remained a part of, and the way Hannah and her family members 
drew from the discourses of partilineage, patriarchy, the greater filiality of 
daughters, and gender equality, to further their own interests and to 
dodge undesirable claims for support. The painfulness of these 
negotiations brings us back to the point of familial affect, that is enacted 
through, and entangled in, the exchange of care.
Crossing the fuzzy borders
! At the time I met Hannah, she was a 25 year old recent graduate 
who lived and worked in Beijing. Hannah comes from a village in Fujian 
province in the southeast coast of China. Fujian is known as the main 
source of legal and illegal labour migration to Europe, Southeast Asia and 
US, but not all areas within the province are equally involved in 
emigration. There are villages where each household has at least one 
member abroad, while the village next to it might have none. The 
migration networks that channel information and opportunities are 
deeply embedded in the local economies of these migrant sending 
communities, and the ideas of achievement and success are so strongly 
linked to overseas migration that it overrides all prospects arising locally 
(Chin 1999; Pieke et al. 2004; Zhang 2008; Chu 2010). The Longyan 
prefecture at the Western border of Fujian where Hannah’s home village is 
located, is not significantly involved in the international migration 
networks. Instead, temporary labour migration between villages and 
Being the first to get rich
155
urban centres is widespread. Economic opportunities in Fujian are ample 
in comparison to many other provinces. Fujian’s proximity to Taiwan and 
the experimental market reform policies in its various economic and 
technological development zones have stimulated private enterprise, 
foreign investment and international trade in the area. Longyan is the 
main link between Xiamen (one of the five original Special Economic 
Zones) and the inner provinces, as well as being home to significant 
forestry and mining industries. The availability of opportunities does not 
explain why some are taken up and others are not, but it is important to 
note the specific characteristics of the local economy when trying to 
understand why Hannah’s brothers’ education did not take precedence 
over hers. 
! Education is an important route to socioeconomic mobility for 
rural families. The ‘educational desire’, which Kipnis (2011) has called ‘a 
total social phenomenon’ (Mauss 1990 [1925]) in his research area in rural 
Shandong, has greatly increased the value given to the education of 
children in general, including daughters. Among the factors that have 
contributed to the shift toward also valuing daughters’ education, is the 
rural marriage market that currently favours women and their families. 
For them, marriage provides an opportunity for upward social mobility, 
while inflicting a considerable economic burden on the families of sons. In 
addition, as women now marry later than before28, their primary 
attachment to the natal family lasts longer. These changes have to an 
extent changed the perception on the economic value of daughters, and 
education that can lead to a good job and a good marriage can be seen to 
benefit the entire family. Aside from these direct economic considerations, 
the general value and attention given to each child, both sons and 
daughters, has increased with the limitations to family size (Kipnis 2009, 
2011). The emphasis on education in general and of daughters in 
particular varies regionally. In the inland rural regions with little 
investment and industry, high value is given to education, and as the 
parents’ best strategy to old age security is to make sure their sons have 
the means to provide for them in the future, they often choose to support 
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28 Later age for marriage has been promoted by the communist and reform era 
regimes with varying intensity since the 1950 Marriage Law. The current legal 
minima are 20 for women and 22 for men. Women in rural areas tend to marry 
between early and mid 20s.
the education of sons rather than daughters (Obendiek 2011). In Fujian, in 
contrast, and more specifically Longyan, entrepreneurial success stories 
are readily in display, which has downplayed the emphasis on education 
as the favoured route to socioeconomic mobility. Parents do not need to 
fear that supporting the educational aspirations of a female child will 
directly be followed by socioeconomic immobility of other, especially 
male, children. With a range of choices, a child’s individual inclinations 
can play a bigger role in the decision making.
! It is also important to note that choosing to support the education 
of one child, does not necessarily mean that a higher value or importance 
is placed upon this particular child’s endeavours and success. This was 
apparent when we visited Hannah’s family in Fujian. While 
accompanying other students on their hometown visits, I saw parents 
fussing around their returned student and showing a great deal on 
interest in her studies, daily struggles, career and future plans by asking 
concerned questions and voicing their opinions. The behaviour of 
Hannah’s parents was markedly different. There were no discussions of 
her life, studies, work or future plans. When directly asked to give their 
opinions, the parents gave disinterested answers such as: ‘she can do what 
she wants’ or ‘Everyone has their own path, I hope she will do whatever is 
best for her’. These statements seem to indicate a rather detached attitude, 
as if the parents felt that Hannah’s future had only limited connection to 
theirs, and therefore her endeavours had no direct value to them. In a 
situation where parents entirely rely on their children to support them 
after retirement, this is not an insignificant point. While the parents’ 
attitude might have reflected the type of interpersonal communication 
and dynamics in this particular family, it also followed the logic of 
patrilineal family system, where ‘married daughter is like water thrown 
out’ (Jia chuqu de nü’er po chuqu de shui). 
! Whether the parents’ decision to support Hannah through 
university was without any expectation of future benefits to the rest of the 
family, is difficult to say. While they supported Hannah through middle 
school and high school, the loans that covered the considerably higher 
expenses of the university degree29  were paid back by Hannah herself 
after graduation. To my knowledge, her parents made very few requests 
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yuan respectively.
for money after Hannah had finished the back payments. But this should 
not lead us simply to conclude that they did not expect Hannah to share 
the benefits of her education with the family. In China, it is the children’s 
legal30  as well as cultural duty to care for elderly parents and as sons, 
Hannah’s brothers were the main carriers of this responsibility. It was thus 
not so much for the parents, as it was for the brothers to organise the care 
and to negotiate the share each sibling should take on. As detailed later in 
this chapter, Hannah was indeed in frequent conflict with her brothers 
about the type and amount of support she should provide for the rest of 
the family. These conflicts point to two interpretations of the situation: the 
two brothers seeing Hannah’s education as a family investment, and 
Hannah viewing it as her personal project. Both parties somewhat 
acknowledged the reasoning behind the other view, which often made the 
negotiations subtle rather than direct arguments. Ideas of what it means to 
be a daughter and a son, a sister and a brother, a woman and a man, 
underlay these disagreements. 
! Hannah spent her childhood in her mother’s natal village. Her 
parents’ marriage was uxorilocal, not an uncommon arrangement 
between two families of which one lacks a male heir, and the other cannot 
afford bridewealth. After the reforms in the 1980s that decollectivised the 
farmland and eased off mobility restrictions, the family gradually moved 
to the prefectural city of Longyan. Their relocation has not been 
permanent, but involves a back and forth movement between the city and 
the village where they still have a house, allocated farmland and where 
their household is permanently registered. The two brothers have tried 
their hands in several trades, including electrical engineering, 
construction, transport and the restaurant business. After graduating from 
the village middle school, the only training they have had has been on the 
job. Hannah is the youngest child, and the only daughter. She went to the 
village primary school with her brothers, but unlike them, showed great 
interest in study and consistently received high marks. The primary 
school teacher encouraged her to pursue better quality secondary 
education in the city, and she managed to reach the required score level to 
enter a middle school in Longyan. This coincided with the gradual 
migration of family members to the city. Father was already working at 
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the nearby coal mine and mother did housekeeping for the family that 
owned the mining company. The wages from these jobs, as well as the 
money the two brothers were now earning, increased the family income 
and they were able to replace the old family home in the village with a 
new three storey building. In this relatively stable economic situation, the 
family had sufficient funds to cover Hannah’s school fees and board, and 
she was allowed to go. In time, the parents developed a good relationship 
with the family that employed them. Hannah told me that when she was 
in school, the employers always encouraged her, and sometimes gave her 
money. ‘So we just became related like that.’ This relatedness, created 
through exchange, was indicated by the use of kinship terms between the 
two families. The supportive environment and Hannah’s own hard work 
bore result as Hannah was accepted to a key-point academic high school 
(zhongdian gaozhong) and went on to study for the college entrance exam 
(gaokao). She did exceptionally well, and was accepted to study 
international business in one of the country’s most prestigious universities 
in Beijing.
! Meanwhile, however, the family economy had taken a downturn. 
When Hannah was in high school, their new home in the village was 
destroyed in flooding and had to be rebuilt. Moreover, the two brothers 
were now in their mid-20s and had aspirations that required family funds, 
such as starting a small business, buying a motorbike, and most 
importantly, getting married. In this changed situation, Hannah’s parents 
and the brothers were not readily supportive of her plans to go to 
university in the country’s capital, which would involve having to find 
money to cover the 12.000 yuan yearly tuition fee and the monthly living 
expenses of around 800 yuan. At the time the parents’ combined monthly 
income was less than 1000 yuan. Hannah recounted these tensions 
between interests: 
So when I wanted to go to university my brothers didn’t 
support me. Because they thought that if my parents spend so 
much money on me, they will not have money to get married. 
How selfish they are! They only think about themselves! And 
my parents didn’t support me at first. But my [high school] 
teacher was always on my side, and he helped to persuade my 
parents to let me go. Because if you go to university, you have 
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to spend about 60.000 yuan, including the meals. So my 
parents borrowed from other people and now I send them 
money, 1000 yuan almost every month. Maybe after this 
Spring Festival we will not be in debt anymore, and my 
parents will feel happier.
! Hannah’s teachers played an essential mediating role between her 
and her parents. The importance of these relationships became clear to me 
when we spent the Spring Festival 2009 with Hannah’s family in Fujian. 
During this yearly visit, most of our time was spent with Hannah’s 
immediate family or accompanying them on visits to relatives and 
neighbours. There were four marked exceptions to this. One of them was a 
visit to Hannah’s high school class mate, who had left for university in 
Beijing at the same time as her, and just like Hannah, had now returned 
home for the Spring Festival. There were three other meetings she made 
sure to arrange.
! On the first day after our arrival, mother took us to visit the ‘boss’ 
family’, i.e. the owners of the coal mining company. Hannah had stressed 
to me that we had to make time to visit this family during our trip. We 
spent an hour at their home, drinking tea and answering the enthusiastic 
questions about Hannah’s work and life in Beijing, and my impressions of 
China and their hometown. The family was visibly pleased and impressed 
by Hannah’s success, of which they no doubt felt able to take partial credit 
for. The old couple’s grandson who was also present, was ordered to 
practice his English with me. He had been taking private language lessons 
for years in preparation for his planned overseas studies. As the shy 
teenager and I engaged in an awkward conversation, everyone in the 
room listened in silence. As we were leaving, the boy’s mother invited us 
to visit their home, where we talked about education in China and abroad 
with her late into the night. 
! Equal importance was given to meetings with the teachers who 
had supported Hannah’s transfer from the village to better schools in the 
city, and then later to university in Beijing. On the first day of the New 
Year, the two of us visited the headmaster of the village primary school 
and his kindergarden teacher wife, who now also lived in Longyan. Again 
we were enthusiastically received, and enjoyed a cheery wine-fuelled 
evening of talking about Hannah’s life in Beijing and taking in stride the 
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hustle and bustle around me, Hannah’s ‘foreign friend’ (the only 
disappointment being that I was not male). Due to the various 
commitments during this time of the year, Hannah was unable to arrange 
a visit to her high school teacher. The high regard given to this 
relationship by both parties was indicated in the solution to the problem. 
On the morning we left Longyan, the high school teacher came to see us 
off. We met him at the train station where he was already waiting with 
boarding tickets he had bought for us. The Finnish chocolates I had given 
to Hannah’s family as a Spring Festival gift, were given to the teacher. He 
waited for the train with us and proudly told me that he had already had 
one student studying in the US, maybe Hannah would be the next to go 
abroad.   
! Through their higher economic and social status, these people had 
facilitated Hannah’s access to opportunities that were available to very 
few of her background. Her success in turn gave them joy and prestige, as 
well as social capital that could be mobilised in aid of children of friends 
and relatives who wished to follow the same path. These people had had 
confidence in the benefits Hannah would receive through education, now 
valuing her achievements and urging her to pursue them further. This was 
a notably different attitude from that of Hannah’s family members, whose 
everyday life and concerns were quite far removed from those of the 
educated professionals in big cities. 
! Hannah’s parents had not been readily convinced by the benefits 
investment in education would bring. In their view, this was an expensive 
route with no guarantees of success in the end. The stories of graduate 
unemployment and fierce competition had been circulating in the media 
since the 1990s, when the state job assignment system was dismantled and 
the enrolment in higher education drastically expanded (Zweig 2002). 
Coupled with the restructuring of the economy that had resulted in the 
massive lay offs of the 1990s, it had brought increased career uncertainty 
to those in the upper strata of the job market. As Hannah recounts, this 
was also a concern to her parents:
They said, how are you going to find a job, are you going to 
sweep the streets? I said, maybe, but I really want to go, I like 
to study!
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! Finally the parents agreed to support Hannah, and borrowed 
money from friends and relatives to cover the expenses. After the second 
year, Hannah was able to earn enough money to support herself by 
having part-time jobs and working through summers. She remembers 
student life as prudent, much focused on diligent study and work. Unlike 
many other university students, first time away from their parents and 
recently released from the college entrance exam preparation that has 
dominated their teenage years, she did not date, and her social life mainly 
consisted of a few friends who were as serious about their studies as she 
was. After graduation, she landed an excellent job as a Business 
Development Executive at the Beijing office of an Indian company. Her 
initial salary was 4000 yuan, and after eighteen months in the company, it 
was raised to 6000 yuan. For Hannah, this success validated her 
aspirations, and the family’s reluctant support.  
But now my parents are proud of me, I have a very good job 
and I earn a good salary. I can send money home every month. 
I say to my parents, had I not gone to university, my life would 
be so different! I would work in a restaurant. I would be so 
tired, and earn very little, just 700-800 yuan a month! 
New life, new reference group
! After graduation, Hannah’s lifestyle changed. She moved to the 
affluent part of the city that is home to many young professionals, 
foreigners and multinational companies. This was a conscious choice, as 
she explained:
If a client or a business partner invites me for a drink in the 
evening and asks where I live, I have to be able to say that it’s 
somewhere around here. If I say, I live somewhere near the 4th 
or 5th Ring, maybe they will just say: oh that’s too far, forget 
about it. So I pay high rent but I think it’s necessary.
Hannah did not hesitate to spend money on things required to mark her 
status as a young white-collar professional, including a room in a Western 
Being the first to get rich
style apartment with an agreeable address, good quality clothes, 
expensive hair cut, and treating friends and business relations to dinners. 
But her consumption habits still differed greatly from those of other 
informants who were in a similar professional situation, but of an urban 
background. She was extremely careful with money, and knew exactly 
what she spent it on. She did not buy more clothes than was absolutely 
necessary, ate simple and inexpensive food at home, and only used taxis 
on work related trips. Apart from work dinners, she rarely went out, and 
spent her free time at home reading, watching TV or using the internet. 
Her social life consisted of friends whom she had met through work and 
who could help, collaborate or advise her on business related matters. 
Being very attractive and outgoing, she had many suitors, but she was not 
interested in dating unless the man would fit the high standards she held 
for a potential husband. 
! These actions and attitudes seemed to simultaneously 
purposefully link her to a new reference group detached from her 
background, as well as highlighting her continuous attachment to the 
original one. The concept is Oded Stark’s (Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark 
and Taylor 1989) whose theory of the new economics of labour migration 
(NELM) challenged the neoclassical view that migration is based on 
utility-maximising decisions made by rational individuals (Borjas 1989; 
Lee 1966; Ravenstein 1889; Stouffer 1940). Stark argued that migration is 
rather a collective enterprise that also involves non-migrants, forming 
transnational communities that entail both the migrants and their social 
networks in the places of origin. In many instances, the main reference 
group for the migrant, against which they evaluate their achievements 
and troubles, continues to be the community of origin. This view gave 
insight to some phenomena previously troubling migration scholars, such 
as why would a migrant return after having saved enough money to build 
a house and a family tomb, rather than staying abroad to maximise life-
time earnings; or why migrants are willing to endure a degraded status in 
their host communities. To an extent, the NELM concepts can help us 
understand the temporary rural-urban labour migration in China, which 
is often a household strategy to ensure an alternative source of income 
outside the local economy. Hannah’s case differs from temporary labour 
migrants in a sense that through higher education she wished to 
permanently enter a social sphere closed to people of her original 
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reference group, that of the national elite. The process of disengagement 
took place partly through the kind of purposeful action described above, 
and in part through spontaneous engagement with her new social 
environment. This of course is somewhat a simplified description of a 
process that involves complex affects. We will return to these complexities 
when examining the negotiation of obligations with family members, but 
for now, let us elaborate on the way Hannah engaged with the new 
reference group and alienated herself, as well as felt alienated, from the 
original one.
! In Beijing Hannah had few friends of rural background, and 
during our numerous conversations about her suitors, she proclaimed 
strong disdain for the qualities that she linked to a village background: ‘he 
is very crude, not gentle at all’, ‘he always thinks about money’, ‘the 
people from his home region are not very clean’. These evaluations were 
of young men who similarly to her had migrated from the countryside to 
Beijing, graduated from universities, and now had successful careers. In 
her own interactions with people, Hannah usually kept her village 
background a secret. She also told me that during her yearly visits back 
home, she had felt alienated from her former classmates and friends. Their 
life experiences seemed far removed from hers, which rendered common 
topics of conversation few and brought about conflicts. For example, she 
told me about two high school class mates, who had subsequently 
married each other, despite the obvious lack of romantic love between 
them, and about a friend who was now completely focused on the well-
being and education of her young child, rather than thinking about her 
own education and career. Hannah had criticised these choices, which had 
led to arguments and ill-feeling. She now seldom contacted friends who 
remained in Longyan and did not arrange to meet them during our trip. 
Instead, we visited the high school classmate who had embarked on the 
same route as her, now living and working in Beijing.
! Hannah’s lifestyle was very much geared towards realising the life 
plan, the dream, she had developed after moving to the capital. After 
graduation, she was to work for some years to save money. Within five 
years or so, she would have sufficient funds to do an MBA degree in the 
UK. Eventually, she would run her own, successful business in China and 
start a charity that would focus on programmes to help the disadvantaged 
rural Chinese. Her determination to realise this dream was observable in 
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many aspects of daily life from the way she spent her time and money, to 
the friends she chose. Apart from furthering her career, learning new skills 
and developing relations that would be of use in realising her goals, she 
had little time and interest for anything else.
! Hannah earned a monthly salary of 4000 yuan, and a yearly Spring 
Festival bonus of several thousand yuan. More than half of the salary was 
spent on rent and bills. With careful spending habits, she could limit her 
other expenses to around 500-1000 yuan per month. This meant moderate, 
but steady monthly savings. Considering that just the yearly tuition fees 
for an MBA in the UK currently range between 160.000 and 370.000 yuan, 
saving up such a sum would of course be a hopeless cause. Hannah’s plan 
thus was that after working for a few years to save starting capital, to gain 
experience and to build guanxi, she would quickly start her own business, 
which would enable higher earnings. But before any of this, her first 
obligation was to pay back the loans taken for her education. By the 
Spring Festival 2009, she had done this. Soon after, she got a pay rise, now 
earning 6000 yuan per month. I noticed a subtle change in Hannah’s 
attitude towards money. She became less prudent in her lifestyle, starting 
to buy more business clothes, taking driving lessons and flute classes. At 
the same time, she was constantly developing ideas for starting her own 
business and negotiating with potential partners. Hannah now seemed to 
feel that having fulfilled her obligation towards parents, she was free to 
focus on pursuing her own career and educational aspirations. It became 
clear very quickly that this idea was not shared by her brothers.
In the web of care
! As Stafford (2000b) has argued, Chinese relatedness is very much 
tied to cycles of exchange. The idea that it is not patrilineage but exchange 
that is at the core of Chinese kinship, helps us understand how the urban 
daughter-only families can reformulate ideas of filial obligation and 
gender roles. Hannah’s family, however, is not one of them. They have 
two sons who, according to the principles of patrilineal kinship, patrilocal 
residence and Confucian filial piety, have the responsibility to continue 
the family line and care for the parents. What Stafford’s approach offers, is 
not merely an acknowledgement of the fluidity and processual nature of 
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relatedness, but insight into how different kinds of relationships are 
connected to each other, and how they become mobilised differently in 
specific contexts. For the latter part of this chapter, I aim to show how 
Hannah is still very much connected to the cycle, or rather a web, of the 
exchange of care (yang) in her family, and how she, her brothers and 
parents use the various discourses drawing from both older and newer 
symbolic resources, to advance their interests. 
! In her PhD thesis about siblinghood and support in rural 
Northwest China, Helena Obendiek (2011) shows that labour migrant 
siblings often support one sibling through higher education. Upon 
graduation the flow of support is reversed. In his description of how 
Hannah’s education had been funded, Big brother clearly portrayed a 
common family effort by saying how hard they had all had to work to get 
enough money together and later pay off the loans. Another indication of 
the brothers feeling that Hannah was indebted to not only the parents, but 
to the brothers, became apparent during negotiations about father’s 
retirement. On the first night of the new year, Hannah, her brothers and 
father sat down around the table for a discussion. During the following 
hours, father mostly sat quiet, while Hannah and the brothers negotiated 
the matter. Mother listened while continuing her housework. As this 
conversation was in local dialect, largely unintelligible to me, the 
following account heavily relies on Hannah’s later explanation.
! Hannah and the brothers wanted their father to retire from his job 
at the coal mine, because it was tiring and forced him to live at the 
workplace only to return home at weekends. During the previous year his 
health had become an added concern as the pollution around the mine 
had given him a bad cough. There were two issues to resolve. In the 
absence of any pension scheme, financial support had to be arranged. 
When mother had retired from her housekeeping job in the previous year, 
she had started working at Big brother’s restaurant and lived with him on 
the second floor of the restaurant. Similar arrangement would be needed 
for father. Second brother was now a foreman at a construction company, 
and it was agreed that father would work as his assistant for a monthly 
wage of 1000 yuan. He would stay with Second brother, his wife and 
young daughter at their rented apartment. The second issue was the 
money still owed to friends and relatives for Hannah’s education and the 
weddings of the brothers. Father had refused to retire until the loans were 
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paid off. Of the 5000 yuan still left, Hannah suggested that she would pay 
3000, and the brothers 1000 each. The brothers were reluctant to agree, 
saying that they did not have money. I understood that they wanted 
Hannah to cover the whole sum. After a heated discussion Big brother 
gave in but Second brother still resisted. He did not want to take on a 
share of the payment, insisting that they should ‘pay together’. I took this 
to mean that he wanted Hannah to help him pay his share. The plan was 
left open, as neither one of them could push the other to agree. When 
going to bed later, Hannah was angry, but also implied that there was not 
much she could do about it, other than pay the Second brother’s share if 
he continued to resist. Second brother did not clearly state why Hannah 
should pay his share, nor did Hannah give me a reason why she accepted 
that she had no means to force him and might end up paying his share. 
Both thought that they had some grounds for their claims, and took the 
indirect strategy of refusing to comply. Enquiring about the matter some 
weeks later, I found out that Second brother had paid his share.
! When directly asked, both brothers claimed that Hannah’s 
education did not have any direct benefit to them, other than being proud 
of their sister. In practice, they often asked Hannah for money or other 
help through her guanxi. The requests ranged from relatively small sums 
of money to be spent on Big brother’s second wedding or medicine for the 
parents, to investing in a car that the brothers could turn into a transport 
business, and to arranging a loan of 50.000 yuan for Second brother’s 
project of buying land and building a house. After Hannah’s graduation, 
the brothers started to expect this kind of help from her.
AK: How did your brothers get the money to get married?
Hannah: When Big brother got married, my parents had to 
borrow money from others. And then only one year later, he 
divorced! And then, last June, when Second brother got 
married, I had already graduated, so I gave him 2000 yuan. 
And when his wife had a baby, I gave another 1000 yuan. At 
the time he said he will pay me back later, but then he got 
angry with me and said that he treated me like a sister, but I 
don’t treat him like a brother!
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! Both Hannah and her brothers claimed, when directly asked, that 
Hannah had the sole right to decide how to use her money. On several 
occasions, Hannah also said that once the loans for her education would 
have been paid off, she would be free. This view did neither stop the 
money requests from coming, nor the implicit acknowledgement from all 
three of them that the brothers’ claims were not entirely ungrounded. 
Hannah agonised over their requests for loans precisely because she knew 
that they would not be willing or able to pay back, and as their sister, she 
would just ‘have to stay silent’. She would thus try, though not always 
successfully, to choose and limit the kind of causes she gave money for. 
! Obendiek (2011) further notes that as sons bear the main 
responsibility of providing for parents, sisters’ investment in brothers’ 
education or careers can be seen as part of paying off the parental debt of 
care (yang). Until now, any surplus income had gone into paying back the 
family loans. The loans now cleared, Hannah was not the only one with 
ideas for new projects. Brothers brought up their plan to set up a small 
transport business. In the lack of capital to invest, they needed Hannah to 
participate. Her reluctance, as she explained to me, was due to her distrust 
in their ability to turn the business into a success. Brothers also started 
talking about buying a house in the city, asking Hannah to join the 
investment. Hannah in turn had waited for this moment in a hope that she 
would now gain freedom to pursue her own goals. In her recurrent 
narrative, this idea was backed with the notion of filial piety based on 
patrilineality. When first describing her family to me, she explained:
In China, parents think that a girl is going to get married and 
go away, but the sons will always stay with them. They live 
together and take care of them. The daughters, when they go 
to visit, maybe have to buy some clothes for the parents, or 
give some money. But not all the time, the sons will give all the 
time. But if there is only a daughter and no sons, in this case 
the daughter should take care of the family.
Hannah here makes a clear distinction between the roles of sons and 
daughters and repeated it on several occasions by saying that after the 
clearance of debts, her help to the parents would be situational. Her 
narrative does not acknowledge that the unification of economic and 
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symbolic markets that had brought within her reach the kind of 
opportunities formerly unavailable to rural women, might also have 
caused her family to expect a stronger supporting role than what was 
demanded from daughters before. Hannah made her attitude clear to the 
family after the debts had been paid. Responding to the brothers’ 
suggestion of joint investments, she revealed her plans of going abroad to 
study. She also said that she had other plans, such as getting a driver’s 
licence, that she would need money for. Falling back on the patrilineal 
discourse, she reasoned that as she will marry into another family and not 
return to Longyan, these joint projects will not bring her any benefit. The 
brothers could not argue with this and gave up trying to persuade her. To 
her parents, Hannah said that if they ever needed money for food or 
clothes, they should ask her, thus specifying the form of support she 
would provide. She also said to her mother that if the brothers ever 
neglected their moral and legal duties of caring for the parents, Hannah 
and the parents would sue them. 
! When explaining to me why there were now many young women 
getting overseas education and having successful careers, and more 
specifically, why her parents had supported her education, Hannah 
employed the discourses of the greater filiality of  daughters and gender 
equality. In contrast to drawing from traditional ideas, she now 
emphasised the change in Chinese society and people’s thinking.
!
One reason is that China is now much more developed than 
before. So we can have a good life now, not so poor anymore. 
Before people used to think that sons were better, especially if 
they lived in the village. Sons will work with them and take 
care of them, because they live in the same house. Daughters 
will marry and live with other people, maybe in the same 
village or nearby. But now people are not so poor anymore, 
very few people stay in the villages and most move to cities. 
So they don’t worry so much anymore. And also their thinking 
has changed. Maybe they’ve seen that some sons don’t take 
such good care of their parents. And their daughter takes good 
care. Because the daughter loves her parents more. The sons 
are always thinking that they have to marry, or they have their 
own families, get pressure like that. So maybe the daughter 
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doesn’t visit so often, just once a year, but will always give 
them more money. They know that when they get old, their 
daughter will also give them money and take care of them. So 
maybe parents still like a son, but they also think, a daughter 
is acceptable. 
And the one child policy has had a big effect on people’s 
thinking. Because if you have just one child, you don’t have 
the choice of thinking, we want a son. So people focus more on 
success now. When people chat, they’re always talking whose 
daughter is very rich and like that. If someone has many sons 
but they’re all poor, no-one will mention it. So when people 
have a daughter, they want her to get a good education, and in 
the future they hope she will be successful, and then she will 
also give them money. So it’s money oriented, not so much 
about if it’s a son or a daughter. Maybe it’s not always so 
good, but society is like this. Maybe there are some people in 
the villages, very few people, who think a son is better, but 
most people think that son and daughter are just the same.
! A membership in not only a patrilineal family, but in a web of 
reciprocal exchanges translates into various obligations toward kin and 
family members that extend well beyond the simplistic view of the lineage 
paradigm, of sons returning the care received from parents directly (their 
wives largely performing it in practice), and daughters transferring it to 
their in-laws. Yet drawing on this precise logic, Hannah managed to 
negotiate some freedom and control over her resources. She acquired 
these resources through the new kind of opportunities that have become 
available to a few rural women through the unification of symbolic and 
economic markets. But the limits of this freedom were never far. Although 
the idea of joint investments had been buried, brothers kept asking for 
Hannah’s help in various other matters. Most of the time she would give 
in and send money, while continuing to complain and resist indirectly. For 
example, she did not tell the family about her pay rise. Accepting that 
some support from her was expected and justified, Hannah tried to retain 
some control over the form it would take. One of her future plans was to 
buy a house in Longyan, which her parents, brothers and their wives and 
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children could share. This way, she explained, her brothers could take 
better care of the parents.  
In the web of affect
! What complicates the familial negotiations further, are the strong 
emotions entangled in the affective attachments. It has long been 
established that decisions about migration, investment, or any other 
activity for that matter, are not made on the basis of rational evaluation of 
some objective reality, even though deliberate calculation does form a part 
of the process. It would also do crude injustice to the informants’ 
experiences to portray them merely as strategising with whatever 
resources and cultural models are available. Hannah’s dilemma of 
situating herself in the family’s web of exchange seemed to be first and 
foremost emotional. Its painfulness was reflected in the interactions 
during our visit. Distressed, she told me about an incident when she had 
jokingly suggested to her mother that it was much better to have a 
daughter than a son because a daughter would give her money and take 
good care of her. But daughters are far away, sons will always stay by 
your side, her mother had replied, leaving Hannah feeling unappreciated 
and adding to the bitterness she was already feeling towards her family 
over their lack of support and appreciation. On our last night in Fujian she 
aired these feelings in an argument with her parents and Big brother. She 
said that her family was always thinking about money, only contacting 
her when they needed something, that her brothers had not supported her 
and that her parents did not care about her wellbeing. The discussion was 
mainly between Hannah and Big brother, mother and father listening in 
silence. As the local dialect was used, my understanding was again 
limited. In the aftermath, however, expressions of remorse were clear. At 
the end of the night Big brother said that perhaps he had not been a good 
brother, and needed to correct this mistake. Mother told Hannah not to 
worry too much about her harsh words before. Later that evening Hannah 
had a long conversation with her parents, during which she promised 
them that if the two brothers did not have money to pay off their share of 
the debt, she would pay. The next morning Big brother took great care in 
providing us with snacks and drinks for the long train journey ahead, and 
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when I was left alone with him for a moment at the station, he asked me 
to look after Hannah in Beijing, as they were all worried about her health 
and about the fact that she had no one there to take care of her.
! In conjunction with the idea described in the previous section, of 
how daughters have become more appreciated in the recent years, 
Hannah sometimes portrayed herself as the favourite child in her 
narratives. When discussing the arguments about money, she conclusively 
responded to my questions by saying that it was not really money that 
was causing the arguments, but her brothers were always angry with her 
because their parents loved her the most. She also related childhood 
stories of how she was favoured by her parents, such as by being given 
the best part of the fish to eat. Apart from the emotional value of this 
narrative, it helped to explain her parents’ exceptional support to her as a 
daughter. The importance of this narrative to Hannah was all the more 
visible in the distress she expressed on occasions when her family’s 
actions and attitudes seemed to contradict it.
! Finally, despite Hannah’s strong determination to make the most 
of the opportunities she had been given, the affective attachment with her 
family was too meaningful for her to ignore. Numerous times she 
expressed sadness over not experiencing the kind of warmth with her 
family members that she thought families should share. After the 
argument during our visit, everyone seemed to be making an effort to 
show more concern. Her brothers and parents now telephoned more 
often, and in general Hannah said that there was less tension and more 
warmth in the relations. For her own part, she started to use explanations 
such as ‘money is not the most important thing’, ‘I want my family to be 
close’, and ‘we all have to take care of each other’ when I asked why she 
had once again agreed to send money for some purpose. During one of 
our conversations about her ageing parents she said that she would 
always make sure that her brothers would be able to take good care of 
them. I asked if she would still support her brothers once her parents had 
passed away. Yes, she responded, because money is not the most 
important thing and she needs a warm family. So if the brothers have 
some problems, as their sister she will always support them.
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Conclusion
! The idea of letting some people get rich first is followed by an 
assumption that the rest will soon follow. When this slogan was brought 
up by informants in different contexts, it was usually followed by an 
explanation that it is the responsibility of those who get rich, to use their 
wealth to help others still waiting their turn. Also Hannah shared this 
idea. When talking about her hopes for future success, she often stressed 
that all this would not be for herself, but for the benefit of the motherland 
and the fellow Chinese, especially the most disadvantaged who shared the 
same background with her. But first she had to get into the position to 
help others. What this position would be, and the specific methods and 
targets of her help were all clearly planned. But people around her held 
other ideas. To her family, they were the disadvantaged and Hannah was 
already in the position to offer support. The reforms in educational 
policies, economy and migration controls had facilitated Hannah’s 
physical and social mobility. As she came to share the social field of the 
urban single-child students, she started to harbour the dream very 
common amongst them, going abroad to study. But in contrast to them, 
hers was an individual ambition, not a family project.
! It is very possible that Hannah’s dream of going abroad to study 
will never realise. Her pursuit of cosmopolitan subjectivity mainly relies 
on the cosmopolitan encounters in China, which include talking to her 
foreign flatmates, dating foreign men, passing through airports, watching 
news reports and films, and reading about the experiences of student 
migrants on the internet discussion forums. In spite of staying put, she 
actively engages in the cosmopolitan flows. What is more, her domestic 
student migration resembles in many ways the international student 
migration of the urban ‘onlies’, involving similar processes of shifting 
position in the power hierarchies and the reflexive work of trying to 
resolve the caring, the desiring and the enterprising elements of 
subjectivity. Hannah has in her disposal many of the same symbolic 
resources as the urban student migrants. Like them, she uses of the 
discourses of patrilineage, gender equality, and the filiality of daughters in 
the negotiations. To her, however, the challenge of balancing the desiring, 
the enterprising and the caring parts of subjectivity is greater because of 
the economic gap within her family, and the actual financial dependency 
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of the parents. The obligation to succeed is central to the filiality of urban 
singletons, whose parents do not need their actual financial support. 
Hannah shares their ideal of the enterprising individual, but her success is 
held back by the actual obligations of care she has toward her family. 
Material care and emotional attachments are entangled together in the 
constitution of family relations. Even when Hannah could argue with the 
patrilineal logic to evade filial obligations, the emotional costs and 
rewards kept her tied to these exchanges. 
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CONCLUSIONS
! Many sociocultural, political and economic factors can be 
identified that give the student migration flow its shape and make it 
specifically Chinese. Sons and daughters go in equal numbers and rely 
heavily on the support of their parents. The majority of them study 
subjects that can offer opportunities in the Chinese economy on its route 
from manufacture to innovation, as well as in the global market. The 
experience of the student migrants is shaped by orientations that I have 
termed care, enterprising and desire, and the tensions that arise between 
them. These orientations are based on the Chinese cultural and structural 
context, which comes to the level of lived experience through the 
enactment of affect. The familial gender models are present in the way 
male students articulate their concerns in terms of the filial obligation to 
succeed, and in the way women dream about dating and marrying 
foreigners. 
! From an early age, both daughters and sons of urban single-child 
families learn that they have to study diligently and to ‘improve 
themselves’ to compete with their peers. They learn that education is the 
key to a secure and wealthy future and compete for the access into best 
schools in China and abroad. To their parents, they are the ‘great 
treasure’ (dabao); pampered, tutored, supervised and sponsored to make 
the most of their potential. They are encouraged to cultivate nengli 
(ability), i.e. to be enterprising. What differentiates them from their parents, 
is the sense of individual entitlement they feel. Just as their parents, they 
believe they must work hard to succeed, but their main strive for success 
is not to keep the family (including parents and future offspring) out of 
poverty and improving the family’s position, i.e. care. It is the individual 
desire to be and to have. This can take the form of studying a subject that is 
interesting, challenging or offers good career prospects; of self-expression 
through consumption habits and romantic and sexual relations; and of 
cultivation of a cosmopolitan identity. Their cosmopolitanism is rooted in 
the reform era economic and political developments and sanctioned by 
the state, it is fuelled by the virtual and imaginary travel, and it is realised 
through participation in the flows of the international education market. 
Contradictions are inherent in the cosmopolitan pursuit, as it encompasses 
the skills, competencies and connections the Chinese state seeks to benefit 
from, the standardised education that yields profits to institutions and 
brokers, and the orientation that becomes part of the student migrants’ 
mode of existence, as they become attached and reattached to multiple 
spatial and sociocultural fields. 
! This much is true for both women and men student migrants. In 
the light of my research, there is no doubt about it: the only child, be it a 
son or a daughter, is pushed towards educational success. This is of course 
linked to the fact that there is no competition between siblings over family 
resources. Also important is the changing notion of filiality, as the urban 
parents are becoming less dependent on their child’s material care in old 
age. Coupled with the symbolic change that undermines the patrilineage 
and its institutions, and centres on the individual, the parent-child 
relationship has become more mediated by reciprocity and emotional 
attachment than patrilineal obligation. This gives a basis for alternative 
models for familial attachments, which can be drawn from situationally. 
Successful daughters who ‘love their parents more’ can be just as reliable 
as sons to provide care in old age. What is more, they will not inflict such 
a financial burden on their parents when they marry. The strength of 
patrilineage as an ethical discourse can also be employed for both, 
progressive and regressive claims. For daughters, it can give more 
freedom to pursue their individual interests and goals while still falling 
back on parental support. For sons it can give a sense of privilege and 
status, but at the same time, it carries the burden of greater obligation.   
! The idealisation of independence that is so central to the 
cosmopolitan subjectivity, and the actual reliance on the parents results in 
conflicts. At the same time, the exchanges between parents and children 
reproduce family ties across distances. If exchange is in the core of 
Chinese kinship, then the parents’ interferences on the pursuit of 
independence via money, practical care, advice, arguments, opinions, etc. 
do not merely reflect a conflict between old values and new social 
practices, but in fact uphold the core value of Chinese kinship. The 
continuity of this core value is seen for example in the necessity of gaining 
the parents’ approval for marriage, a practice that otherwise may seem at 
odds with the current emphasis on individualism, romantic love and 
desire. 
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! In the experience of the young student migrants, these models of 
what it is to be a son and a daughter participating in the familial cycle of 
support are tightly linked to the roles of a wife, a husband, a mother and a 
father they will soon take up. The three markets that are the locus of the 
majority of their concerns, desires and worries, are interconnected. That is, 
the education, job and marriage markets. The interconnections include the 
ideals of hypergamy and the gendered division of labour in which the 
husband provides much of the material support and the wife much of the 
reproductive support for the family. These models for what men and 
women do, are in line with the models of what they are; through 
appropriate social roles they fulfil their essential gender identities. The 
way cultural models for kinship and gender intersect the markets for 
education, job and marriage, has very real consequences to the female 
student migrants. They, along with their parents, worry that if they are too 
successful, they will not be able to find a ‘good husband’ who would fit 
their high standards and be willing to marry them. They are also pushed 
towards less demanding and risky fields in education and the job market 
by social pressure and discrimination. Those who enter the male 
dominated fields are exposed to their discriminative practices and 
attitudes.
! What of the cosmopolitan pursuit?  The high value parents now 
place on daughters in general, and on their education in particular, as well 
as the ideas of gender equality, romantic love and nengli, give some tools 
to individuals to challenge the gendered expectations and limitations. 
These are available to all daughters of urban single-child families. The 
student migrants also have their cosmopolitan resources to draw from. 
They can, and do, challenge their roles in four ways. First, through their 
personal experiences of adaptation and alienation, they are at the forefront 
of the unification of symbolic markets, in which ideas are introduced, 
circulated, devalued and revalued. Second, their cosmopolitan 
connections, skills and competencies can widen their field of 
opportunities, for example by opening access to the job and marriage 
markets of different countries. Third, through their spatial mobility, their 
positioning in various hierarchies (e.g., generation, gender, nationality, 
race) shift and sometimes a relative autonomy from power systems that 
formerly dominated their experience, follows. What is more, this shift can 
result in a permanent sense of autonomy, that remains even with return 
Conclusions
177
and re-migration. Many women returnees felt that through the experience 
of migration, they became more independent, aggressive and daring to 
challenge the gendered social norms. Through their cosmopolitan 
orientation, a mode of relating to sociocultural fields, they challenged the 
existing gender models.
! In the unification of symbolic markets, symbolic universes that 
were formerly separate become part of the same framework. The 
coexistence of the ideas of partilineage, value of daughters, filial piety, 
individual success, good match, romantic love and sex detached from the 
goal of marriage, is characteristic of the experience of the current urban 
youth in China. It broadens the notion of what is possible for the student 
migrants, but at the same time, creates tensions. It would be a mistake to 
assume that the student migrants are always in a position to manipulate 
the various ideas and resources to their benefit. As in the case of the Béarn 
bachelors (Bourdieu 2007), some become trapped in the symbolic 
transformation.
! In the summer 2013 I received an email from Hannah. She was 
visiting her family to say goodbyes before going away. Had she managed 
to save enough money to go abroad to study? No. She was on her way to 
Guangzhou, to apprentice at a Buddhist temple, to live in seclusion for at 
least four years and to devote herself to the study of Buddhism. She was 
forfeiting her business career and had no interest in marriage or having a 
baby, she wrote. This was shocking news. Among all the aspiring, current 
and returned student migrants I had got to know during this research, 
Hannah had been remarkable in her ambition and determination. She 
wanted to succeed, become rich, marry well and educate outstanding 
children, and almost everything she did was geared toward realising these 
goals. After some reflection, however, her decision started to seem quite 
understandable. Over the years Hannah had continued to struggle to get 
ahead in her career. She changed companies several times, as she did not 
feel that she was given enough opportunities to develop and to move 
forward. Meanwhile, she worked relentlessly to find the right connections 
and resources to start her own business, which would be her gateway 
abroad. After several fallen through deals, she became discouraged and 
often bemoaned the difficulties she had as a young woman to get ahead in 
a male-dominated business. Meanwhile, the demands for support from 
her family never ceased. In 2010, Big brother had a car accident, which left 
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the family 300.000 yuan in dept. Borrowing the money and dealing with 
the lenders fell on Hannah. ‘I hope good luck will come to me soon, so I 
can earn more money to help my family’, she wrote to me at the time. I 
cannot say if these difficulties were the main reason why Hannah decided 
to leave her career and to devote herself to Buddhism, but there is no 
doubt that she felt the burden of these pressures heavy. The women’s 
changing position and the new educational opportunities enabled Hannah 
to leave her village and to become an educated urbanite. She skilfully 
used the old and the new symbolic resources in the market to her benefit. 
But at the same time, just like the Béarn bachelors, she was partly caught 
up in this transformation, as due to her familial obligations and the male 
dominance still prevalent in her field of business, she constantly struggled 
to get ahead. 
! Apart from losing interest in a career in business, Hannah also lost 
interest in marrying and having a child. She had never had a shortage of 
suitors. Every year she received several marriage proposals. ‘I have been 
proposed by four men this year, I turned them all down. I turned one of 
them down this afternoon’, she wrote to me in 2011. She put her 
reluctance to date and to marry down to the lack of high quality 
candidates. Doubtless it was difficult to find a man who would match her 
ambition, diligence and determination. But Hannah was also aware of the 
potential of marriage and motherhood to limit the freedom to pursue her 
very detailed plans for future. She refused several suitors on the grounds 
that their current situation and future plans did not fit together with hers. 
In addition, she was critical of her friends who after becoming mothers 
had shifted their focus from their own career to the future of their child.
! To my young informants, marriage was not only about making a 
commitment to another person, it was about starting a family. Because of 
this, marrying before graduating was out of the question. Moreover, to be 
ready to marry meant being ready to have a baby, which required certain 
financial stability and job security. But there was still more to it. Early on I 
noted the disinterest my young female informants had in talking about 
the prospect of motherhood. ‘I’m too young to think about that’, or ‘I 
haven’t thought about it’ were common answers if I asked whether they 
would like to have a child in the future. This was somewhat surprising 
because at the same time, these women enjoyed making plans and 
fantasising about their future studies, career and marriage. Motherhood 
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was mainly talked about in the context of acknowledging the sacrifices the 
generation of their own mothers had been willing to make for their 
children, or talking about the stress, hard work and financial burden 
bringing up a child in contemporary China would involve. Becoming a 
‘tiger mother‘, devoted to raising and educating outstanding children, was 
not a particularly appealing prospect to the young women in this study. 
None of my informants explicitly stated that they did not want to have 
children in the future, but it was not something they viewed with 
excitement and anticipation comparable to overseas study, building a 
career, dating and getting married. 
! The father-son nexus has lost its centrality in the urban Chinese 
family, but the centre stage has been taken by the only child rather than 
the conjugal couple. In the child-centred family, the core value is not the 
continuity of the lineage nor the pure relationship (Giddens 1992) between 
wife and husband. It it the nurturance of the child. The current student 
migrants belong to the first generation who must make the transition from 
being the centre of the family to being the nurturing and the sacrificing 
parent. This has different implications for men and women. In the role of 
the parent, both are expected to put the well-being and the future of their 
child before their personal interests. The difference is that a father’s 
contribution is more in line with his upbringing as the only child, than the 
mother’s. Both daughters and sons have been raised to pursue individual 
success and self-development, but when they reach parenthood, it is the 
mothers who are expected to put their career on the side to take care of 
and to educate their child. The main contribution a father can make, in 
contrast, is through his personal career success. 
! We are yet to see what kind of parents the current generation of 
highly educated cosmopolitans will become. Most likely they will not 
simply follow the model of the sacrificing parent of the previous 
generation. Each student migrant will have to repeatedly resolve in her or 
his personal experience the questions of how to be a mother and a father, a 
daughter and a son, a wife and a husband, in the midst of the 
transformation of the gendered familial models. 
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Glossary
Ai ! 爱! love
Bang dakuan! 傍⼤大款! to live off a rich man
Baoernai ! 包⼆二奶! to keep a mistress
Baoyang ! 包养! to keep a mistress
Benke wenping! 本科⽂文凭! undergraduate diploma
Boshi xuewei! 博⼠士学位! PhD degree
Bu kaifang ! 不开放! not open-minded
Chudeng jiaoyu! 初等教育! primary education
Chudeng xuexiao! 初等学校! primary school
Chuji zhongdeng! 初级中等! junior secondary (education)
Daxue! ⼤大学! university
Duanqi zhiye daxue! 短期职业⼤大学! short-cycle vocational college
Fada guojia ! 发达国家! developed countries
Gaodeng jiaoyu! ⾼高等教育! higher education
Gaoji zhongdeng! ⾼高级中等! senior secondary (education)
Gaokao ! ⾼高考! university entrance examination
Gaozhong ! ⾼高中! senior secondary school
Guanxi! 关系! connections
Guanxin ! 关⼼心! caring, concerned
Hukou ! 户⼜⼝口! registered residence
Jiandan ! 简单! simple
Jishu daxue! 技术⼤大学 ! technical college
Jishu xuexiao! 技术学校! technical school
Kaifang ! 开放! open (open-minded)
Kaoyan! 考研! entrance exam (postgraduate)
Langman de ! 浪漫的! romantic
Laorenyuan ! ⽼老⼈人院! elderly care home
Liudong renkou ! 流动⼈人⼜⼝口! floating population
Nengli ! 能⼒力! ability
Putong xuexiao! 普通学校! Regular school
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Quanli! 权⼒力! power, authority
Rencai ! ⼈人才! human talent, talented person
Tuo kuan shiye ! 拓宽视野! broadening of vision
Shengnü! 剩⼥女! leftover women
Shuoshi xuewei! 硕⼠士学位! Master’s degree
Wenhua! ⽂文化! culture, civilisation
Wenming ! ⽂文明! civilisation, civilised
Xiandaihua ! 现代化! modernisation
Xueqian jiaoyu! 学前教育! pre-school education
Xueshi xuewei! 学⼠士学位! Bachelor’s degree
Yang   ! 养! care, raise, support
You’eryuan! 幼⼉儿园! pre-school/kindergarden
Youhui zhengce! 优惠政策! preferential policies
Youxiu! 优秀! outstanding, excellent
Yuanzhu jiaoji ! 援助交际! compensated dating
Zhiye daxue! 职业⼤大学 ! vocational college
Zhiye xuexiao! 职业学校! vocational school
Zhongdeng jiaoyu! 中等教育! secondary education 
Zhongdian ! 重点! key-point (education institution)
Zhuanke wenping! 专科⽂文凭! vocational diploma 
Zhuanye daxue! 专业⼤大学 ! specialised college
Zhuanye xuexiao! 专业学校! specialised school
Zi fei ! ⾃自费! self-sponsored
PHRASES AND PROVERBS
Jia chuqu de nü’er po chuqu de shui; 家出去的⼥女⼉儿; ‘Married daughter is 
like water thrown out’
Jia ji sui ji, jia gou sui gou; 嫁鸡随鸡嫁狗随; ‘You marry a chicken, you 
follow the chicken, marry a dog, follow the dog’
Liang tian tui zoulu; 两条腿⾛走路; ‘Walk on two legs’
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Sangaonü: xueli gao shouru gao zhiwei gao de nü; 三⾼高⼥女：学历⾼高收⼊入⾼高
职位⾼高的⼥女; ‘A woman of three highs: high education, high salary, and 
high professional status’
Rang yibufen ren xian fu qilai; 让⼀一部分⼈人先富起来; ‘Let some people get 
rich first’
Wang zi cheng long, wang nü cheng feng; 望⼦子成龙往⼥女成凤; ‘Everyone 
wants their son to become a dragon and their daughter to become a 
phoenix’
Zhichi liuxue, guli hui guo, lai qu ziyou; ⽀支持留学⿎鼓励回国来去⾃自由; 
‘Support overseas study, encourage people to return, give freedom to 
come and go’
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Appendix 1
NOTES ON THE SURVEY STUDIES
! The survey questionnaire included questions about the following 
themes: family background, education background, overseas studies, 
dating and marriage. I tested the survey questionnaire by sending it to 10 
students I knew personally, and modified the questions on the basis of 
their comments. I also discussed the categorisation used in some of the 
questions with Huang Jianbo, Associate Professor of Anthropology at the 
School of Sociology and Population Studies, the Renmin University of 
China.
Survey at the Renmin University of China
! In 2009 Renmin university had 21278 Chinese students. I handed 
out 1716 survey questionnaires and got 427 valid responses, which gives a 
response rate of 25%. The campus had 48 dormitories for Chinese 
students. These were all single sex, and were mostly designated for either 
undergraduate or graduate students. I selected a number of dormitories 
for each of these categories (female undergraduates, female graduates, 
male undergraduates, male graduates), that roughly corresponded with 
their proportion in the student body. At first I left the survey 
questionnaires at the receptions of the dormitory, with a note about the 
research and a return box for the forms. A week later I found that this 
method had brought very few responses. I then stood at the lobby of each 
dormitory during meal times when students go to the canteens to eat, 
handing out forms, explaining my research and asking students to fill in 
the forms and return them to the box. I had two assistants to help me with 
the task. This yielded a much higher response rate.
! One of the survey questions was: do you have plans to go abroad 
to study, to which students responded either ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘not sure’. For 
the purposes of this thesis, I have only used the data from the student 
group that had plans to go abroad, comprising roughly half of the 
respondents to this survey, as detailed here:
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TOTAL! 427
Male ! ! 175! 41%
Female!! 252! 59%
YES! ! 175
Male! ! 81! 46%
Female!! 94! 54%
NO! ! 171
Male! ! 66! 37%
Female!! 105! 42%!
NOT SURE! 81
Male! ! 28! 16%
Female!! 53! 21%
Survey at the London School of Economics
! For the survey among the Chinese students at the London School 
of Economics, the Data Management Unit sent out my email and a link to 
the online survey to the students domiciled from China (excluding 
Taiwan, Macao and Hong Kong). The total number of these students was 
926, and I got 203 responses, giving the response rate of 22%. The 
proportion of female and male respondents correlated with their 
proportion in the Chinese student population at the LSE: 21% of the 
respondents were male (n: 42, from the total of 278 male Chinese students 
at the LSE); 79% of them were female (n:161 from the total of 648).
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Appendix 2
NOTES ON THE ESDS AND HESA STATISTICS
! These statistics include undergraduate and postgraduate students 
in the UK who are domiciled from China (excluding students domiciled 
from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao). The statistics for 1980, 1985 and 
1990 are from the UK Data Archive (Economic and Social Data Service). 
The statistics for 1995, 2000 and 2010 are from the Higher Education 
Statistics Agency (HESA). The population used for published counts of 
students changed in 2000/01. From 1994/95 to 1999/00 published figures 
counted student enrolments as at 1st December of the academic year. 
From 2000/01 students are counted regardless of whether they are active 
on 1st December of the reporting period. To aid comparability, the 1st 
December population has been used for all years from 1995 onwards.
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